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Robinhood Chain·Scanned 05 Nov 2026, 16:42 UTC

PonsV2LauncherToken $SAIBOT92

0x7673a00106c99d1e00b85496f9f495076873b654

Verdict

Caution

71/100 safety

Template token with no owner powers; buy/sell work at fixed 3.7% curve fee; snipers exited, top holder 2.5%.

The token contract itself is clean: no one controls it, supply is fixed, and buying and selling work with a fixed 3.7% curve fee. The main risks are a thin, not-yet-graduated market, a small bundle and one wallet cluster holding a few percent, and that the token's promised product access is not live yet. The Pons launchpad owner keeps some powers over graduation and fee routing that we could not fully review. Launch snipers have already sold out, and the creator has not sold.

Score breakdown

  • Contract
    86
  • Token
    62
  • Social / X
    55
  • Website
    50

Higher is safer · 0 = worst · 100 = best

Yes
3.7%
None (no owner role)
0% / 0%

NarrativeSteady

Trend scout · Grok 4.7 · X search via twitterapi.io

22/100 heat

A separate score, not part of the safety score: hype never makes a contract safer.

  • agentic futures intelligence
  • crypto futures
  • trading signals
Fit
Core: the product is this narrative
Buzz
Mixed21 posts from 12 accounts; 8% of authors have accounts under 30 days old; 3 accounts wrote 57% of the posts; 6 post(s) with engagement that does not fit the follower count.
Momentum
Project mentions jumped from about 1 to roughly 199 week over week; AI-agent talk was roughly flat.

Talk about $SAIBOT92 is a small burst, mostly the developer describing a futures scanner: market search, regime or Agent State, what changed, and squeeze conditions. Replies are thin, views are low, and several mentions are bots, ticker alerts, or collab asks. Broader AI-agent discussion is active but does not center this token.

Posts and accounts (5 posts)
  • @Tobhiasgsaibot · 05 Nov 2026, 02:50 UTC

    “Find the futures market you want to inspect, open it, then use Agent State to understand the current regime”

  • @Tobhiasgsaibot · 05 Nov 2026, 04:45 UTC

    “The current stack already tracks market state, short-term transitions, squeeze conditions and futures context”

  • @0xGenuflect · 05 Nov 2026, 03:29 UTC

    “Alpha possible #100x $SAIBOT92 #SAIBOT92”

  • @papinossss · 05 Nov 2026, 03:17 UTC

    “SAIBOT92 — Entry Signal”

  • @Larpcheckbot · 05 Nov 2026, 04:04 UTC

    “Unproven futures-tool pitch; 3 linked wallets hold 5.8%, 49 holders, coin 3h old.”

Who pushes it

Posts, last 7 days vs the 7 before

  • project: ~199 vs 1 (up 199.0× (rough))
  • AI agents: ~8089 vs 9477 (flat (rough))
  • crypto futures: ~19342 (no comparison)

~ = estimated from one page of results

Measured in code from 21 posts by 12 accounts: 8% fresh accounts (< 30 days), 0% near-copies, top 3 accounts wrote 57%.

X posts searched from 2026-10-06 to 2026-11-06 (UTC). Post links come only from the X search results.

Key findings

  • MediumClaimed token-gated access is not live; app is analytics only
  • LowGraduation migration relies on unreviewed Pons factory code
  • LowPons owner can redirect creator fees but not touch curve reserves
  • LowThin unlocked Uniswap v4 pool exists before graduation
  • GoodFixed-supply template token with no owner powers

What would change the verdict

  • Raises safety:Curve graduates and liquidity is seeded and locked in the Pons LP locker → up
  • Lowers safety:Pons factory owner uses rescue/graduation-executor powers to divert graduation funds → down
  • Raises safety:Token-gated holder access actually goes live on the site → website/social up

Unlock PRO for this project

A one-time payment adds hourly re-checks for good, a 7-day watch, questions to the jury, the launch map and deeper social forensics.

Post on XView on explorer ↗

Findings

13 findings

Risks (5)

  • MediumClaimed token-gated access is not live; app is analytics onlyclaims-mismatchAI

    The live application did not provide token-gated access or agentic execution: testing found no wallet connection or transaction capability and described the holder layer as planned rather than operational. Memory and infrastructure claims were not independently demonstrated either.

    Evidence

    Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

  • LowGraduation migration relies on unreviewed Pons factory codeliquidityAI

    When the curve sells out, its ETH reserve (about 0.64 ETH real today) and the reserved token allocation are handed to whatever recipient the factory passes in. The factory is then expected to seed a Uniswap v4 pool and lock the position in the Pons LP locker. The factory owner (0x263e…19Dd) has these related powers: - swap the graduation executor and the launch deployer; - call forceSweptGraduation; - call rescueSweptGraduation, which per the function table sends tokens and ETH out, behind a 7-day GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY. The factory source was omitted, so we cannot confirm where rescued or migrated funds go. Holders are trusting the Pons protocol owner for a correct migration. This is a launchpad-wide power, not specific to this token.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L598-L638
      Show source
      function graduate(address recipient) external onlyFactory returns (uint256 quoteOut, uint256 tokenOut) {
              if (graduated) revert AlreadyGraduated();
              if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
              if (!readyToGraduate()) revert NotReadyToGraduate();
      
              // Halt trading before the sweep, not after. The sweep pays the escrow,
              // and a quote asset with a transfer callback can re-enter buy() or
              // sell() from inside that payment. This function is deliberately not
              // nonReentrant so it stays callable from within buy()'s own guarded
              // scope, so the flag is the only thing closing that window. Reentering
              // while it was still false repopulated the fee buckets after they had
              // been zeroed, leaving balances with no quote behind them once the
              // reserve was handed over, and no way to ever sweep them.
              //
              // Safe to set here: readyToGraduate() is already evaluated above, and
    • on-chainfactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) [owner] @PonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1286 — sends tokens out, sends ETH
    • on-chaingraduationExecutor = 0xC7819B64A1dAECD7eC19856d026cb14EfBd89046 (settable by setGraduationExecutor [owner]); GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 604800

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

  • LowPons owner can redirect creator fees but not touch curve reservesownershipAI

    Through the factory, the protocol owner can do three things to this curve: - Change who receives creator fees. Factory comments describe a protocol-owner override, and a 3-day timelock constant exists. - Turn the buyback-and-lock route on or off for future fees. - Call rescueFees, which pays pending fees straight to the fixed protocol recipient and the current creator recipient. None of these can withdraw the curve's trading reserves or change prices. They only affect fee revenue, so the effect on holders is small.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L343-L363
      Show source
      function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
              if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
              emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(deployer, newRecipient);
              deployer = newRecipient;
          }
      
          /**
           * @notice Enables or disables this launch's buyback-and-lock fee route.
           * The factory authorizes both the current creator recipient and protocol
           * owner before forwarding the setting here.
           * @dev Applies to fees charged from here on, not to fees already pending.
           * Each trade earmarks its buyback slice as it is charged, so a toggle
           * cannot reach back and reroute value that accrued under the opposite
           * setting. Without that, a disable landing before a sweep would divert a
           * buyback the creator had already earned into their own payout, and an
    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L850-L871
      Show source
      function rescueFees() external onlyFactory returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount) {
              uint256 pending = quoteFeeBalance;
              uint256 tax = creatorTaxBalance;
              if (pending == 0 && tax == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
      
              protocolAmount = (pending * protocolFeeShareBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
              creatorAmount = pending - protocolAmount + tax;
      
              quoteFeeBalance = 0;
              // Symmetrical with the sweep. This pays the creator their whole
              // bucket, earmark included, so leaving the earmark behind would let a
              // settled claim survive into the next accrual and divert fees the
              // creator has not earned yet into the vest.
              buybackQuoteBalance = 0;
              creatorTaxBalance = 0;
    • on-chainCREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK = 259200

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • LowThin unlocked Uniswap v4 pool exists before graduationliquidityAI

    The curve has not graduated, yet a separate Uniswap v4 pool for the token already exists. It holds about $1 of liquidity, and that liquidity sits in two unlocked wallets. This is not the official migration pool. Its price can be easily moved, and its LP owners can pull the liquidity at any time. Buyers should trade on the bonding curve until graduation.

    Evidence

    • on-chainuniswap-v4 0xec3fea86564ae64dbd6491414432b9a4a15b82f829244ca8ef106da58b8db4fe liquidityUsd=1, lpLockedPct=0
    • on-chainv4 position liquidity holders: 0x2a26d20747edb78f6d4876ed29f78c4863b99e1a [other: wallet (unlocked)] 55.3995%, 0x0ff786e026c2fbd585e8b6adc2ec01e3559a1137 [other: wallet (unlocked)] 44.6004%
    • on-chaincurve: graduated=false

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • LowLaunch bundle and one funding cluster hold a few percentholdersAI

    Two wallets bought 3.34% of supply in the same block shortly after launch (a bundle). Four wallets funded by a single address (0x88d2…51d3) together hold 3.44% now. Concentration outside the curve is moderate: the top 10 holders own 17.6%, and no single wallet holds more than 2.55%. A coordinated sale by the cluster would push the price down but would not drain the curve.

    Evidence

    • on-chainbundles: block 106310338 wallets 0xd8291c56a6f1c1d0625368d221094c7c39027778, 0xb430ced2b4f0de8f52b88ba6842412db3c243d03 pctSupply 3.3371
    • on-chaincluster funder 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3 pctSupplyHeldNow 3.4401
    • on-chaintop10Pct 17.6485

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (3)

  • PositiveFixed-supply template token with no owner powersownershipAI

    SAIBOT92 is the standard Pons V2 launcher token: an OpenZeppelin ERC-20 with a holder-only burn. It has no owner, no mint after construction, no fee, no blacklist, no pause and no transfer hooks. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. The deployer variable is stored only as a label and gives no powers. No one can change balances or block transfers at the token level.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21-L71
      Show source
      contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
          struct Socials {
              string twitter;
              string telegram;
              string discord;
              string website;
              string farcaster;
          }
      
          error ZeroAddress();
      
          address public immutable deployer;
          address public immutable launchFactory;
          address public immutable curve;
    • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
      Show source
      function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
              if (from == address(0)) {
                  // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                  _totalSupply += value;
              } else {
                  uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                  if (fromBalance < value) {
                      revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                  }
                  unchecked {
                      // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                      _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                  }
              }
    • staticprivileges: [] ; slither issues: []

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • PositiveSimulated buy and sell work, including from a second wallethoneypotAI

    A real buy and sell on the bonding curve succeeded on a fork. The round-trip cost was about 3.7% per side, which matches the curve's fixed fees. A wallet that received tokens by plain transfer could also sell, and selling still worked one hour later. Nothing in the token or curve code singles out sellers.

    Evidence

    • forkcanBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=3.68, sellTaxPct=3.7, transferTaxPct=0
    • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok
    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L541-L566
      Show source
      function sell(uint256 tokensIn, uint256 minQuoteOut, address recipient)
              external
              nonReentrant
              onlyInitialized
              returns (uint256 quoteOut)
          {
              if (graduated || readyToGraduate()) revert CurveGraduated();
              if (tokensIn == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
              if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
      
              (uint256 quoteReserveBefore, uint256 tokenReserveBefore) = getReserves();
              IERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokensIn);
      
              uint256 grossQuoteOut = PonsV2BondingCurveMath.getAmountOut(tokensIn, tokenReserveBefore, quoteReserveBefore, 0);
              uint256 fee = (grossQuoteOut * feeBps) / BASIS_POINTS;

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • PositiveVerified dev account predates the token and links the same sitesocialAI

    The project bio points to @Tobhiasgsaibot (display name Tobias G). That account is verified, was created 2025-07-25, links the same website, and has posted about building SAIBOT92 since September 2026 — before the 2026-11-05 token deploy. This is a public handle and first name, not a full identity with documents. The project account itself is small (22 followers, created 2026-08-07) with low likes, and its older posts are about the same product, not an unrelated reused account.

    Evidence

    Confirmed by: grok-4.7

Notes (5)

  • InfoCurve trading fees fixed at 3.7% and cannot be raisedfeesAI

    Every curve buy and sell pays a 1% protocol fee (feeBps=100) plus a 2.7% creator tax (creatorTaxBps=270). Both values are immutable and were set when the curve was deployed. The constructor also refuses any total above 20%. Neither the creator nor the factory owner can raise these fees on this launch. The 99% anti-snipe tax only applied during the first 3 seconds after launch and is now 0.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L109-L114
      Show source
      uint256 public immutable feeBps;
          // Creator-chosen at launch, capped by the protocol at launch time. Kept
          // entirely separate from feeBps: it is layered on top of the base trade
          // fee, not part of the protocol/buyback/creator split, and is paid to
          // the creator in full.
          uint256 public immutable creatorTaxBps;
    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L222
      Show source
      if (feeBps_ + creatorTaxBps_ > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidFeePolicy();
    • on-chaincurve: feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=270, snipeTaxNow=0bps over 3s

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • InfoLaunch snipers bought 6.9% and have fully soldsnipersAI

    Five wallets bought 6.9% of supply in the first 100 blocks. They now hold 0%, so there is no remaining sniper supply waiting to be dumped.

    Evidence

    • on-chainsnipers pctSupplyBought 6.9043, pctSupplyHeldNow 0

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

  • InfoCreator wallet holds 1.52% and has not soldinsidersAI

    The creator 0xB337…1Fad was declared at launch and was exempt from the snipe tax. It holds 1.524% and has sold nothing so far. The creator also earns the 2.7% creator tax on every trade, collected through the fee escrow.

    Evidence

    • on-chainDeployer 0xb337615a3e5b3bc0da356e3a980d3e0eede21fad holds 1.524% now; deployerSoldPct 0
    • on-chaininsiders: declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve)

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

  • InfoCurve sells pause briefly between sell-out and graduationotherAI

    Once the curve's sellable allocation is used up but graduation has not yet run, sell() reverts. Graduation can be triggered without permission through the factory, which reopens trading on Uniswap v4. Holders are not stranded unless the graduation itself fails.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L547
      Show source
      if (graduated || readyToGraduate()) revert CurveGraduated();
    • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L696-L703
      Show source
      function _tryAutoGraduate() private {
              if (readyToGraduate()) {
                  try IPonsV2LaunchFactoryGraduation(factory).graduate(token) {}
                  catch {
                      emit AutoGraduationFailed(token, gasleft());
                  }
              }
          }

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

  • InfoScanner bot criticism is unverified; holder count roughly matchessocialAI

    LarpCheck (an automated scanner bot) called the product unproven and, in earlier replies, sketchy, citing an offline app, a holder-access module not live, and linked wallets / a cabal. Those wallet claims are not in the on-chain basics we have, so they stay unverified. Holder count is in the same ballpark: the bot said 38 then 49 holders; our facts say 44. Top 10 hold about 17.6%. No third-party posts we found call this contract a rug or honeypot. A separate price bot listed a different SAIBOT92 address, not this contract.

    Evidence

    Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol · Disputed by: claude-opus-5.5

Score breakdown

Higher is safer. The overall is the weighted average of the assessed parts, then capped by hard facts.

  • Contract

    weight 45%
    86

    Verified, non-upgradeable fixed-supply token with no owner powers and working buy/sell at immutable fees; some protocol-level graduation powers rely on unreviewed factory code.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • No owner, mint, pause, blacklist or fee in token
    • Buy, sell and second-wallet sell all pass
    • Curve fees fixed at 3.7% and cannot be raised
    • Verified source, no Slither issues

    Lowered the score

    • Graduation migration depends on unreviewed factory code
    • Pons owner can redirect creator fees and toggle buyback
  • Token

    weight 30%
    62

    Moderate distribution and a fairly clean launch, but liquidity is tiny and a bundle plus a funding cluster exist.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • Snipers took only 6.9% and have fully exited
    • Creator holds 1.5% and has not sold
    • No single wallet above 2.55%; empty deployer rug history

    Lowered the score

    • Two-wallet launch bundle bought 3.3%
    • Four wallets from one funder hold 3.4%
    • Curve liquidity only about $1.4k; not yet graduated
    • Thin unlocked $1 Uniswap v4 pool outside the curve
  • Social / X

    weight 15%
    55

    Small but consistent account history with a verified dev handle predating the token, though posts overstate what is live.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • Verified dev account predates token and links same site
    • Project posts consistently about the same product

    Lowered the score

    • Project account small (22 followers, created Aug 2026)
    • Posts claim token utility that is not live
    • Scanner bot allegations remain unverified
  • Website

    weight 10%
    50

    A working futures analytics dashboard exists, but the token's claimed access utility is only planned and the site is thin.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • Futures telemetry dashboard confirmed working

    Lowered the score

    • Token-gated access claim contradicted by testing
    • No tokenomics, team or docs visible on site
    • Domain about two months old