PonsV2LauncherToken $LMNI

Risks (10)

• HighLaunch sniped: 54 wallets took 90.3% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 54 wallets bought 90.3% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 1.91% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=54, pctSupplyBought=90.3474, pctSupplyHeldNow=1.9073
  • on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought=90.3474, pctSupplyHeldNow=1.9073
  • on-chainbundle block 105539959 commonFunder 0xa5a5491bca93dd4c076e4906e79e7673f4a5a142 pctSupply=14.7316
  • on-chainbundle block 105539960 commonFunder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupply=8.3252

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumOne funder's 12 wallets bundled 8.33% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  12 wallets funded by the same address 0xf70d…dbef bought 8.33% of the supply together (block 105539960). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef: 12 wallets, pctSupply 8.33

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumOne funder's 11 wallets bundled 14.7% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  11 wallets funded by the same address 0xa5a5…a142 bought 14.7% of the supply together (block 105539959). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0xa5a5491bca93dd4c076e4906e79e7673f4a5a142: 11 wallets, pctSupply 14.73

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumCreator-declared wallets bought 19.3% of supply at launchinsidersDeterministic

  3 wallet(s) linked to the team (declared by the creator at launch, exempt from the snipe tax) bought 19.3% of the supply in the first blocks — an insider allocation that real buyers did not get. They now hold 0%, so current dump pressure from them is low; most of it has already been sold.

  Evidence

  • on-chaininsiders: 3 wallets, fundedBy declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0xb74811d9b157dfcfc4198a82bcdeba763050adfa), bought at launch 19.25%, pctSupplyHeldNow 0
  • on-chaininsiders: wallets 0xb74811d9b157dfcfc4198a82bcdeba763050adfa, 0x0f045383c56776c27c7c3a024446427091cfd9af, 0x1f03b9e27c67b9cd5f3518dcd39f5a7037328000; pctSupplyHeldNow=0
    Show source

    declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve

  • on-chainbundle block 105539938 pctSupply=19.2502
  • on-chaindeployerSoldPct=2.6477; burns by deployer 6.5%

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumTeam's buyback-burn claim is not backed by the on-chain burnsclaims-mismatchAI

  The 65M-token burn and 6.5% figure are confirmed, but all four recorded burns are attributed to the deployer and none is identified as a buyback burn. Thus the claim's buyback component is not supported by the burn trail and is misleading when presented together with the burn total.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate/status/2117927336322482362
    Show source

    65M $LMNI burned so far. That's 6.5% of supply. 40M from the dev allocation. Follow-up burns: 10M + 10M + 5M. Buybacks after launch: 22.22M $LMNI across 36 purchases.

  • on-chaintoken.burns.burned = 65000000000000000000000000; token.burns.burnedPct = 6.5; token.burns.count = 4
  • on-chaintoken.burns.buybackBurns = 0
  • on-chaintoken.burns.by: address=0xb74811d9b157dfcfc4198a82bcdeba763050adfa, kind=deployer, pct=6.5, count=4, buyback=0

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: claude-opus-5.5

• LowPool charges a fixed 2.5% fee on every tradefeesAI

  After graduation the shared Pons hook takes 1% (hook fee) plus 1.5% (creator tax) of each swap's output side through afterSwap. The hook fee is split 30% to the protocol, with the rest going to the creator and buyback. The creator tax goes entirely to the creator. The rates are snapshotted per pool when the pool is registered, and _afterSwap reads the stored per-pool values. The owner's setHookFeeBps (capped at 10%) therefore only affects future launches, not this pool. Registration also caps creator tax plus hook fee at 20% combined. This fee is normal launchpad economics.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L444-L485
    Show source

    function _afterSwap(address, PoolKey calldata key, SwapParams calldata params, BalanceDelta delta, bytes calldata)
            internal
            override
            returns (bytes4, int128)
        {
            // The conversion and buyback legs swap against this same pool, but
            // they are never taxed here: v4-core skips a pool's hooks when the
            // hook itself is the caller (Hooks.afterSwap). Were that not so, the
            // skim would come out of the buyback before it reached the vault.
            PoolId poolId = key.toId();
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L342-L378
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    if (
                policy.protocolFeeRecipient == address(0) || policy.protocolFeeShareBps > MAX_PROTOCOL_FEE_SHARE_BPS
                    || policy.buybackBurnBps > BASIS_POINTS || policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS
                    || policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps == 0 || policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps >= BASIS_POINTS
            ) {
                revert InvalidBps();
            }
            // The curve bounds the same sum in its own constructor rather than
            // inheriting it from the factory. A pool taking more than the whole
            // unspecified leg would flip the swapper's output delta negative.
            if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
    
            // The factory builds the key correctly today, but these two facts are
            // what every later fee credit and swap direction is derived from. A
            // memecoin that is neither currency would silently designate the wrong

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L251-L255
    Show source

    function setHookFeeBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
            hookFeeBps = bps;
            emit HookFeeBpsUpdated(bps);
        }

  • on-chainlaunchpad fees: buyPct=2.5, sellPct=2.5 (protocol fee 1%; creator tax 1.5%)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowOne Pons admin controls the hook, factory, vault and LP lockerownershipAI

  Address 0x263e…19Dd owns the meme hook, the launch factory, the buyback vault and the LP locker. Hook ownership cannot be renounced. For this pool the hook owner can: - replace the fee-sweep operator, which decides when memecoin fees are converted and bought back; - rescue pending fees, but only to the stored recipients. The owner can also point the vault and locker at a new factory via setFactory. Factory-only actions on graduated launches include rescueSweptGraduation, which moves tokens and ETH after a 7-day delay. The locker, vault and factory sources were not provided, so whether a changed factory could touch locked LP cannot be confirmed. Whether this admin is a multisig is unknown. This is launchpad-wide trust, not a token-specific backdoor.

  Evidence

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; PonsV2LaunchFactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; PonsV2BuybackVault owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; PonsV2LaunchLocker owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd
  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L230-L237
    Show source

    /**
         * @notice Permanently disabled. An ownerless hook could never rotate the
         * fee sweep operator, so accrued fees on every graduated pool would stay
         * stranded. Ownership can still be transferred to a new owner.
         */
        function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L274-L278
    Show source

    function setFeeSweepOperator(address operator) external onlyOwner {
            if (operator == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            feeSweepOperator = operator;
            emit FeeSweepOperatorUpdated(operator);
        }

  • on-chainPonsV2LaunchLocker setFactory(address) [owner]; PonsV2LaunchFactory rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) [owner]; GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 604800

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowWebsite domain is days old and dApp tests could not runwebsiteAI

  The project domain was registered on 2026-10-26, about nine days before the token launched. It was first archived on launch day. The automated dApp tests did not complete because the site did not finish responding, so any wallet interactions on the site are untested.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://get-lemniscate.tech/
    Show source

    Lemniscate | Options that never expire

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-10-26T14:38:54.161Z; waybackFirstSeen = 2026-11-04T03:56:52Z
  • forkwarnings: dApp tests stopped after 5 min (the site did not finish responding) — skipped

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowWebsite never names the LMNI token or its contractwebsiteAI

  The public site only markets everlasting options. It does not mention the ticker, the token contract, supply, or how the coin relates to the options product. Holders cannot confirm from the site that this Pons launch token is the project's token. The X account does name $LMNI, so a scanner claim that X never names the coin is wrong.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://get-lemniscate.tech/
    Show source

    Options that never expire. Explore everlasting calls, puts, and Stock Token protection with Lemniscate.

  • Xhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate/status/2118039419055960110
    Show source

    Stick with us. $LMNI.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowX bio implies a Robinhood app listing; product is on Robinhood Chainclaims-mismatchAI

  The profile says the product is 'Live On @robinhoodapp'. Launch posts say it is on Robinhood Chain, a separate chain (eip155:4663), not the retail Robinhood app. That wording can make the product look officially inside Robinhood when the posts only claim a chain deployment.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate
    Show source

    Everlasting options for tokenized stocks.
    Live On @robinhoodapp

  • Xhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate/status/2117867187725865367
    Show source

    We built the first options on Robinhood Chain that never expire. ... Live on mainnet since Oct 29.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (3)

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powersownershipAI

  LMNI is the standard Pons V2 launch token: a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus voluntary burn. It has no owner, no mint after deployment, no fees, no blacklist and no pause. The whole supply was minted once, to the bonding curve, in the constructor. The stored deployer value is reference data only and gives no control. Static analysis found no privileges or issues.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21-L71
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
        struct Socials {
            string twitter;
            string telegram;
            string discord;
            string website;
            string farcaster;
        }
    
        error ZeroAddress();
    
        address public immutable deployer;
        address public immutable launchFactory;
        address public immutable curve;

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • on-chainprivileges = [] ; static issues = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveBuy, sell and transfer-then-sell all worked at 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  A fork simulation bought and sold through the graduated Uniswap v4 pool and got exactly the expected amounts. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and selling still worked an hour later. Token-level tax was 0% on buys, sells and transfers.

  Evidence

  • forkcanBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
    Show source

    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is fully held by the Pons LP lockerliquidityAI

  The graduated v4 pool (about $25k of liquidity) is 100% locked and the deployer holds none of it. The locker 0x2674…4952 is the Pons launchpad locker. Its function table shows only factory-gated lock functions and no unlock or withdraw function. Its source was not provided (see unknowns).

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity pool 0xacfdab1773ab86dceeddb327a1eafb03dcd08327882643049e2998e7405c5d71: lpLockedPct=100, lpHeldByDeployerPct=0, liquidityUsd=25236
  • on-chainPonsV2LaunchLocker functions: lockPosition [factory], lockTokenSupply [factory], setFactory [owner]

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (5)

• InfoOne-time burn: 6.5% of supply sent to a burn addressburnDeterministic

  6.5% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 4 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-04. Burned by: the deployer 0xb748…adfa (6.5%, 4 burns). This happened once, around launch; there is no sign of a continuing burn mechanism.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x63b5c2b1eb93ad62ea06560370f4f317ee1b97d3

  Confirmed by: facts

• InfoPool hook cannot block sells or LP withdrawalsotherAI

  The hook address only enables three callbacks: beforeInitialize, afterSwap and afterSwapReturnDelta. beforeRemoveLiquidity and beforeSwap are disabled, so the hook cannot lock LPs or reject a swap before it runs. afterSwap only takes the fixed per-pool fee and has no whitelist or owner-controlled revert. The owner's rescuePoolFees only pays pending fees to the recipients stored for the pool, not to an arbitrary address.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L184-L201
    Show source

    function getHookPermissions() public pure override returns (Hooks.Permissions memory) {
            return Hooks.Permissions({
                beforeInitialize: true,
                afterInitialize: false,
                beforeAddLiquidity: false,
                afterAddLiquidity: false,
                beforeRemoveLiquidity: false,
                afterRemoveLiquidity: false,
                beforeSwap: false,
                afterSwap: true,
                beforeDonate: false,
                afterDonate: false,
                beforeSwapReturnDelta: false,
                afterSwapReturnDelta: true,
                afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta: false,

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
    Show source

    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  • on-chainhook permissions (from address bits) = beforeInitialize, afterSwap, afterSwapReturnDelta

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoAnonymous rug accusations are unproven by deployer historysocialAI

  Several accounts say $LMNI and @UseBursar are the same team and that the team already rugged. Those posts give no names, wallet, or transaction, and one says the proof was a screenshot from an insider group. The on-chain basics list no prior tokens for this deployer, so the rug history is unverified. Do not treat the posts as proof.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/jideade58/status/2118038682749829400
    Show source

    Same team is responsible for multiple rugs, u losers @UseLemniscate . Also don’t buy @UseBursar , same team. Both rugs.

  • Xhttps://x.com/hnaplus75/status/2118038100773597434
    Show source

    This is big scam (lmni vs bursar same dev)!

  • on-chaindeployerHistory=[] for deployer 0xb74811d9b157dFcFc4198a82BCdeBA763050aDfA
    Show source

    deployerHistory: []

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoTeam is anonymous: no named person behind 'main dev'socialAI

  The account speaks as 'Main dev' and asks holders who do not believe to sell, but the bio and posts do not name anyone or link identity proof. 'Doxxed' cannot be checked. The X account itself is new (created 2026-10-08), verified, with about 300 followers.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate/status/2118039419055960110
    Show source

    We wish those that don’t believe in us to sell, move on. Last message on this matter. Main dev.

  • webhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• InfoOptions writer deposits have a lock and multi-day withdrawal delayclaims-mismatchAI

  The team says money put in as an options writer waits out a 24 hour deposit lock, then a withdrawal ticket, then 3 days before claim, and the payout uses the pool value at claim time. That is a delay and price risk for people funding the options pool, not a power shown on the LMNI token contract itself. Whether the contracts enforce it was not checked here.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/UseLemniscate/status/2118012210081673373
    Show source

    Lemniscate writer withdrawals: 1. Wait out the 24 hour deposit lock. 2. Request a withdrawal ticket. 3. Claim after 3 days. Your payout uses the pool value at claim time.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol