Robinhood Chain·Scanned 06 Nov 2026, 12:55 UTC
TURA
Verdict
52/100 safety
Unverified Pons template token, no owner powers seen; buy/sell work at ~2.5% fee; clusters hold ~11%.
TURA is a fresh Pons launchpad token still trading on its bonding curve. Its code is unverified, but it looks like the standard template, and buying and selling work at about a 2.5% fee. The main risks are tiny liquidity with three wallet clusters holding about 11%, and an X account created the same day. The linked AI-product website never mentions the token. The deployer holds nothing, and the launch snipers have already sold out.
Score breakdown
- Contract58
- Token55
- Social / X35
- Website45
Higher is safer · 0 = worst · 100 = best
- Yes
- 2.5%
- Unknown
- 0% / 0%
NarrativeCooling
Trend scout · Grok 4.7 · X search via twitterapi.io
36/100 heat
A separate score, not part of the safety score: hype never makes a contract safer.
- AI agents
- LLM cost optimization
- verifiable AI
- Fit
- Core: the product is this narrative
- Buzz
- Mixed8 posts from 6 accounts; 0% of authors have accounts under 30 days old; 3 accounts wrote 63% of the posts; 5 post(s) with engagement that does not fit the follower count.
- Momentum
- Rough project mentions about 9.4k this week vs none the week before (one-page estimate; a short burst can inflate it). AI-agent talk roughly flat to slightly lower (~6.9k vs ~8.9k).
Tura is a new Robinhood Chain token pitching cheaper, auditable AI-agent runs. This week's mentions are a short same-hour burst of replies and one tracker post, mostly with almost no likes or views. Broader AI-agent talk is active but flat and does not focus on Tura.
Posts and accounts (5 posts)
- @saixbt888 · 06 Nov 2026, 12:47 UTC
“$TURA sitting at just $10K MC 👀 by @turaai_net 665 GitHub stars ⭐ Real AI coding runtime focused on cutting token costs”
- @PeepRadars · 06 Nov 2026, 12:45 UTC
“🟢 $TURA ·c73a — Tura 💰 2 smart wallets just bought · Robinhood 📊 MCap $11K · Price $1.06e-5 🚀 launched on pons_v2”
- @Alex_XFinance · 06 Nov 2026, 12:35 UTC
“Có lẽ Trend "AI Agents" sắp kết thúc thật rồi, khi token liên tục chia 5 xẻ 7. 1. $PTAH 2. $JAGENT”
Who pushes it
- @MrbossOfficiial · 232.1K followers
- @MaxelRowan · 126.1K followers
- @Alahlyloo · 60.6K followers
- @PeepRadars · 3.9K followers
- @saixbt888 · 355 followers
Competing for the same narrative
PTAH, JAGENT, UAI, NAUTILO
Posts, last 7 days vs the 7 before
- project: ~9436 vs 0 (new this week)
- AI agents: ~6913 vs 8877 (flat (rough))
- LLM cost optimization: 13 (no comparison)
~ = estimated from one page of results
Measured in code from 8 posts by 6 accounts: 0% fresh accounts (< 30 days), 0% near-copies, top 3 accounts wrote 63%.
X posts searched from 2026-10-07 to 2026-11-07 (UTC). Post links come only from the X search results.
Key findings
- MediumSource code is not verified
- MediumPons owner can take stuck graduation reserves after 7 days
- MediumThree funder clusters hold about 11% with tiny liquidity
- MediumWebsite never mentions the token, so the token-product link is unproven
- GoodBuy and sell work on the curve with about 2.5% fees
What would change the verdict
- Raises safety:Token and bonding-curve source get verified and match the Pons template → contract score up
- Lowers safety:The three funder clusters (~11% combined) sell into the ~$2.3k curve liquidity → down
- Raises safety:Curve graduates and LP is locked in the Pons locker → up
- Lowers safety:Graduated reserves sit 7 days unseeded and the Pons owner rescues them to another address → down
Unlock PRO for this project
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Findings
14 findingsRisks (7)
MediumSource code is not verifiedotherDeterministic
The contract source is not published on the explorer, so nobody can read what it really does. The analysis relies on bytecode only.
Evidence
- on-chainexplorer: no verified source for 0xcf1d48b0a41Ed18e8969f5f2EE40b9dd9654C73A
- on-chaincontract.verified = false; sourceFileCount = 0
Show source
"verified": false - on-chainCreated by factory contract 0x3711ceA4feaDE896C913C68F01Eda97Cb06D1A42; tx sender 0xeDD5E88160516AB545a59823d9197077Fc6229d7
- on-chainrelatedContracts: bonding curve 0xF8dC597A724Ca02c56821daD979f29F84e02df1C verified=false
Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
MediumPons owner can take stuck graduation reserves after 7 daysliquidityAI
When the curve graduates, its ETH and tokens are swept into the factory, then used to seed a Uniswap v4 pool. If a launch sits in the 'Swept' state for 7 days without a pool being created, the factory owner (0x263e…19Dd) can call rescueSweptGraduation. This sends all swept reserves to any address the owner chooses, meant for off-chain distribution. The owner can also call forceSweptGraduation, but only when the pool seed is judged not viable. There are limits on this power. Pool creation (createGraduatedPool) is open to anyone, so any holder can close the rescue path by seeding the pool during the 7-day wait. The curve has not graduated yet, so nothing is exposed today.
Evidence
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1285
Show source
function rescueSweptGraduation(address token, address recipient) external onlyOwner nonReentrant { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.Swept) revert WrongGraduationPhase(); if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress(); uint256 availableAt = launch.sweptAt + GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY; if (block.timestamp < availableAt) revert GraduationRescueTooEarly(availableAt); uint256 quoteAmount = launch.sweptQuote; uint256 tokenAmount = launch.sweptTokens; address pairToken = launch.pairToken; launch.sweptQuote = 0; launch.sweptTokens = 0; - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1109-L1123
Show source
function forceSweptGraduation(address token) external onlyOwner nonReentrant { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.NotGraduated) revert WrongGraduationPhase(); PonsV2BondingCurve curve = PonsV2BondingCurve(launch.curve); if (!curve.readyToGraduate()) { revert PonsV2BondingCurve.NotReadyToGraduate(); } if (_graduationSeedable(token, launch, curve.realQuoteReserve(), curve.tokenReserve())) { revert GraduationStillViable(); } _sweepCurve(token, launch, curve); emit LaunchForceSwept(token); } - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1193-L1211
Show source
function createGraduatedPool(address token) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 positionId) { if (address(graduationExecutor) == address(0)) revert GraduationExecutorNotSet(); LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.Swept) revert WrongGraduationPhase(); uint256 sweptQuote = launch.sweptQuote; _assertGraduationSeedable(token, launch, sweptQuote, launch.sweptTokens); uint256 tokenAmount = _lockExcessGraduationTokens(token, launch, sweptQuote, launch.sweptTokens); launch.sweptQuote = 0; launch.sweptTokens = 0; launch.sweptAt = 0; launch.phase = GraduationPhase.PoolCreated; - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L104
Show source
uint256 public constant GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 7 days;
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
MediumThree funder clusters hold about 11% with tiny liquidityinsidersAI
Three funding wallets each financed two holder wallets. These pairs hold 4.15%, 4.11% and 2.89% of supply, about 11% combined. All of them sit in the top 20. With only 32 holders and about $2,334 of curve liquidity, a coordinated sale by these wallets would move the price sharply. Nothing links them to the deployer.
Evidence
- on-chainclusters: funder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupplyHeldNow 4.1471; funder 0x511808449be470efaf4131838b2d4998500a6f72 pctSupplyHeldNow 4.1066; funder 0x728f51950ff096dc03a48f5e83f45ac8bb75f500 pctSupplyHeldNow 2.888
- on-chainholdersCount = 32; top10Pct = 28.0546; liquidityUsd = 2334
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
MediumWebsite never mentions the token, so the token-product link is unprovenclaims-mismatchAI
The project's X account and domain present Tura as an enterprise tool that cuts LLM costs, with public docs. The homepage and docs text do not mention a token, ticker, or contract. A reply on launch day asked the account to put the CA on the website. Someone buying $TURA can easily think they are buying a stake in that software company. Nothing on the site says that. The X account was created the same morning the contract was deployed, so the social identity is hours old while the domain is older (created 2026-01-22, first archived 2026-08-15).
Evidence
Show source
Tura helps enterprise teams cut LLM costs by 80% while keeping completed outcomes, execution evidence, and benchmark results auditable.Show source
Official Tura documentation for installation, model providers, commands, agents, customization, architecture, testing, security, and support.Show source
@turaai_net Can you put CA on web ??Show source
Cheap agents don't matter if you can't trust what they ship. Tura gives teams: • governed access to internal APIs, tools and data
Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
LowPons owner can redirect creator fees after a 3-day timelockownershipAI
The factory owner can propose a new creator-fee recipient for any launch. Anyone can execute the change after a 3-day timelock, within a 3-day window. A matured proposal overrides any change the creator made in the meantime. This redirects the 1.5% creator tax and vested buyback tokens. Holder balances and trading are not affected. The owner can also switch off this launch's buyback, but only the creator can switch it on. The factory owner can never be renounced.
Evidence
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L946-L974
Show source
function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address token, address newRecipient) external onlyOwner { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress(); uint256 effectiveAt = block.timestamp + CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK; uint256 expiresAt = effectiveAt + CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_EXECUTION_WINDOW; pendingCreatorFeeRecipient[token] = PendingCreatorFeeRecipient({newRecipient: newRecipient, effectiveAt: effectiveAt, expiresAt: expiresAt}); emit CreatorFeeRecipientChangeProposed(token, launch.creatorFeeRecipient, newRecipient, effectiveAt, expiresAt); } /** * @notice Applies a protocol-owner's proposed creator fee recipient - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L904-L921
Show source
function setBuybackEnabled(address token, bool enabled) external { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); bool isCreator = msg.sender == launch.creatorFeeRecipient; bool isOwner = msg.sender == owner(); if (!isCreator && !isOwner) revert NotBuybackController(); // Enabling spends the creator's bucket, so only the creator may enable. if (enabled && !isCreator) revert NotBuybackController(); launch.buybackEnabled = enabled; if (launch.phase == GraduationPhase.NotGraduated) { PonsV2BondingCurve(launch.curve).setBuybackEnabled(enabled); } else if (launch.phase == GraduationPhase.PoolCreated) { memeHook.setBuybackEnabled(_poolIdFor(token, launch), enabled); } - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L630-L632
Show source
function renounceOwnership() public pure override { revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced(); }
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
LowLocker and vault owner can change their trusted factoryownershipAI
The LP locker and the buyback vault share an owner (0x263e…19Dd), and that owner can call setFactory. The factory address decides who can lock positions in the locker and who can change the vault's creator recipient. The source of both contracts was left out of the material. So it cannot be confirmed whether a replacement factory could ever withdraw a locked LP position. The function tables show no unlock or withdraw function.
Evidence
- on-chainLP-locker param factory = 0x7eD598BcEf8bd9Edd8C97A195C6d13f40801EC7e (settable by setFactory(address) [owner])
- on-chainbuyback-vault param factory = 0x7eD598BcEf8bd9Edd8C97A195C6d13f40801EC7e (settable by setFactory(address) [owner])
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol
LowX account created hours before launch with almost no audiencesocialAI
@turaai_net was created 2026-11-06 at 00:43 UTC, about 12 hours before the token deploy at 12:32 UTC the same day. It is unverified, follows 3 accounts, and has 7 followers. Launch posts have 0–2 likes. That is a brand-new anonymous account, not a long-running company presence. No named founder or proof of identity appears in the bio or posts.
Evidence
Show source
Agents get expensive because they call the model again after every tool result. Tura runs the whole job as one command graph.
Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: claude-opus-5.5
Positive signals (3)
PositiveBuy and sell work on the curve with about 2.5% feeshoneypotAI
A fork simulation bought and sold on the Pons bonding curve. Buy tax was 2.48% and sell tax 2.5%. That is the 1% protocol fee plus a 1.5% creator tax. Plain transfers had 0% tax. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and selling still worked one hour later. Per the factory code, the creator tax is fixed when the token launches. Later changes to the ceiling do not affect this token. The launch snipe tax has already dropped to 0.
Evidence
- forkcanBuy=true buyTaxPct=2.48 canSell=true sellTaxPct=2.5 transferTaxPct=0
- forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L545-L554
Show source
/** * @notice Adjusts the ceiling a creator's chosen trade tax is validated * against at launch time. Already-launched tokens keep the immutable * tax rate they launched with regardless of later ceiling changes. */ function setMaxCreatorTaxBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner { if (bps > MAX_CREATOR_TAX_CEILING_BPS) revert InvalidBasisPoints(); maxCreatorTaxBps = bps; emit MaxCreatorTaxUpdated(bps); } - on-chaincurve: graduated=false, feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=150, snipeTaxNow=0bps over 3s
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
PositiveLP will be locked permanently in the Pons locker at graduationliquidityAI
On graduation, the factory mints a full-range Uniswap v4 position and hands it straight to the Pons locker. Leftover tokens from the virtual reserve are also locked permanently. Neither the creator nor the deployer receives the LP. The token has not graduated yet, so this lock does not exist today.
Evidence
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1386-L1402
Show source
(int24 tickLower, int24 tickUpper) = _fullRangeTicks(launch.tickSpacing); positionId = positionManager.nextTokenId(); uint256 nativeValue = _fundGraduationExecutor(currency0, currency1, amount0, amount1); graduationExecutor.mintFullRangePosition{value: nativeValue}( token, key, tickLower, tickUpper, sqrtPriceX96, amount0, amount1, currency0, currency1, policy.protocolFeeRecipient - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1293-L1307
Show source
function _lockExcessGraduationTokens( address token, LaunchedToken storage launch, uint256 sweptQuote, uint256 totalTokenAmount ) private returns (uint256 poolTokenAmount) { poolTokenAmount = _poolTokenAmount(launch, sweptQuote, totalTokenAmount); uint256 excess = totalTokenAmount - poolTokenAmount; if (excess != 0) { IERC20(token).forceApprove(address(locker), excess); locker.lockTokenSupply(token, excess); emit GraduationTokensPermanentlyLocked(token, excess); } } - on-chainNo Uniswap pool yet — trading on bonding curve 0xF8dC597A724Ca02c56821daD979f29F84e02df1C (not graduated)
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
PositiveDeployer holds no tokens and has sold noneinsidersAI
The creator wallet 0xeDD5…29d7 was the only wallet declared exempt from the snipe tax. It now holds 0% of supply and has sold 0%. It made a single burn of 0.577% of supply to the dead address.
Evidence
- on-chainDeployer 0xedd5e88160516ab545a59823d9197077fc6229d7 holds 0% now; deployerSoldPct 0
- on-chainburns.by: deployer pct 0.577 count 1
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
Notes (4)
InfoOne-time burn: 0.58% of supply sent to a burn addressburnDeterministic
0.58% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 1 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-06. Burned by: the deployer 0xedd5…29d7 (0.58%, 1 burn). This happened once, around launch; there is no sign of a continuing burn mechanism.
Evidence
- on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0xcf1d48b0a41ed18e8969f5f2ee40b9dd9654c73a
Confirmed by: facts
InfoLaunch snipers and the bundle have fully sold outsnipersAI
Five wallets in the 100-block sniper window bought 7.5% of supply, and they now hold 0%. One bundle of two wallets with a common funder bought 1.8%, and that pair now holds 0%. That past selling pressure is gone, and these wallets no longer pose a dump risk.
Evidence
- on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought 7.5078, pctSupplyHeldNow 0
- on-chainbundle block 107580621 commonFunder 0x53091256ebd2d8aa37b45536a5fd864ca764f32f pctSupply 1.8022; cluster pctSupplyHeldNow 0
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol
InfoLinked website is an AI product with no crypto featureswebsiteAI
The on-chain socials link to turaai.net, an AI cost-cutting product ('Cut LLM Costs by 80%'). The dApp tests found no wallet connection or trading on the site. Those test 'failures' only mean the site has no crypto features. They do not show any blocked withdrawal. The domain was created 2026-01-22 and archived in August 2026, both before this token launched. Nothing in the material shows whether the product team actually issued the token.
Evidence
- forkdappTests: buy (open a position) — step result
Show source
The website is not a crypto dApp and has no wallet connection or trading/position functionality (it is an AI software platform). Show source
Tura — Cut LLM Costs by 80%- on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-01-22T22:15:16.000Z; waybackFirstSeen = 2026-08-15T12:40:58Z
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
InfoOnly a single low-effort shill; no scam reports foundsocialAI
The only token-specific promo from another account is a single 'next 100x' reply with no likes, plus a follow-back request. A chart bot noted the token launched on pons_v2 on Robinhood Chain. Searches for scam, rug, and honeypot did not return posts about this contract. DEXPAID on the project account is a paid DEX Screener listing alert, which is ordinary marketing, not proof of quality or of a rug.
Evidence
Show source
@turaai_net @turaai_net $Tura could be next 100x !Show source
🟢 $TURA ·c73a — Tura 💰 2 smart wallets just bought · Robinhood 🚀 launched on pons_v2 0xcf1d48b0a41ed18e8969f5f2ee40b9dd9654c73aShow source
DEXPAID!
Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5
Score breakdown
Higher is safer. The overall is the weighted average of the assessed parts, then capped by hard facts.
Contract
weight 45%58Capped · max 60source code not verified → max 60
The token appears to be a standard Pons template with no owner, mint or blacklist functions, and buys and sells work. The token and curve source are unverified, and the Pons protocol owner keeps some powers over fees and graduation.
Why this score
Raised the score
- Buy and sell simulation passed at ~2.5% fee
- Transfers have 0% tax, sells work from a second wallet
- No mint, pause, blacklist or owner selectors exposed
- Created by the verified Pons deployer; fees fixed at launch
Lowered the score
- Token and bonding-curve source not verified
- Pons owner can rescue stuck graduation reserves after 7 days
- Pons owner can redirect creator fees after a 3-day timelock
Token
weight 30%55Launch sniping was moderate and those snipers have fully exited, and the deployer holds nothing. However, holders are few, liquidity is tiny and three funder clusters hold about 11%.
Why this score
Raised the score
- Deployer holds 0% and has sold nothing
- Snipers (7.5%) and the bundle (1.8%) have fully exited
- Graduation design locks LP permanently
Lowered the score
- Only 32 holders and ~$2.3k curve liquidity
- Three funder clusters hold ~11% across six wallets
- Not yet graduated; no locked LP exists today
Social / X
weight 15%35The X account was created hours before launch, has almost no audience and no named team, and the only third-party promotion is low-effort shilling.
Why this score
Raised the score
- No scam or rug accusations found
Lowered the score
- X account created the same day as the token
- About 7 followers, no identified team
- Only low-effort 100x shill replies
Website
weight 10%45The linked site is an older AI-product page with docs, but it never mentions the token, so the link between the product and the token is unproven.
Why this score
Raised the score
- Domain registered in January 2026, archived before launch
- Site has product docs
Lowered the score
- Site never mentions the token or the contract
- Buyers may confuse the token with a stake in the software company
- The 80% cost-cut claim is unverified