PonsV2LauncherToken $AGENT CITY

Risks (6)

• MediumOne funder's 4 wallets bundled 7.23% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  4 wallets funded by the same address 0x88d2…51d3 bought 7.23% of the supply together (block 79175192). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3: 4 wallets, pctSupply 7.23

  Confirmed by: facts

• LowLaunch sniped: 18 wallets took 16.7% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 18 wallets bought 16.7% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=18, pctSupplyBought=16.727, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chainsnipers.pctSupplyBought = 16.727; snipers.pctSupplyHeldNow = 0
  • on-chainbundle block 79175192 commonFunder 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3 pctSupply 7.2338

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• LowPons protocol owner controls hook, factory and vault settingsownershipAI

  Address 0x263e…19Dd owns the hook, the factory, the buyback vault and the locker. Hook ownership cannot be renounced. On the hook, this owner can: - set future-launch fee policy (protocol share up to 50%, hook fee up to 10%); - change the global protocol fee recipient; - replace the fee-sweep operator, who chooses the minimum outputs when collected fees are converted; - call rescuePoolFees, which pays pending fees to the pool's protocol and creator recipients by their normal split. The owner cannot change this pool's stored fee rate and cannot block swaps. The worst realistic abuse is a careless or malicious sweep operator converting accumulated fees at a bad price, which hurts fee recipients and briefly moves the price. The factory can also rotate the creator fee recipient, behind a 3-day timelock. Whether this owner is a multisig is unknown.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L235-L237
    Show source

    function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L239-L279
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    function setProtocolFeeShareBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > MAX_PROTOCOL_FEE_SHARE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
            protocolFeeShareBps = bps;
            emit ProtocolFeeShareUpdated(bps);
        }
    
        function setBuybackBurnBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > BASIS_POINTS) revert InvalidBps();
            buybackBurnBps = bps;
            emit BuybackBurnBpsUpdated(bps);
        }
    
        function setHookFeeBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
            hookFeeBps = bps;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
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    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L384-L397
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    /**
         * @notice Updates who receives this pool's creator fee share. Restricted
         * to the factory, which gates both self-service creator transfers and
         * protocol-owner overrides before forwarding here, so this contract only
         * needs to trust one caller.
         */
        function setCreatorFeeRecipient(PoolId poolId, address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            LaunchInfo storage info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(poolId, info.creator, newRecipient);
            info.creator = newRecipient;
        }

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; PonsV2LaunchFactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowUnidentified contract wallets hold sizeable token sharesholdersAI

  Several holders are unlabelled contracts: - 0x6a35…dC35 holds 4.85%; - 0x4D35…3BE6 holds 3.90%; - other contracts each hold about 2%. They could be smart wallets, vaults or aggregators. Their owners and any lockups are unknown. Combined, they could add notable selling pressure. Top-10 concentration excluding infrastructure is 26.6%.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTop holders (excl. pools/curve/burn/infra/launchpad): 0x6a3509c2df3475208c7af85b2e31d493b00cdc35 [contract] 4.8454%, 0x4d356f15a97a2bc6978780f7a105d7806b413be6 [contract] 3.8999%
  • on-chaintop10Pct = 26.5701

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowTiny side pools use a third-party hook or unlocked liquidityliquidityAI

  Three small extra v4 pools exist besides the main Pons pool: - Pool 0xbf3ef072… (~$20) uses the HookrRoot hook. That hook can run on swaps and on liquidity removal and can take a cut of swaps. Its liquidity is held by a HookrLauncher contract. - Pools 0x7f5ae057… (~$5) and 0x680053b7… (~$3) have liquidity in an unlocked wallet (0xe8d7…cc3c). These are not part of the Pons system and are negligible in size. Routing a trade through them could give bad prices or hook fees.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0xbf3ef07277…: v4 hook runs on liquidity removal (it can block or tax LP withdrawals)
  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x7f5ae057f6…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0xe8d7c2a9c81d89e5282b6dc63346fb014532cc3c [other: wallet (unlocked)] 100%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowWebsite is a near-empty page with no team or docswebsiteAI

  agentcity.lol was registered the day before the token was deployed and the public page only says the project is a city for AI agents. There is no team page, whitepaper, tokenomics, or contract explanation a holder can check against the posts.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://agentcity.lol/
    Show source

    Discover agents, explore their capabilities, and enter a living city of intelligence.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (4)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 2.7% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  2.7% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 17 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-06. Burned by: the deployer 0xb322…dcfd (2.7%, 4 burns); pool 0x8366…0951 (0.0%, 7 burns); holder 0x73aa…e177 (0.0%, 6 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x878fbde429e1b21522735ed9dcf25e752a119284

  Confirmed by: facts

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powersownershipAI

  AGENT CITY is the standard Pons V2 template: plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Burnable. There is no owner, no mint after deployment, no fee, no blacklist, no pause and no transfer hook. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. The stored deployer address is reference data only and gives no special rights. Nobody can change how transfers work.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21-L34
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    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
        struct Socials {
            string twitter;
            string telegram;
            string discord;
            string website;
            string farcaster;
        }
    
        error ZeroAddress();
    
        address public immutable deployer;
        address public immutable launchFactory;
        address public immutable curve;

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
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    _mint(curve_, supply_);

  • staticprivileges: [] ; slither issues: []
  • forkbuyTaxPct 0, sellTaxPct 0, transferTaxPct 0; second wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is permanently locked by PonsliquidityAI

  The graduated Uniswap v4 pool holds about $35.9k of liquidity, and 100% of its position is held by PonsV2LaunchLocker. The locker has no withdraw function and no arbitrary-call function. Its owner can only set the factory once, and ownership cannot be renounced. This means neither the creator nor the Pons admin can pull this liquidity.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x033ce00a47…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x267444d099b10fb5ed7c3cc7b7c767adca574952 [locked: PonsV2LaunchLocker (permanent LP lock)] 100%
  • codePonsV2LaunchLocker.sol:L11-L20
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    /**
     * @title PonsV2LaunchLocker
     * @notice Permanently holds the graduated Uniswap V4 position NFT for every
     * pons v2 launch. Unlike v1's locker, there is no `collectFees()` here: fee
     * collection and distribution belong entirely to PonsV2MemeHook and
     * PonsV2FeeEscrow, since a V4 position accrues fees inside the singleton
     * PoolManager rather than on the NFT itself. This contract exposes no
     * withdrawal or arbitrary-call function, so locked liquidity can never be
     * removed by an administrator.
     */

  • codePonsV2LaunchLocker.sol:L60-L66
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    function setFactory(address factory_) external onlyOwner {
            if (factory != address(0)) revert AlreadyInitialized();
            if (factory_ == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            factory = factory_;
            emit FactorySet(factory_);
        }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveCreator holds under 1% and has never soldinsidersAI

  The creator wallet 0xb322…DcFd was declared at launch, which made it exempt from the snipe tax. It now holds 0.895% of supply. Recorded deployer sales are 0%, and the wallet sent 2.73% of supply to the burn address in 4 transactions. There is no large creator stack that could be dumped.

  Evidence

  • on-chainDeployer 0xb322473be6546f4652f483239c008ee4fffbdcfd holds 0.895% now; deployerSoldPct 0
  • on-chainburns.by deployer pct 2.7306 count 4

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (2)

• LowAbout 3% fee per swap goes to Pons and the creatorfeesAI

  PonsV2MemeHook's afterSwap takes hookFeeBps plus the creator tax out of every swap through the main pool. The launchpad data shows a 1% protocol fee and a 2% creator tax, which is about 3% per buy or sell. These rates are copied into the pool's record when the pool is registered, and afterSwap reads that stored record rather than the live owner setting. So a later setHookFeeBps by the hook owner does not change this pool's fee. Registration also refuses any pool where creator tax plus hook fee exceeds 20%. Part of the fee goes to the protocol, the rest to the creator, and the creator's share may be partly used for buyback.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L352
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    if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L364-L378
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    launches[poolId] = LaunchInfo({
                registered: true,
                memecoinIsCurrency0: memecoinIsCurrency0,
                memecoin: memecoin,
                quoteToken: quoteToken,
                creator: creator,
                buybackCreatorRecipient: buybackCreatorRecipient,
                protocolFeeRecipient: policy.protocolFeeRecipient,
                creatorTaxBps: creatorTaxBps,
                protocolFeeShareBps: policy.protocolFeeShareBps,
                buybackBurnBps: policy.buybackBurnBps,
                hookFeeBps: policy.hookFeeBps,
                maxInternalPriceImpactBps: policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps,
                buybackEnabled: buybackEnabled
            });

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L453-L484
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    PoolId poolId = key.toId();
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;
            (Currency feeCurrency, int128 unspecifiedAmount) =
                specifiedIsCurrency0 ? (key.currency1, delta.amount1()) : (key.currency0, delta.amount0());
            if (unspecifiedAmount < 0) unspecifiedAmount = -unspecifiedAmount;
            if (unspecifiedAmount == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            uint256 unspecified = uint256(uint128(unspecifiedAmount));
            uint256 feeAmount = (unspecified * info.hookFeeBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            uint256 taxAmount = (unspecified * info.creatorTaxBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            uint256 totalAmount = feeAmount + taxAmount;

  • on-chainlaunchpad.fees
    Show source

    protocol fee 1%; creator tax 2%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• Info'90% in top wallets' posts contradict on-chain holder dataclaims-mismatchAI

  One account repeatedly says over 90% of $AGENTCITY sits in top wallets and that one wallet holds 48 million tokens, and asks if the team is the same as $CODEMEN. Other users reply that those figures mix in the pool, the Pons launcher, and the null address. The contract basics supplied for this review say 403 holders and top 10 wallets at about 26.6%, which does not match the 90% claim. No posts in the search called the token a scam, rug, or honeypot.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/mark_ippol51515/status/2118666296162193605
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    90 percent of the supply is in the top wallets... $agentcity is using the same ai cartoon video generator as $CODEMEN ar they the same dev?

  • Xhttps://x.com/CryptoBrada/status/2118662814843970005
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    Its maybe including the Poolmanager, Pons launcher & Null address. There are no big bagholders, bundles or clusters.

  • on-chainholdersCount: 403, top10Pct: 26.5701
    Show source

    top10Pct 26.5701

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol