PonsV2LauncherToken $BELL

Risks (10)

• MediumLaunch sniped: 25 wallets took 48.3% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 25 wallets bought 48.3% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 1.29% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=25, pctSupplyBought=48.3213, pctSupplyHeldNow=1.2939
  • on-chainsnipers.pctSupplyBought 48.3213, pctSupplyHeldNow 1.2939
  • on-chainbundles: block 106132762 pctSupply 13.0101; block 106132763 pctSupply 10.9216
  • on-chainclusters funder 0xa5a5491bca93dd4c076e4906e79e7673f4a5a142 wallets pctSupplyHeldNow 0

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumFactory owner has unaudited rescue powers over graduation reservesliquidityAI

  When the curve sells out, all curve reserves (ETH plus the reserved token allocation) go to a recipient chosen by the factory, which then seeds the Uniswap v4 pool. The factory owner (0x263e…19Dd) has several functions that touch this step: - rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) sends tokens and ETH out. - forceSweptGraduation. - setGraduationExecutor, which swaps the executor contract. There is a 7-day GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY constant. However, the factory source was not provided, so we cannot confirm where rescued funds can go or what triggers the delay. Worst case, if these functions let the owner send stuck graduation reserves to an address of their choice, liquidity meant for the pool could be diverted. This is a launchpad-wide power, not specific to BELL, and the curve has not graduated yet.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L598-L638
    Show source

    function graduate(address recipient) external onlyFactory returns (uint256 quoteOut, uint256 tokenOut) {
            if (graduated) revert AlreadyGraduated();
            if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            if (!readyToGraduate()) revert NotReadyToGraduate();
    
            // Halt trading before the sweep, not after. The sweep pays the escrow,
            // and a quote asset with a transfer callback can re-enter buy() or
            // sell() from inside that payment. This function is deliberately not
            // nonReentrant so it stays callable from within buy()'s own guarded
            // scope, so the flag is the only thing closing that window. Reentering
            // while it was still false repopulated the fee buckets after they had
            // been zeroed, leaving balances with no quote behind them once the
            // reserve was handed over, and no way to ever sweep them.
            //
            // Safe to set here: readyToGraduate() is already evaluated above, and

  • staticfactory fn rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) [owner] — sends tokens out, sends ETH @PonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1286
  • staticfactory param GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 604800; graduationExecutor settable by setGraduationExecutor [owner]

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumClaimed 2.9M BELL buyback-and-burn: burns came from deployer, not buybackclaims-mismatchAI

  Burn records show burns by the deployer but identify zero buyback burns, so the claimed 2.9M buyback-and-burn is not supported as a buyback. The token source expressly says the protocol locks bought-back tokens for five years instead of burning them.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/BELLdexFi/status/2118091720810467673
    Show source

    $BELL buyback and burn has begun. 2.9M $BELL just burned. Buyback: https://t.co/haqP0cGflB Burn: https://t.co/eXM1Q7Japm → Burned: 2.9M $BELL → Supply burned: 0.29% → Supply locked: 2.2%

  • on-chaintoken.burns: burnedPct=0.4011, burned=4011091149224120916889648, count=2, buybackBurns=0, complete=true
  • on-chaintoken.burns.by: address=0xb430e09e1d17f0224ef394efae69171862871f15, kind=deployer, pct=0.4011, count=2, buyback=0
  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L16-L19
    Show source

    * `ERC20Burnable` lets any holder voluntarily burn their own balance; the
     * protocol's buyback mechanism does not use it, bought-back tokens are
     * locked into `PonsV2BuybackVault` for a five-year vest instead of being
     * burned.

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• MediumClaimed extra 1.1M buyback-and-burn not shown as a buyback on-chainclaims-mismatchAI

  Approximately 4.011M BELL is recorded at burn addresses, but both burn events came from the deployer and zero were classified as buybacks. Thus the cumulative burn amount is broadly supported while the claimed additional buyback-and-burn is false or misleading.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/BELLdexFi/status/2118682560876462434
    Show source

    Another solana:8hqPzBRtRW7m9wqTDRzF4vfQpuLNk69rkh8DEzhrKwo4 buyback and burn, done. 1.1M solana:8hqPzBRtRW7m9wqTDRzF4vfQpuLNk69rkh8DEzhrKwo4 bought back. 1.1M solana:8hqPzBRtRW7m9wqTDRzF4vfQpuLNk69rkh8DEzhrKwo4 burned.

  • on-chaintoken.burns: burnedPct=0.4011, burned=4011091149224120916889648, count=2, buybackBurns=0, complete=true
  • on-chaintoken.burns.by: address=0xb430e09e1d17f0224ef394efae69171862871f15, kind=deployer, pct=0.4011, count=2, buyback=0
  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L16-L19
    Show source

    * `ERC20Burnable` lets any holder voluntarily burn their own balance; the
     * protocol's buyback mechanism does not use it, bought-back tokens are
     * locked into `PonsV2BuybackVault` for a five-year vest instead of being
     * burned.

  • Xhttps://x.com/BELLdexFi/status/2118060859335590019
    Show source

    100% dev tokens, locked. 22,576,163.43 solana:8hqPzBRtRW7m9wqTDRzF4vfQpuLNk69rkh8DEzhrKwo4 locked on RobinFlow

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• LowFactory owner can redirect creator fee recipient and pending feesownershipAI

  Through the factory, the protocol owner can: - call rescueFees, which pays pending fees directly to the fixed protocol recipient and to the current creator recipient; - override the creator fee recipient (setCreatorFeeRecipient); - toggle buyback-and-lock. These only affect fee revenue (protocol and creator money). They do not touch holder balances or the curve's trading reserves. Self-service creator recipient changes go through a 3-day timelock.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L343-L363
    Show source

    function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(deployer, newRecipient);
            deployer = newRecipient;
        }
    
        /**
         * @notice Enables or disables this launch's buyback-and-lock fee route.
         * The factory authorizes both the current creator recipient and protocol
         * owner before forwarding the setting here.
         * @dev Applies to fees charged from here on, not to fees already pending.
         * Each trade earmarks its buyback slice as it is charged, so a toggle
         * cannot reach back and reroute value that accrued under the opposite
         * setting. Without that, a disable landing before a sweep would divert a
         * buyback the creator had already earned into their own payout, and an

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L850-L871
    Show source

    function rescueFees() external onlyFactory returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount) {
            uint256 pending = quoteFeeBalance;
            uint256 tax = creatorTaxBalance;
            if (pending == 0 && tax == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
    
            protocolAmount = (pending * protocolFeeShareBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            creatorAmount = pending - protocolAmount + tax;
    
            quoteFeeBalance = 0;
            // Symmetrical with the sweep. This pays the creator their whole
            // bucket, earmark included, so leaving the earmark behind would let a
            // settled claim survive into the next accrual and divert fees the
            // creator has not earned yet into the vest.
            buybackQuoteBalance = 0;
            creatorTaxBalance = 0;

  • on-chainfactory param CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK = 259200

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowDeployer-funded wallet holds 2.26% of supplyinsidersAI

  Wallet 0xb1b0…1015 is a contract that was funded by the deployer and holds 2.2576% of supply. This is effectively a team-linked stack that could be sold. The deployer wallet itself holds 0%; it burned 0.4011% of supply in 2 burns and has not sold.

  Evidence

  • on-chaininsiders: 0xb1b04a9a5e804074001f3ab4e572b59f0e081015 fundedBy 0xb430e09e1d17f0224ef394efae69171862871f15 pctSupplyHeldNow 2.2576
  • on-chainDeployer 0xb430e09e1d17f0224ef394efae69171862871f15 holds 0% now; burns by deployer pct 0.4011

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowThin curve liquidity; side v4 pools are empty and unlockedliquidityAI

  BELL still trades only on the bonding curve, with about $2,521 of liquidity. Real quote reserve is about 1.13 ETH against a 4.2 ETH graduation threshold. Three Uniswap v4 pools exist outside the launchpad. Each has about $0–1 of liquidity, held 100% by single unlocked wallets. Those are not the official graduated pool and should be avoided. Near sell-out there is a short window where sell reverts until graduation runs. Graduation is permissionless through the factory, so holders are not stranded.

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity pons-v2-bonding-curve 0xFDB36b0cBEa90B5Fc30Df502bbaDF04B17805245 liquidityUsd 2521; graduated=false
  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x8ea6f65256…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x1af0a8f2516044ed01d595cdeb3a69e2470d654c [other: wallet (unlocked)] 100%
  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L541-L547
    Show source

    function sell(uint256 tokensIn, uint256 minQuoteOut, address recipient)
            external
            nonReentrant
            onlyInitialized
            returns (uint256 quoteOut)
        {
            if (graduated || readyToGraduate()) revert CurveGraduated();

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowProject dApp swaps through an unverified PoolManager and hookwebsiteAI

  In the dApp test, the site's BellRouter sent 0.1 USDG to 0x8b26…7b56. The test flagged this as an unverified third party. That address is BellRouter's immutable poolManager, and the swap returned NVDA to the wallet, so this was not theft in the test. However, it is not the PoolManager the Pons factory uses (0x8366…0951), and its code is unverified. Neither that contract nor the BELL hook 0x89d4…Ecc0 could be audited. The website's claims (market-data checks, per-swap caps, always-withdrawable positions) could not be confirmed, and the test was marked not passed. The approval in the test was exact (0.1 USDG), not unlimited.

  Evidence

  • forkSwap step: WARNING: funds moved to third party 0x8b26fefa276860592d45114cb30b335dddd87b56: 0.1 USDG
  • on-chainBellRouter param poolManager = 0x8b26FEfa276860592D45114Cb30B335DdDd87B56
  • webhttps://www.bellstocks.tech/
    Show source

    Every trade is capped per swap and across a rolling window, so one order cannot drain a pool.

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• Low100% dev-token lock claimed on an unidentified locker (RobinFlow)socialAI

  The team says 100% of dev tokens are locked on RobinFlow and calls it non-custodial and verifiable. RobinFlow is not a known locker in this ecosystem, and the supplied on-chain facts do not show a lock, locker balance, or unlock date. The claim cannot be checked from the material, so it should not be treated as locked supply.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/BELLdexFi/status/2118060859335590019
    Show source

    100% dev tokens, locked. 🔒 22,576,163.43 solana:8hqPzBRtRW7m9wqTDRzF4vfQpuLNk69rkh8DEzhrKwo4 locked on RobinFlow — non-custodial and verifiable onchain on Robinhood Chain.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowSite shows a status check dated before the domain existedwebsiteAI

  The homepage presents a mainnet snapshot 'Directory checked 31 Oct 2026' as current protocol status. The domain was created 3 Nov 2026 and the token was deployed 4 Nov 2026, so that date is before this site and this token existed. It makes the deployment look older than it is.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://www.bellstocks.tech/
    Show source

    Directory checked 31 Oct 2026

  • webhttps://www.bellstocks.tech/

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (2)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 0.4% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  0.4% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 2 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-06. Burned by: the deployer 0xb430…1f15 (0.4%, 2 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0xc5d6c1d90c8a87a07e2670b99b1556e818803228

  Confirmed by: facts

• PositiveToken has fixed supply and no owner, mint, blacklist or pause powersownershipAI

  BELL is the standard Pons V2 launch token: plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus a voluntary burn. It has no owner, no mint after deployment, no fees, no blacklist and no pause. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. The stored deployer address is only a label and gives no control. Nobody can change token balances or block transfers at the token level. The fork simulation confirms that buys, sells and wallet-to-wallet transfers work, with 0% transfer tax.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21-L71
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
        struct Socials {
            string twitter;
            string telegram;
            string discord;
            string website;
            string farcaster;
        }
    
        error ZeroAddress();
    
        address public immutable deployer;
        address public immutable launchFactory;
        address public immutable curve;

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
    Show source

    _mint(curve_, supply_);

  • on-chainprivileges = [] ; isProxy = false
  • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; transferTaxPct 0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (4)

• InfoCurve fee fixed at 2.99% (1% protocol + 1.99% creator tax)feesAI

  Every buy and sell on the bonding curve pays a 1% base fee (feeBps=100) and a 1.99% creator tax (creatorTaxBps=199). Both are set once at deploy and cannot be changed afterwards. The curve also enforces a hard ceiling of 20% for the two combined. The creator tax goes entirely to the creator fee recipient (currently the deployer). Simulation measured about 2.97% on a buy and 2.99% on a sell, which matches. No one can raise these fees on this curve.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L109-L114
    Show source

    uint256 public immutable feeBps;
        // Creator-chosen at launch, capped by the protocol at launch time. Kept
        // entirely separate from feeBps: it is layered on top of the base trade
        // fee, not part of the protocol/buyback/creator split, and is paid to
        // the creator in full.
        uint256 public immutable creatorTaxBps;

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L219-L222
    Show source

    // The factory applies the same ceiling before deploying, but the curve
            // defends its own invariant rather than inheriting it: a combined fee
            // at or above the whole trade would break the quote accounting.
            if (feeBps_ + creatorTaxBps_ > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidFeePolicy();

  • forkbuyTaxPct 2.97, sellTaxPct 2.99; curve fees: feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=199

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoWebsite domain registered one day before token launchwebsiteAI

  The bellstocks.tech domain was created on 2026-11-03 and the token was deployed on 2026-11-04. This is a very new project with no track record. It is context only, not proof of wrongdoing.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt 2026-11-03T04:59:36.276Z; contract.deployedAt 2026-11-04T19:07:30.000Z

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoSite discloses that its security audit is incompletewebsiteAI

  The project discloses, in the footer and on the protocol page, that an independent audit is incomplete, and that it is not affiliated with Robinhood. That is a limit on how much of the hook, pause and auction design has been independently checked, not a hidden claim of an audit.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://www.bellstocks.tech/
    Show source

    BELL is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or officially connected with Robinhood Markets, Inc. · Independent audit incomplete

  • webhttps://www.bellstocks.tech/protocol/
    Show source

    An independent security audit is not complete. BELL is independent and is not affiliated with Robinhood Markets, Inc.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoX account is about a week old with 76 followerssocialAI

  @BELLdexFi was created 28 Oct 2026, has 76 followers and 3 following, and started posting the BELL thesis on 3 Nov 2026, the day the domain was registered. Replies are mostly generic collaboration pitches, not scam accusations. A new anonymous account is context, not proof of a rug; no earlier project or renamed history showed up in the material.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/BELLdexFi/status/2117519423120847045
    Show source

    Markets keep hours. So should liquidity. Meet BELL: session-aware liquidity for Robinhood stock tokens.

  • webhttps://x.com/BELLdexFi

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7