Robinhood Chain·Scanned 06 Nov 2026, 17:33 UTC
PonsV2LauncherToken $Kinetiq
Verdict
56/100 safety
Token has no owner powers; sells work at ~2.9% curve fee, but insiders sniped 24.6% at launch and sold it all.
The token contract itself is clean: there is no owner, supply is fixed, and buying and selling work with about a 2.9% launchpad fee. The main concern is the launch. A creator-declared wallet linked to a funded group of wallets helped snipe about a quarter of the supply in the first seconds, and that group then sold everything into later buyers. The project also uses the name of an established Kinetiq project that does not acknowledge it, through an X account and website created on launch day. The bonding curve holding the buyers' funds is unverified, and the Pons factory owner keeps some fallback powers over stuck graduations.
Score breakdown
- Contract85
- Token35
- Social / X25
- Website30
Higher is safer · 0 = worst · 100 = best
- Yes
- 2.9%
- None (no owner role)
- 0% / 0%
NarrativeSteady
Trend scout · Grok 4.7 · X search via twitterapi.io
44/100 heat
A separate score, not part of the safety score: hype never makes a contract safer.
- memecoin launchpad
- Robinhood Chain
- Elysium mainnet
- Fit
- Core: the product is this narrative
- Buzz
- Mixed31 posts from 24 accounts; 4% of authors have accounts under 30 days old; 16 post(s) with engagement that does not fit the follower count.
- Momentum
- Project mentions rose from about 1 to roughly 348 week over week (one-page estimate, easily distorted); memecoin-launchpad talk was flat at roughly 503 vs 491; Robinhood Chain talk is large at roughly
Kinetiq Pad is a small launchpad (55 followers) for creating and buying Elysium tokens, including with Robinhood ETH and HYPE pairs. Mentions jumped this week, but most are short replies, ticker alerts, or generic comments with tiny views. Broader launchpad talk is flat; Robinhood Chain talk is much larger than this project.
Posts and accounts (5 posts)
- @RAIZ_75 · 06 Nov 2026, 12:50 UTC
“@Enter_Elysium mainnet sunday, this is the only Elysium tech on @RobinhoodApp”
- @nononsensetrade · 06 Nov 2026, 10:26 UTC
“Solana elysium launchpads bonding. This is alone currently unbonded on RH.”
- @PeepRadars · 06 Nov 2026, 12:56 UTC
“$Kinetiq ·4498 — Kinetiq Pad 💰 2 smart wallets just bought · Robinhood”
- @kellenxbt · 06 Nov 2026, 17:15 UTC
“the $BEEPZ token and the beepz platform launch together on robinhood chain”
Who pushes it
- @RAIZ_75 · 9.3K followers
- @nononsensetrade · 4K followers
- @PeepRadars · 3.9K followers
- @SolanaTren59241 · 2.8K followers
- @KinetiqPepe · 30 followers
Competing for the same narrative
beepz, Torchpad, EscapeHub, KForge
Posts, last 7 days vs the 7 before
- project: ~348 vs 1 (up 348.0× (rough))
- memecoin launchpad: ~503 vs 491 (flat (rough))
- Robinhood Chain: ~7418 (no comparison)
~ = estimated from one page of results
Measured in code from 31 posts by 24 accounts: 4% fresh accounts (< 30 days), 0% near-copies, top 3 accounts wrote 26%.
X posts searched from 2026-10-07 to 2026-11-07 (UTC). Post links come only from the X search results.
Key findings
- HighUses the Kinetiq name without any link to the established Kinetiq project
- MediumCreator-declared wallet's funded cluster sniped and dumped its supply
- MediumUnverified bonding curve holds half the supply and all buyer funds
- MediumFactory owner can take a stuck graduation's reserves after 7 days
- GoodToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powers
What would change the verdict
- Raises safety:Bonding curve source code gets verified and shows factory-only access on sweep, rescue and graduate → contract score up
- Lowers safety:Factory owner uses the 7-day rescue path to send swept graduation reserves to an arbitrary address → down
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Findings
14 findingsRisks (10)
HighUses the Kinetiq name without any link to the established Kinetiq projectsocialAI
The token is named Kinetiq and is promoted by a one-day-old X account called Kinetiq Pad (@kinetiqfun, created 2026-11-05, 55 followers). The established Kinetiq project (@Kinetiq_xyz, created 2024-09-25, about 33.6k followers) says it created Elysium and links kinetiq.xyz; a search of its posts found no mention of @kinetiqfun or Kinetiq Pad. A holder can easily buy this Pons launch token thinking it is the official Kinetiq / Elysium asset. Nobody on the new account is identified.
Evidence
Show source
Start with ETH on Robinhood Chain. Fund your Elysium wallet with HYPE, then launch a token and open its first HYPE or KNTQ market. CA : 0x7916bd37d8fc40455a4b1a10a19c3de83ccf4498
Confirmed by: grok-4.7
MediumCreator-declared wallet's funded cluster sniped and dumped its supplyinsidersAI
Wallet 0x5b2f…44be was declared by the creator at launch, which exempted it from the snipe tax. It shares a funder (0xe68d…1934) with 10 other wallets. Several of those wallets appear in the sniper list and in launch-block bundles. In total, snipers bought 24.58% of supply in the first 100 blocks and now hold 0%. This pattern, a team-linked group buying cheaply at launch and selling everything, fits an insider allocation that was dumped on later buyers. Their supply is now gone, so there is no further dump risk from them.
Evidence
- on-chaininsiders: wallets 0xc919514ec337577f2b5c6dc2abf62e48258e647b, 0x5b2fcf42fbbb6cd9ad3b0813db38ec00d12e44be — declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt); pctSupplyHeldNow 0
- on-chainclusters: funder 0xe68d0bbc023de3febda04f413db23ce9c5ea1934, 11 wallets, pctSupplyHeldNow 0
- on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought 24.5786, pctSupplyHeldNow 0
- on-chainbundles: block 106842673 wallets 0x5bc235acecff3dde394f4bfc696f7c35efd502f0, 0x1d047f47f1e0e1c70f359429e4b7d5f9a813c653 pctSupply 4.0487
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
MediumUnverified bonding curve holds half the supply and all buyer fundsotherAI
The curve contract holds 49.8% of the supply and all the ETH buyers have paid in. Its source code is not verified. It exposes functions such as sweepFees, rescueFees, setCreatorFeeRecipient, initialize and graduate. The factory source suggests these are meant to be callable only by the factory, but that cannot be confirmed without the curve's code. The fork simulation shows that buying and selling work today.
Evidence
- on-chainrelatedContracts: bonding curve 0x5f46c1Bb4884e26Ccf2a7975Fce94B55F8D5dbaF verified=false
- on-chaintopHolders: 0x5f46c1Bb4884e26Ccf2a7975Fce94B55F8D5dbaF 49.8152% (bonding curve)
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol
MediumFactory owner can take a stuck graduation's reserves after 7 daysliquidityAI
Graduation has two steps. First the curve is swept into the factory. Then a Uniswap v4 pool is seeded and permanently locked. If the second step cannot complete, the factory owner (0x263e…19Dd) can call rescueSweptGraduation once 7 days have passed since the sweep. That call sends all swept ETH and tokens to any address the owner picks, for off-chain redistribution. Two limits apply. Anyone can call createGraduatedPool during the wait, and if that succeeds the rescue path closes. The owner can only force-sweep a launch when the seed check fails. Holders must still trust the owner in this edge case.
Evidence
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1285
Show source
function rescueSweptGraduation(address token, address recipient) external onlyOwner nonReentrant { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.Swept) revert WrongGraduationPhase(); if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress(); uint256 availableAt = launch.sweptAt + GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY; if (block.timestamp < availableAt) revert GraduationRescueTooEarly(availableAt); uint256 quoteAmount = launch.sweptQuote; uint256 tokenAmount = launch.sweptTokens; address pairToken = launch.pairToken; launch.sweptQuote = 0; launch.sweptTokens = 0; - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1109-L1123
Show source
function forceSweptGraduation(address token) external onlyOwner nonReentrant { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.NotGraduated) revert WrongGraduationPhase(); PonsV2BondingCurve curve = PonsV2BondingCurve(launch.curve); if (!curve.readyToGraduate()) { revert PonsV2BondingCurve.NotReadyToGraduate(); } if (_graduationSeedable(token, launch, curve.realQuoteReserve(), curve.tokenReserve())) { revert GraduationStillViable(); } _sweepCurve(token, launch, curve); emit LaunchForceSwept(token); } - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1193-L1211
Show source
function createGraduatedPool(address token) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 positionId) { if (address(graduationExecutor) == address(0)) revert GraduationExecutorNotSet(); LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.Swept) revert WrongGraduationPhase(); uint256 sweptQuote = launch.sweptQuote; _assertGraduationSeedable(token, launch, sweptQuote, launch.sweptTokens); uint256 tokenAmount = _lockExcessGraduationTokens(token, launch, sweptQuote, launch.sweptTokens); launch.sweptQuote = 0; launch.sweptTokens = 0; launch.sweptAt = 0; launch.phase = GraduationPhase.PoolCreated;
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
MediumLaunch-day website is a bare launch board built for the Elysium chainwebsiteAI
The website domain was registered on 2026-11-05, the same day the token launched. The token's on-chain description advertises launching and trading 'on Elysium Mainnet with HYPE or KNTQ pairs', but the token lives on Robinhood Chain. The scripted dApp test could not use the site because it requires the 'Elysium Mainnet' chain. The site's JavaScript references a RelayDepository contract (0x4cD0…BC31) that Blockscout labels as scam. That label is not proof. Whether this project is connected to any existing 'Kinetiq'/KNTQ brand cannot be verified from the material. Buyers should not assume such a connection.
Evidence
- on-chaindescription() = Launch and trade tokens on Elysium Mainnet with HYPE or KNTQ pairs. Fund your Elysium wallet with ETH from Robinhood Chain.
Show source
Kinetiq Pad- on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-11-05T12:46:10.717Z
- forkdappTests Swap: The app requires Elysium Mainnet ('Elysium Mainnet' chain), but switching/adding that chain fails with 'unsupported chain'
- on-chain[related 0x4cd00e38] Blockscout flags this address: is_scam=TRUE, reputation=scam (explorer label — not proof)
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol
LowLaunch sniped: 17 wallets took 24.6% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic
The launch was captured: 17 wallets bought 24.6% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.
Evidence
- on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=17, pctSupplyBought=24.5786, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
Confirmed by: facts
LowFactory owner can redirect creator fees after a 3-day noticeownershipAI
The factory owner can propose a new creator-fee recipient for any launch. After a 3-day timelock, anyone can execute the change within a 3-day window. The change also redirects the buyback-vault vest. The creator cannot veto it. This affects creator income, not holders' tokens. The owner can also switch buyback off, but cannot switch it on. Factory ownership can never be renounced.
Evidence
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L946-L957
Show source
function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address token, address newRecipient) external onlyOwner { LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token]; if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound(); if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress(); uint256 effectiveAt = block.timestamp + CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK; uint256 expiresAt = effectiveAt + CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_EXECUTION_WINDOW; pendingCreatorFeeRecipient[token] = PendingCreatorFeeRecipient({newRecipient: newRecipient, effectiveAt: effectiveAt, expiresAt: expiresAt}); emit CreatorFeeRecipientChangeProposed(token, launch.creatorFeeRecipient, newRecipient, effectiveAt, expiresAt); } - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L988-L1006
Show source
function _setCreatorFeeRecipient(address token, LaunchedToken storage launch, address newRecipient) private { if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress(); address previousRecipient = launch.creatorFeeRecipient; launch.creatorFeeRecipient = newRecipient; if (launch.phase == GraduationPhase.PoolCreated) { memeHook.setCreatorFeeRecipient(_poolIdFor(token, launch), newRecipient); } else { PonsV2BondingCurve(launch.curve).setCreatorFeeRecipient(newRecipient); } // Keep the buyback vest's beneficiary aligned with the live creator // recipient so recovery and self-service transfers redirect vested // buyback tokens as well, not only immediate fee payouts. - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L630-L632
Show source
function renounceOwnership() public pure override { revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced(); }
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
LowOne funder controls a 3.8% three-wallet holder clusterholdersAI
Three top holders were funded by the same address (0xf70d…dbef) and together hold 3.83% of supply. They could sell together. Outside the curve, the top 10 holders own 27.5%.
Evidence
- on-chainclusters: funder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef wallets 0xa4bcfcc7f78e37b8a122b2ad53da8f6bbf942afb, 0x73a09c2270f42ad0c0e689691fffcb6c95c8fbb2, 0xa211bb51f3c41ed680dfe9e6d682515b02643f34 pctSupplyHeldNow 3.8306
- on-chaintop10Pct = 27.4997, holdersCount = 97
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol
LowTiny unlocked third-party Uniswap v4 pools exist before graduationliquidityAI
The curve has not graduated, so the official locked pool does not exist yet. Three Uniswap v4 pools were opened by outside wallets with $0–2 of liquidity, none of it locked. Trading there gives terrible prices, and their liquidity can be pulled at any time. The real market is the bonding curve, with about $2,838 of liquidity.
Evidence
- on-chainuniswap-v4 0xef5d0257af…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x1af0a8f2516044ed01d595cdeb3a69e2470d654c [other: wallet (unlocked)] 100%
- on-chainliquidity: pons-v2-bonding-curve 0x5f46c1Bb4884e26Ccf2a7975Fce94B55F8D5dbaF liquidityUsd 2838; launchpad graduated=false
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
LowX replies are generic engagement bait, not real discussionsocialAI
Most mentions of @kinetiqfun are copy-paste style outreach (follow-backs, 'let's connect', a '$Kinetiq could be next 100x' call) from accounts posting the same line more than once. That is not proof the team paid them, but it is not independent support for the token either. One user asked whether the token has burn, buyback, or voting rights and got no answer in the material reviewed.
Evidence
Show source
@kinetiqfun @kinetiqfun $Kinetiq could be next 100x !Show source
@kinetiqfun Amazing vision! 💎 Let’s connect & grow 🤝Show source
@kinetiqfun Use case main token please explain it. Is there a burn buyback voting right?
Confirmed by: grok-4.7
Positive signals (2)
PositiveToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powersownershipAI
Kinetiq is the standard Pons V2 launch token: plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Burnable. There is no owner, mint function, fee, blacklist, pause or transfer restriction. The whole supply was minted once, at deployment, to the bonding curve.
deployer,launchFactoryandcurveare fixed reference values and give no special rights. Slither reported no issues. The fork simulation showed buys, sells, a sell from a second wallet that received tokens by transfer, and a sell one hour later all worked, with 0% transfer tax.Evidence
- codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
Show source
contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable { - codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
Show source
_mint(curve_, supply_); - codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L32-L34
Show source
address public immutable deployer; address public immutable launchFactory; address public immutable curve; - forkcanSell=true, sellTaxPct=2.88, transferTaxPct=0; second wallet (received via transfer) could sell
- staticslither 0.11.6: issues = []
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
PositiveGraduation liquidity will be locked in the Pons LP lockerliquidityAI
When the curve graduates, the factory seeds a full-range Uniswap v4 position and locks it in the Pons LP locker. Excess tokens are locked as well. This protects holders after graduation, provided the locker has no release path. The locker source was omitted, and its owner can change its factory address.
Evidence
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1293-L1307
Show source
function _lockExcessGraduationTokens( address token, LaunchedToken storage launch, uint256 sweptQuote, uint256 totalTokenAmount ) private returns (uint256 poolTokenAmount) { poolTokenAmount = _poolTokenAmount(launch, sweptQuote, totalTokenAmount); uint256 excess = totalTokenAmount - poolTokenAmount; if (excess != 0) { IERC20(token).forceApprove(address(locker), excess); locker.lockTokenSupply(token, excess); emit GraduationTokensPermanentlyLocked(token, excess); } } - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1402
Show source
locker.lockPosition(token, positionId);
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol
Notes (2)
InfoOne-time burn: 0.3% of supply sent to a burn addressburnDeterministic
0.3% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 1 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-05. Burned by: the deployer 0xc919…647b (0.3%, 1 burn). This happened once, around launch; there is no sign of a continuing burn mechanism.
Evidence
- on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x7916bd37d8fc40455a4b1a10a19c3de83ccf4498
- on-chainburns: by 0xc919514ec337577f2b5c6dc2abf62e48258e647b kind deployer pct 0.3
- on-chainDeployer 0xc919514ec337577f2b5c6dc2abf62e48258e647b holds 0% now
Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
InfoAbout 2.9% fee per curve trade (1% protocol + 1.88% creator)feesAI
Every buy and sell on the curve pays a 1% protocol fee and a 1.88% creator tax. The simulation measured 2.86% on a buy and 2.88% on a sell. The factory caps creator tax at 10% and the curve fee at 10%, and these rates are fixed when a token launches. No code shown lets anyone raise this token's fee after launch. The curve itself is unverified, so this cannot be fully confirmed.
Evidence
- forkcurve fees: feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=188
- codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L59-L61
Show source
uint256 private constant MAX_CURVE_FEE_BPS = 1_000; // 10% uint256 private constant MAX_CREATOR_TAX_CEILING_BPS = 1_000; // 10% uint256 private constant MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS = 2_000; // 20% - codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L545-L554
Show source
/** * @notice Adjusts the ceiling a creator's chosen trade tax is validated * against at launch time. Already-launched tokens keep the immutable * tax rate they launched with regardless of later ceiling changes. */ function setMaxCreatorTaxBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner { if (bps > MAX_CREATOR_TAX_CEILING_BPS) revert InvalidBasisPoints(); maxCreatorTaxBps = bps; emit MaxCreatorTaxUpdated(bps); }
Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol
Score breakdown
Higher is safer. The overall is the weighted average of the assessed parts, then capped by hard facts.
Contract
weight 45%85The token itself is a clean fixed-supply template with working buys and sells, but the bonding curve holding half the supply and all buyer funds is unverified, and the Pons factory owner keeps some edge-case powers.
Why this score
Raised the score
- Verified fixed-supply ERC20 with no owner, mint, blacklist or pause
- Buy, sell, transfer-then-sell and delayed sell all pass in simulation
- Slither found no issues
- Curve fees fixed at launch (1% protocol + 1.88% creator)
Lowered the score
- Bonding curve holding ~50% of supply and buyer ETH is unverified
- Factory owner can redirect a stuck graduation's reserves after 7 days
- Factory owner can redirect creator fees after a 3-day timelock
Token
weight 30%35The launch was captured: a creator-declared wallet in an 11-wallet funded cluster helped snipe 24.6% of supply and fully exited on later buyers, and liquidity is small.
Why this score
Raised the score
- Snipers and insiders now hold 0%, so remaining dump pressure from them is low
- Deployer holds nothing and has no recorded sales
- Graduation liquidity is set to be locked in the Pons locker
Lowered the score
- 17 wallets sniped 24.6% of supply in 10 seconds and sold it all
- Creator-declared, snipe-tax-exempt wallet linked to a funded sniper cluster
- Only about $2.8k of liquidity on the curve
- Tiny unlocked third-party Uniswap v4 pools exist
- One funder controls a 3.8% three-wallet cluster
Social / X
weight 15%25A one-day-old anonymous X account uses the name of an established Kinetiq project that does not mention it, and its engagement is mostly generic bait.
Why this score
Raised the score
- No specific scam or rug report about this contract was found
Lowered the score
- Name collides with the established Kinetiq / Elysium project
- X account created on launch day with about 55 followers
- No identified team
- Replies are mostly copy-paste engagement bait
Website
weight 10%30The site was registered on launch day, is only a bare launch board with no docs or team, and points users to an Elysium chain flow that could not be tested.
Why this score
Raised the score
- Site loads and shows a launch board
Lowered the score
- Domain registered the same day as the token
- No docs, team page or link to the established Kinetiq site
- Site requires the Elysium Mainnet chain; the dApp test could not complete
- Site script references a contract that the explorer labels as scam (not proof)