Veil $VEIL

Risks (9)

• HighPool liquidity is neither burned nor lockedliquidityDeterministic

  Only 0% of the Orca Whirlpool pool's LP is burned or locked. Whoever holds the LP tokens can withdraw the liquidity ("rug pull") at any time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool 6Vua6T9dK3Yjeubdj65hJrA3dNume4T8QdH1R8BG3cLz (Orca Whirlpool): lpBurnedPct=0, lpLockedPct=0
  • on-chain[pools] Orca Whirlpool 6Vua6T9dK3Yjeubdj65hJrA3dNume4T8QdH1R8BG3cLz: 2 live positions; top 2 cover 100% of position liquidity — burned 0%, locked 0%, deployer 0%
  • on-chain[pools] Meteora DLMM 2LhZHygydAYPBoxxhW95mEvN1yndL1JpoScakULSxgWo: 13 live positions; top 13 cover 100% of position liquidity — burned 0%, locked 0%, deployer 0%

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• HighOne funder's 13 wallets bundled 84% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  13 wallets funded by the same address a77herqtfn1hllpvz9pctu66fetm8bveoakbbmoz4rir bought 84% of the supply together (block 456154323). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder a77herqtfn1hllpvz9pctu66fetm8bveoakbbmoz4rir: 13 wallets, pctSupply 83.99

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighLaunch sniped: 50 wallets took 86.8% of supply in 10 seconds (25 slots)snipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 50 wallets bought 86.8% of the supply within 10 seconds (25 slots). A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0.06% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=25, wallets=50, pctSupplyBought=86.7901, pctSupplyHeldNow=0.0597
  • on-chainbundles[0] block 456154323 commonFunder A77HErqtfN1hLLpvZ9pCtu66FEtM8BveoaKbbMoZ4RiR pctSupply 83.9866
  • on-chainLaunch slot 456154323; sniper window 25 slots (≈10s at 400 ms/slot); 50 buys by 50 wallets in window
  • on-chainsnipers.pctSupplyBought = 86.7901, snipers.pctSupplyHeldNow = 0.0597

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• MediumCreator's funder also funded wallets in the launch bundleinsidersAI

  The deployer E2XHr7cxVsLwruEprbzZzPjv765KCbWGunLBZsdmCaLn was first funded by BmFdpraQhkiDQE6SnfG5omcA1VwzqfXrwtNYBwWTymy6. That same funder funded 4Rj5rSDAit2hUpuR7j1eUf2fmnbKc4n2YDHA2rB3wcPP and 7kT1F3P9GjUszvsEkL3aDKQ8ojj5JWP3iZfBYwidDNqo, both in the creation-slot bundle. It also funded 4Cp6CWaSepsc7nA8xHFxQ9Zi9yPjKzHux1xfrSJZhStj, which still holds 0.8683%. The creator's own wallet shows 0% dev buy and never held tokens, but this link suggests the creator side bought through other wallets. A shared funder could also be an exchange or a bot, so this is a signal, not proof.

  Evidence

  • on-chainDeployer was first funded by BmFdpraQhkiDQE6SnfG5omcA1VwzqfXrwtNYBwWTymy6
  • on-chainclusters funder BmFdpraQhkiDQE6SnfG5omcA1VwzqfXrwtNYBwWTymy6 wallets 4Cp6CWaSepsc7nA8xHFxQ9Zi9yPjKzHux1xfrSJZhStj, 4Rj5rSDAit2hUpuR7j1eUf2fmnbKc4n2YDHA2rB3wcPP, 7kT1F3P9GjUszvsEkL3aDKQ8ojj5JWP3iZfBYwidDNqo pctSupplyHeldNow 0.8683
  • on-chainCommon funders may be exchanges / bots funding many unrelated wallets — clusters are a signal, not proof

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• MediumVeil privacy program upgradeable by an unnamed 2-of-2 multisigwebsiteAI

  The $VEIL mint itself has no owner, but money shielded in the Veil app sits in a separate Solana program. Veil's own pages say a 2-of-2 Squads multisig is both admin and upgrade authority, can pause exits for about 3 days, and can change those rules by upgrading the program. No named people are tied to that multisig, so anyone who shields funds is trusting two unknown keys, not an immutable contract.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://app.veilit.xyz/launch
    Show source

    The admin and upgrade authority is a 2-of-2 Squads multisig (). It can pause and set limits, but no instruction lets anyone move a note without its owner's proof.

  • webhttps://app.veilit.xyz/compliance
    Show source

    The same multisig controls program upgrades, so it could change these rules through an upgrade; upgrades are announced in advance.

  • on-chainowner() = null; ownerRenounced = true
    Show source

    Token mint owner is null and marked renounced; that does not cover the separate Veil program.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• MediumClaimed 98/100 ContractWolf audit not shown on linked pageclaims-mismatchAI

  The site and @veilzk say the program is live and audited by ContractWolf at 98/100, Diamond tier, with every finding fixed. Opening the audit URL they link returned only a generic ContractWolf title and no Veil report, score, or date. Treat the audit claim as unverified until the partner page actually shows it. Their launch page also says a verifiable build is still next, so the deployed program cannot be checked against an audit from the material we have.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://veilit.xyz/
    Show source

    Live · audited

  • webhttps://veilit.xyz/
    Show source

    Audited ContractWolf · 98/100

  • webhttps://contractwolf.io/projects/veil
    Show source

    Blockchain security and Smart Contract Audits

  • Xhttps://x.com/veilzk/status/2117483364672549040
    Show source

    Veil just reached Diamond tier with our audit partner @contractwolf_io. ... 98/100 audit score

  • webhttps://app.veilit.xyz/launch
    Show source

    Next: a verifiable build of the program.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• Lowpump.fun platform multisig can upgrade or pause PumpSwap tradingproxy-upgradeAI

  The token itself has no admin. Trading, however, runs through the pump.fun launchpad and PumpSwap AMM programs. A Squads v4 multisig (7gZufwwAo17y5kg8FMyJy2phgpvv9RSdzWtdXiWHjFr8) can replace the code of both programs, and neither has an OtterSec-verified build. The PumpSwap admin can also call 'disable', which can turn off buy, sell, deposit and withdraw platform-wide. It can call 'update_fee_config' to change LP, protocol and creator fees, and 'admin_set_coin_creator' to change who receives creator fees. This is platform-level trust in pump.fun shared by every token on it, not a VEIL-specific control.

  Evidence

  • on-chainupgrade authority 7gZufwwAo17y5kg8FMyJy2phgpvv9RSdzWtdXiWHjFr8: multisig (Squads v4 multisig vault (PDA))
  • on-chainOtterSec: On chain program not verified
  • on-chainix disable(disable_create_pool: bool, disable_deposit: bool, disable_withdraw: bool, disable_buy: bool, disable_sell: bool) signers=[admin] risk=medium — requires privileged signer admin
  • on-chainix update_fee_config(lp_fee_basis_points: u64, protocol_fee_basis_points: u64, protocol_fee_recipients: [pubkey;8], coin_creator_fee_basis_points: u64, admin_set_coin_creator_authority: pubkey) signers=[admin] risk=high — requires privileged signer admin; name matches sensitive action (update_)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7

• LowZK privacy product claims unverifiable; domain only weeks oldclaims-mismatchAI

  The metadata and website describe Veil as a zero-knowledge privacy layer for Solana wallets. The token itself is a plain pump.fun memecoin mint, and no Veil privacy program appears in the facts. The domain was registered on 2026-10-03, nine days before the token launched. Whether the product exists and works could not be verified.

  Evidence

  • on-chainmetadata offchain description
    Show source

    Leveraging zero-knowledge (ZK) technology and privacy-preserving infrastructure, Veil enables users to shield transactions

  • webhttps://veilit.xyz/
    Show source

    Veil: Your privacy layer

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-10-03T10:36:34.000Z

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• LowOfficial X account was hijacked once in OctobersocialAI

  @veilzk posted that the account was taken over on 29 Oct 2026, an unauthorized post went out, and access was recovered. A hijacked official account can post fake links or asks for seeds. They warned users to use only their own sites and said they will not DM first, but the takeover already happened once.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/veilzk/status/2115660644922106158
    Show source

    Earlier today, the @veilzk account was briefly compromised. ... The unauthorized post was deleted within moments.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

Positive signals (5)

• PositiveMint and freeze authority revoked: fixed supply, no freezingmintAI

  Nobody can create new VEIL tokens; the supply is fixed at 947,030,204.726079. Nobody can freeze a holder's token account to stop them selling. These are the two most common Solana token-level rug levers, and both are switched off permanently.

  Evidence

  • on-chainmintAuthority = null (revoked)
  • on-chainfreezeAuthority = null (revoked)
  • on-chainsupply
    Show source

    947030204726079 (947,030,204.726079)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveNo risky Token-2022 extensions; metadata cannot be changedotherAI

  The token uses Token-2022, but the only extensions are metadataPointer and tokenMetadata. There is no permanent delegate, transfer hook, transfer fee, default-frozen state or pause. The update authority and the metadata pointer authority are both none, so the name, symbol and logo cannot be changed later.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken-2022 extension metadataPointer risk=info authority=null — metadata at HgTGdc29D5bDMrDvsCLnorxz899VyDj7ZN7FPa6vpump; pointer authority none
  • on-chaintoken-2022 extension tokenMetadata risk=info authority=null — "Veil" (VEIL); update authority none (immutable)
  • on-chainAUTHORITY update = null (revoked)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveSell simulation works with 0% tax and ~2% round-trip costhoneypotAI

  A Jupiter buy-then-sell quote through the PumpSwap pool lost 2.03%. That covers price impact plus normal pool and protocol fees; buy tax and sell tax are both 0. A read-only sell simulation from a real holder wallet succeeded. Nothing indicates the token blocks sales.

  Evidence

  • forksell quote: 16449800798 tokens → 0.097970906 SOL; round-trip loss 2.03% (price impact 2.04%, LP/protocol fees and Token-2022 fees included)
  • forksimulateTransaction: SELL of 16449800798 raw tokens by existing holder 3aUGcPbJ7crRfjYtR4mRxcESPjVqYJWoKPTx7MZK9W7K succeeds (read-only simulation, not signed/sent)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveMain PumpSwap pool LP is 100% burnedliquidityAI

  The token completed its pump.fun bonding curve and migrated to the canonical PumpSwap pool. That pool was created by the pump.fun pool-authority PDA and holds about $75,008 of liquidity. All of its LP tokens were burned, so neither the creator nor anyone else can withdraw this liquidity.

  Evidence

  • on-chain[pools] PumpSwap 4MWjp1aBQqE9Y6iC5cd3NrVvWWcHsN2LgpjWYMDK7u7E: LP minted 4193388283319, LP mint supply now 0 → 100% burned
  • on-chain[pools] PumpSwap pool 4MWjp1aBQqE9Y6iC5cd3NrVvWWcHsN2LgpjWYMDK7u7E is the canonical pump.fun migration pool (created by pump.fun pool-authority PDA)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• PositiveX account, site and token launch timeline is consistentsocialAI

  The X account, domain, and first Wayback snapshot all start 3–4 Oct 2026, the privacy app claims a 4 Oct mainnet launch, and the $VEIL mint was created 12 Oct 2026. Posts in the account are about Veil, not an older unrelated project, so this does not look like a bought dormant account. The account is verified, with about 4.1k followers and modest likes (tens to low hundreds), not a huge bot-like follower spike.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://veilit.xyz/
  • Xhttps://x.com/veilzk/status/2115459721952124935
    Show source

    We brought privacy in one click to @solana

  • on-chaindeployedAt=2026-10-12T19:01:21.000Z
    Show source

    Mint HgTGdc29D5bDMrDvsCLnorxz899VyDj7ZN7FPa6vpump deployed 2026-10-12; deployerHistory empty.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5

Notes (4)

• InfoBroad holder base: 9,105 holders, top 10 hold about 15%holdersAI

  There are 9,105 holders. The top 10 wallets, including the main pool's 6.963%, hold 15.16%; the largest non-pool wallet holds about 2.8%. The deployer holds 0%. Fresh wallets (created within 72 h of launch) among the top holders account for 9.676% of supply.

  Evidence

  • on-chainholdersCount 9105, top10Pct 15.1561
  • on-chainDeployer E2XHr7cxVsLwruEprbzZzPjv765KCbWGunLBZsdmCaLn holds 0% now
  • on-chainfreshWalletsPct 9.676

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• InfoCreator wallet has launched no other tokensdeployer-historyAI

  A scan of the creator's full history (173 transactions) found only this one mint. There is no record of earlier launches or rugs from this wallet. That does not rule out the same people having used other wallets.

  Evidence

  • on-chaindeployerHistory: scanned the creator's 173 most recent successful txs (full history); found 1 mint(s) created, 0 other than this one

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• InfoEx-Monero team claim names no onesocialAI

  The site says Veil was built by former Monero CLI and GUI contributors, but it never names them or links proof. That pedigree cannot be checked. It is not evidence of a rug by itself; it is an unverifiable identity claim.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://app.veilit.xyz/launch
    Show source

    Veil is developed by ex CLI and GUI team members at Monero.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• Info'Scam' replies on X are price complaints, not rug evidencesocialAI

  Replies calling $VEIL a scam are mostly angry holders citing the price drop or a delayed burn, plus one rival account comparing it to $OMNI. None of those posts show a drain, a frozen mint, or a prior rug by this deployer. On-chain basics given here show mint owner renounced, no deployer history, 9,105 holders, and the top 10 holding about 15%.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/JuanJimnez48173/status/2118117356517965907
    Show source

    Why this piece of shit token is going down more and more,fucking tired of holding this fucking scam shit

  • Xhttps://x.com/90210maryjane/status/2118124402491466037
    Show source

    @veilzk has discarded their “tech” and seems to be on its way to zero from 20M ath.

  • on-chainownerRenounced=true; deployerHistory=[]; holdersCount=9105; top10Pct=15.1561
    Show source

    Mint owner renounced; no prior deployer tokens listed; holder concentration is not extreme.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5