bytejury.exe $BYTE

Risks (4)

• HighMint is promoted by an account the official site doesn't namesocialAI

  The website, GitHub, and security page point to @bytejury and an EVM contract, not this Solana mint. A second verified account, @ByteJuryExe, uses the same display name and copied the official launch wording, swapping in “Solana Chain” and this pump.fun address. Buying this mint does not buy the token that account lists. Mentions of the copy are follow-back pump replies, not project discussion.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://bytejury.site/security
    Show source

    Please report vulnerabilities privately by direct message to @bytejury on X

  • webhttps://github.com/bytejury-exe
    Show source

    @bytejury on X

  • Xhttps://x.com/bytejury/status/2118103902726082568
    Show source

    $BYTE is live on Robinhood Chain.
    
    Cybersecurity audits by AI agents.
    Potential exploits. Hidden permissions. Evidence behind every finding.
    
    Audit before you ape.
    Claims lie. Code doesn't.
    
    CA: 0xa4e331ed89db2fae193c6c4216dd99aded105471

  • Xhttps://x.com/ByteJuryExe/status/2118612111203226046
    Show source

    $BYTE is live on Solana Chain. Cybersecurity audits by AI agents. Potential exploits. Hidden permissions. Evidence behind every finding. Audit before you ape. Claims lie. Code doesn't. CA: FDhzy4TT2f6KraTQZPbeKksLjPVLSau2g5wKbikEpump

  • Xhttps://x.com/4CCCD/status/2118591987611992466
    Show source

    @ByteJuryExe Follow back 🔙 Let's Pump it 🚀👀

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• HighProject site doesn't list this mint and says $BYTE is 'soon'claims-mismatchAI

  bytejury.site’s own checks list @bytejuryexe as a site+X project with no contract or token, while that account is telling people this Solana address is live $BYTE. The same pages still label $BYTE as “soon” and never publish this mint. Treat the Solana post as unconfirmed by the site.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://bytejury.site/checks
    Show source

    @bytejuryexe Project (site + X) n/a 50 Unknown No contract or token found; only a new, verified X account with no posts and no website was checked.

  • webhttps://bytejury.site/
    Show source

    $BYTE
    soon

  • Xhttps://x.com/ByteJuryExe/status/2118612111203226046
    Show source

    $BYTE is live on Solana Chain. Cybersecurity audits by AI agents. Potential exploits. Hidden permissions. Evidence behind every finding. Audit before you ape. Claims lie. Code doesn't. CA: FDhzy4TT2f6KraTQZPbeKksLjPVLSau2g5wKbikEpump

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• Lowpump.fun program is upgradeable by multisig, build unverifiedproxy-upgradeAI

  The launchpad program that holds the curve liquidity can be upgraded by a Squads v4 multisig. Its build is not verified by OtterSec. The pump.fun admin can also change global curve parameters, fees and creator settings (e.g. set_params, admin_cto). This is platform-level trust shared by all pump.fun tokens, not something this token's creator controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainupgrade authority 7gZufwwAo17y5kg8FMyJy2phgpvv9RSdzWtdXiWHjFr8: multisig (Squads v4 multisig vault (PDA))
  • on-chainOtterSec: On chain program not verified
  • on-chainix set_params(... fee_basis_points: u64, withdraw_authority: pubkey, ...) signers=[authority] risk=high

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowBrand posts disagree on whether fees are fully or half burnedclaims-mismatchAI

  The brand account told holders that 100% of $BYTE paid for Pro audits is burned, then elsewhere said half is burned and half goes to the treasury. The site matches the split, not the 100% post. Anyone buying a token because “all fees burn” is relying on a contradicted claim. This is about the stated utility, not a power in the Solana mint.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/bytejury/status/2118311961054052361
    Show source

    Pro Audits will be paid in $BYTE, with 100% of the tokens used for payments being burned.

  • Xhttps://x.com/bytejury/status/2118117436935303575
    Show source

    1,000 $BYTE per audit. Half is burned on-chain, half goes to the treasury, and the report stays public for everyone.

  • webhttps://bytejury.site/security
    Show source

    Calls requestScan(chain, address) on ScanPayments. Half the payment is burned, half goes to the treasury.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (4)

• PositiveMint and freeze authority revoked: supply fixed, no freezingmintAI

  No one can create new BYTE tokens, so the supply is fixed at 1,000,000,000. No one can freeze a holder's token account to stop them selling. This is the standard pump.fun setup.

  Evidence

  • on-chainmintAuthority = null (revoked)
  • on-chainfreezeAuthority = null (revoked)
  • on-chainsupply = 1000000000000000 (1,000,000,000), decimals 6
  • on-chainowner = null; ownerRenounced = true
    Show source

    target FDhzy4TT2f6KraTQZPbeKksLjPVLSau2g5wKbikEpump owner null ownerRenounced true

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMetadata immutable and no risky Token-2022 extensionsotherAI

  The mint uses Token-2022 but only has the metadataPointer and tokenMetadata extensions, and neither has an authority. It has no permanent delegate, no transfer hook, no transfer fee and no default-frozen state. The name, symbol and links cannot be changed later.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken-2022 extension metadataPointer authority=null — pointer authority none
  • on-chaintoken-2022 extension tokenMetadata authority=null — "bytejury.exe" (BYTE); update authority none (immutable)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveSelling works in simulation with no token taxhoneypotAI

  A buy and sell quote round-trip succeeded. A read-only sell simulated from an existing holder also succeeded. The 7.89% round-trip loss comes from price impact and pool/protocol fees on a very thin curve, not from a token tax.

  Evidence

  • forksell quote: 2611919821075 tokens → 0.092110283 SOL; round-trip loss 7.89% (price impact 8.05%, LP/protocol fees and Token-2022 fees included)
  • forksimulateTransaction: SELL of 129311766784 raw tokens by existing holder 4fNBKqJ7YUgwpshNvVnP9hpCEnTKzr22XqYGPx3NBPFL succeeds

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveNo snipers or bundles at launch; small, unsold dev stakesnipersAI

  No buys were seen in the first 25 slots and no bundles were detected. The deployer bought 0.94% at launch, holds 1.45% now and has sold nothing. The largest non-curve holder holds 2.17%. This is the creator's only mint in its full transaction history, so there are no earlier launches to check.

  Evidence

  • on-chainLaunch slot 466031633; sniper window 25 slots (≈10s at 400 ms/slot); 0 buys by 0 wallets in window
  • on-chainDeployer BpuNdd7mYrKhmi7c4FtUnuGEGUVrxtNH9u91BiA9Hiq1 holds 1.4542% now
  • on-chaindeployerHistory: scanned the creator's 54 most recent successful txs (full history); found 1 mint(s) created, 0 other than this one

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (4)

• LowCurve is priced in NVDAx, adding routing slippageotherAI

  The bonding curve's quote asset is NVDAx (mint Xsc9qvGR1efVDFGLrVsmkzv3qi45LTBjeUKSPmx9qEh), not SOL. Buying with SOL is routed through extra venues (TesseraV → GoonFi V2), which adds slippage. Holders are also exposed to the NVDAx token itself. The issuer controls on NVDAx (freeze, etc.) were not part of these facts and are unverified.

  Evidence

  • on-chainPOOL pump.fun bonding curve EzXxUXcatTVmyrMcNmptaGQFpKYxJvuh7PyE67Pjb5zZ quote=NVDAx
  • forkdex: jupiter (TesseraV → GoonFi V2 → Pump.fun)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowToken is minutes old with only 5 holdersholdersAI

  The token was minted minutes before this scan and has only 5 holders. Distribution metrics can change quickly. The deployer wallet counts as a fresh wallet.

  Evidence

  • on-chainholdersCount = 5
  • on-chaincreatedAt=2026-11-06T07:50:56.000Z
  • on-chainfreshWalletsPct = 1.4542

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowWebsite is hours old and its audit demo could not be confirmedwebsiteAI

  The website domain was created about 2 hours before the token. It links to contracts on a different chain (Robinhood Chain blockscout), which were not analysed here. An automated attempt to run the site's 'AI audit' feature timed out, so the product claim is unconfirmed. Treat this as inconclusive, not as proof of a fake product.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://bytejury.site/
  • webhttps://bytejury.site/app
    Show source

    could not complete "Run an AI audit" in the UI (timeout: goal time cap reached)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoLiquidity sits in an early, thin pump.fun bonding curveliquidityAI

  The token has not graduated. Liquidity is held by the pump.fun curve program, which the creator cannot withdraw, and no LP tokens exist yet. The curve is only about 4.67% complete with very small reserves, so even small trades move the price a lot.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpump.fun curve EzXxUXcatTVmyrMcNmptaGQFpKYxJvuh7PyE67Pjb5zZ: complete=false, progress ≈ 4.67%
  • on-chainliquidity is held by the curve program (creator cannot withdraw it); LP tokens do not exist until graduation

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol