PepeToken $PEPE

Risks (3)

• HighDeployer sold 93.1% of their tokensinsidersDeterministic

  The deployer wallet has sold 93.1% of the tokens it received — the creator is cashing out.

  Evidence

  • on-chaindeployerSoldPct = 93.0568

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumTop wallet holds ~12% and the top 10 hold ~35% of supplyholdersAI

  The ten largest holders, excluding pools and burn, hold about 35% of supply. The largest single wallet holds 11.92%. Two clusters of wallets funded by the same funder hold 2.77% and 1.51%. Wallets with very low transaction counts hold 4.85%. If big holders sell, the price can drop sharply. This is a market risk, not a contract power. The material does not identify who controls these wallets.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintop10Pct 35.1409; top holder 0xF977814e90dA44bFA03b6295A0616a897441aceC 11.9239%
  • on-chaincluster funder 0x73af3bcf944a6559933396c1577b257e2054d935 wallets pctSupplyHeldNow 2.7688
  • on-chainfreshWalletsPct 4.8521

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• LowWallets blacklisted before the renounce stay frozen foreverblacklistAI

  Every transfer still requires that neither the sender nor the receiver is in the blacklists mapping. No new address can be added, because the owner is renounced. Any address the deployer blacklisted during the roughly 6 hours before renouncing can never send or receive PEPE, and no one can remove it. The material does not show which addresses, if any, are blacklisted. Ordinary holders are not affected.

  Evidence

  • codePepeToken.sol:L617
    Show source

    require(!blacklists[to] && !blacklists[from], "Blacklisted");

  • on-chainownerHistory: owner set at block 17046105, renounced at block 17047934

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

Positive signals (5)

• PositiveOwnership renounced, so admin functions are permanently disabledownershipAI

  All privileged functions (blacklist, setRule, transferOwnership, renounceOwnership) use the standard OpenZeppelin onlyOwner check against owner(). The deployer renounced ownership to the zero address about 6 hours after deployment. No one can send a transaction from the zero address, so these functions can never be called again. The source has no second admin variable or hidden owner path, and the contract is not a proxy, so the code cannot be swapped.

  Evidence

  • on-chainowner() returns 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 (renounced)
  • tx0x91c9a6ca…c528f252
    Show source

    0xfbfeaf0da0f2fde5c66df570133ae35f3eb58c9a→0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 (block 17047934

  • codePepeToken.sol:L72-L75
    Show source

    modifier onlyOwner() {
            require(owner() == _msgSender(), "Ownable: caller is not the owner");
            _;
        }

  • codePepeToken.sol:L601-L610
    Show source

    function blacklist(address _address, bool _isBlacklisting) external onlyOwner {
            blacklists[_address] = _isBlacklisting;
        }
    
        function setRule(bool _limited, address _uniswapV2Pair, uint256 _maxHoldingAmount, uint256 _minHoldingAmount) external onlyOwner {
            limited = _limited;
            uniswapV2Pair = _uniswapV2Pair;
            maxHoldingAmount = _maxHoldingAmount;
            minHoldingAmount = _minHoldingAmount;
        }

  • on-chainisProxy: false
  • on-chainowner() = null; ownerRenounced = true
    Show source

    owner: null, ownerRenounced: true

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveFixed supply: no one can mint new tokensmintAI

  Tokens are created only once, in the constructor, which mints the full supply to the deployer. No external function calls _mint. The only way supply changes is burn(), which lets a holder destroy their own tokens. It cannot touch anyone else's balance.

  Evidence

  • codePepeToken.sol:L597-L599
    Show source

    constructor(uint256 _totalSupply) ERC20("Pepe", "PEPE") {
            _mint(msg.sender, _totalSupply);
        }

  • codePepeToken.sol:L629-L632
    Show source

    function burn(uint256 value) external {
            _burn(msg.sender, value);
        }
    }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveNo buy, sell or transfer tax, and simulated sells workfeesAI

  The transfer hook only checks the blacklist, whether trading has started, and the holding limits. It contains no fee logic. The pair address is set and limited is false, so the start-trading gate and the holding limits do not apply. A fork simulation bought and sold at 0% token tax. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and selling one hour later still worked.

  Evidence

  • codePepeToken.sol:L612-L627
    Show source

    function _beforeTokenTransfer(
            address from,
            address to,
            uint256 amount
        ) override internal virtual {
            require(!blacklists[to] && !blacklists[from], "Blacklisted");
    
            if (uniswapV2Pair == address(0)) {
                require(from == owner() || to == owner(), "trading is not started");
                return;
            }
    
            if (limited && from == uniswapV2Pair) {
                require(super.balanceOf(to) + amount <= maxHoldingAmount && super.balanceOf(to) + amount >= minHoldingAmount, "Forbid");
            }

  • forkbuyTaxPct 0, sellTaxPct 0, transferTaxPct 0, canSell true
    Show source

    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell

  • on-chainparams: limited=false, uniswapV2Pair=0xA43fe16908251ee70EF74718545e4FE6C5cCEc9f

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveMain v2 LP tokens are stuck in the token contract and can't be pulledliquidityAI

  99.3745% of the LP tokens of the main PEPE/WETH v2 pool are held by the PEPE token contract itself. The token contract has no function that can transfer, rescue or withdraw tokens it holds. That liquidity (about $31.7M) is therefore effectively permanently locked. This is not a formal locker lock, but no one can pull it.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v2 0xA43fe16908…: LP tokens other holders: 0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933 [contract — possibly a locker/launchpad] 99.3745%
  • on-chainliquidity uniswap-v2 pool 0xA43fe16908251ee70EF74718545e4FE6C5cCEc9f liquidityUsd 31700892
  • on-chainabiFunctions (no withdraw/rescue function present)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveVerified Pepe X account was created before the token launchsocialAI

  The account others tag as the project (@pepecoineth) was created on 2023-04-04, about ten days before the contract was deployed on 2023-04-14. It is verified, has a large follower count, and recent posts are ordinary $PEPE meme posts with real engagement, not a newly bought shell. Team identity is still not doxxed in the bio.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/pepecoineth/status/2116195847788769596
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    periodt $PEPE

  • on-chaindeployedAt = 2023-04-14T14:51:35.000Z
    Show source

    PepeToken PEPE deployed 2023-04-14; X profile pepecoineth createdAt 2023-04-04T16:17:07.000Z, verified, followers 732201, bio "$PEPE. The most memeable memecoin in existence."

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

Notes (2)

• InfoNo launch snipers or bundles; deployer wallets now hold nothinginsidersAI

  The deployer holds 0% now. A partial transfer-history scan estimates it sold about 93% of what it had. The one insider wallet the deployer funded also holds 0%. No sniper or bundle activity was detected in the launch window. The team cannot dump further supply from these known wallets, though the sell estimate is based on incomplete history.

  Evidence

  • on-chainDeployer 0xfbfeaf0da0f2fde5c66df570133ae35f3eb58c9a holds 0% now
  • on-chaindeployerSoldPct 93.0568 (computed from partial transfer history)
  • on-chaininsiders: 0x92fb5b4f8030103e0b11275c30965d1897ff23e5 fundedBy deployer, pctSupplyHeldNow 0; snipers pctSupplyHeldNow 0; bundles []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• InfoNo prior rugs by the deployer founddeployer-historyAI

  The deployer history supplied for 0xfbfE…8c9A is empty. Searches for the contract address did not return third-party posts calling this specific contract a scam, rug, or honeypot.

  Evidence

  • on-chaindeployer = 0xfbfEaF0DA0F2fdE5c66dF570133aE35f3eB58c9A; deployerHistory = []
    Show source

    deployerHistory: []

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5