flaunch.gg

Risks (2)

• LowETH exits via the hook depend on the unreviewed flETH contractotherAI

  Swapping flETH back to ETH calls flETH.withdraw(amount), and the hook then pays out the ETH that flETH returned. If the flETH contract (0x0000…0130) can be paused, upgraded, or fails to hold enough ETH backing, then flETH-to-ETH swaps through this hook would revert. flETH holders would then be unable to exit to ETH this way. The flETH token's source, owner and upgradeability were not provided, so this risk cannot be confirmed or ruled out. It is a dependency, not proof of wrongdoing.

  Evidence

  • codeflETHHooks.sol:L43-L45
    Show source

    } else {
                flETH.withdraw(amount);
            }

  • codeflETHHooks.sol:L49-L50
    Show source

    if (Currency.unwrap(output) == address(0)) {
                poolManager.settle{value: amount}();

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• InfoProject check: no contract address foundotherDeterministic

  PROJECT CHECK: no token address was found on X or on the website. The website and the X account were checked, and the 1 contract(s) the website names as its own (hooks, vaults…) were audited as components. The token part is NOT assessed. Reply with the token address for a full on-chain check.

  Evidence

  • webX thread, profile, pinned tweet, recent posts and website searched for a contract address

  Confirmed by: facts

Positive signals (2)

• PositiveVerified X account links to the site and names a verified parent labsocialAI

  The public X account @flaunchgg is verified, links to https://flaunch.gg, and says the product is built by @FlayerLabs. That parent account is also verified and says it builds @flaunchgg. Account dates line up with the site's first Wayback snapshot (Aug 2024 vs X created Sep 2024). This is a named, ongoing launchpad presence, not an anonymous one-off token account. No contract was in scope, so this does not say anything about a specific coin's safety.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://flaunch.gg/
    Show source

    Programmable economies across chains

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• PositiveNamed swap hook has no owner or admin functionsownershipAI

  The function table lists only Uniswap v4 callbacks and unlockCallback. beforeSwap and unlockCallback can only be called by the PoolManager. The other callbacks are base-hook stubs, and their permission bits are not set, so the PoolManager never calls them. The function table shows no setter, pause, withdraw/rescue or upgrade function. The PoolManager and flETH addresses are immutable and fixed at deployment. The hook permissions are fixed by the hook address. Nobody can change fees, redirect swaps or block users through this hook. Caveat: the owner field is reported as unknown, and the full FLHooks base source was not shown, so this rests on the function table.

  Evidence

  • codeflETHHooks.sol:L16
    Show source

    IFLETH public immutable flETH;

  • on-chainpoolManager = 0x8366a39CC670B4001A1121B8F6A443A643e40951 (settable by immutable (set at deploy))
  • on-chainflETH = 0x00000000043C1117DAFA3A3D0C7148Eb48B30130 (settable by immutable (set at deploy))
  • staticfunction table: unlockCallback(bytes) [poolManager [msg.sender == address(poolManager)]]

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

Notes (2)

• InfoHomepage shows almost no docs or team detailswebsiteAI

  The live homepage only shows a short tagline and a self-link. A docs URL could not be fetched. Team identity is only claimed on X (FlayerLabs), not on the page text we could read. That is thin public documentation, not proof of a scam.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://flaunch.gg/
    Show source

    Programmable economies across chains

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5

• InfoHook only converts ETH and flETH 1:1 with no feeotherAI

  The only contract the website names is a Uniswap v4 hook on Robinhood Chain. Its custom code does two things. First, it lets a pool use the hook only if the pool is exactly native ETH / flETH (any other pair reverts with InvalidTokenPair). Second, when someone swaps, it takes the input from the PoolManager, wraps ETH into flETH (deposit) or unwraps flETH into ETH (withdraw), and settles exactly the same amount of the other currency back. The swapper gets 1:1. The hook adds no fee, and no amount is kept by the hook or sent to an owner. Its address enables beforeSwap and beforeSwapReturnDelta, so it replaces the normal pool swap with this conversion. That is the documented design of a wrapper hook, not hidden skimming.

  Evidence

  • codeflETHHooks.sol:L30-L34
    Show source

    function _validatePair(PoolKey memory key) internal view override {
            if (Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) != address(0) || Currency.unwrap(key.currency1) != address(flETH)) {
                revert InvalidTokenPair();
            }
        }

  • codeflETHHooks.sol:L39-L55
    Show source

    function _swap(Currency input, Currency output, uint amount) internal override {
            // Convert inputCurrency to outputCurrency
            if (Currency.unwrap(input) == address(0)) {
                flETH.deposit{value: amount}(0);
            } else {
                flETH.withdraw(amount);
            }
    
            // Settle the output currency
            poolManager.sync(output);
            if (Currency.unwrap(output) == address(0)) {
                poolManager.settle{value: amount}();
            } else {
                flETH.transfer(address(poolManager), amount);
                poolManager.settle();

  • staticfunction table: beforeSwap @FLHooks.sol:L85-L102 [poolManager only]
    Show source

    poolManager.take(inputCurrency,address(this),amount)

  • on-chainhook permissions (from address bits) = beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5