PonsV2LauncherToken $Metrion

Risks (5)

• HighCreator-declared wallets bought 30% of supply at launchinsidersDeterministic

  6 wallet(s) linked to the team (declared by the creator at launch, exempt from the snipe tax) bought 30% of the supply in the first blocks — an insider allocation that real buyers did not get. They now hold 0.58%, so current dump pressure from them is low; most of it has already been sold.

  Evidence

  • on-chaininsiders: 6 wallets, fundedBy declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0xd7cdbd82e852b8f81f036b5f280e6ef085e7bce7), bought at launch 30%, pctSupplyHeldNow 0.576
  • on-chaintoken.bundles[block 106220092] commonFunder 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3 pctSupply 30
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    "pctSupply": 30

  • on-chaintoken.insiders fundedBy
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    declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0xd7cdbd82e852b8f81f036b5f280e6ef085e7bce7)

  • on-chaintoken.insiders pctSupplyHeldNow = 0.576; token.clusters[funder 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3] pctSupplyHeldNow = 0
  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L326-L335
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    * @notice Marks `account` as exempt from the snipe tax. Called by the
         * factory during the launch transaction for the creator, their fee
         * recipient, and any bundle wallets the creator declared, so a team's
         * own opening buys clear at the untaxed price while sniper bots in the
         * same window do not.
         */
        function exemptFromSnipeTax(address account) external onlyFactory {
            snipeTaxExempt[account] = true;
            emit SnipeTaxExempted(account);
        }

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• HighSite staking sends ETH to an unverified contract that can slashotherAI

  The Stake page of metrion.network sends ETH to 0x981A…a5C3 via stake(). The fork test confirmed 0.05 ETH left the wallet and is held by that contract. The contract is unverified. Its function table shows slash(address,uint256), setGovernance(address), setConfig(uint256,uint64), transferAdmin, a treasury() address and an unbonding period. Who can call slash or setConfig, and where slashed funds go, cannot be checked. The Unstake test did not run (time budget ran out), so getting deposited ETH back was never demonstrated. Whoever controls admin or governance may be able to slash stakers or change the unbonding terms. Treat any deposit there as trusting an unaudited team contract.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests Stake step: stake() to 0x981a6db50da1d8c20c8e66136df070149a10a5c3
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    wallet -0.05 ETH; contracts: 0x981a…a5c3 (staking) +0.05 ETH; 1 tx (stake ok)

  • forkdappTests Unstake
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    skipped: the dApp-test time budget ran out before this goal

  • staticrelated staking 0x981A6DB50DA1d8C20C8e66136DF070149A10a5C3 verified=false functions slash(address,uint256), setGovernance(address), setConfig(uint256,uint64), withdraw()

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumProject's unverified v4 hook can take swap amounts at a settable feeotherAI

  The website code references a v4 hook at 0x384e…e0cc. This is the project's own hook, not the Pons meme hook. Its address bits enable beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta and afterSwapReturnDelta. That means it can block swaps and take part of each swap's amounts in any pool created with it. It also exposes setFeeBps(bytes32,uint16), reclaim, flush and pool-ownership transfer functions. The source is unverified, so the fee cap (a MAX_FEE_BPS exists but its value is unknown), who can set fees, and where the taken amounts go cannot be checked. The three Metrion v4 pools in FACTS hold about $0–1 of liquidity, so current exposure is small. The token's real market is the Pons bonding curve.

  Evidence

  • staticrelated v4-hook 0x384e596AFF89E1b603539ce3DcE2c2B0849de0cc param hook permissions (from address bits)
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    beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta

  • staticrelated v4-hook 0x384e596AFF89E1b603539ce3DcE2c2B0849de0cc fn setFeeBps(bytes32,uint16) risk=high, verified=false
  • on-chaintoken.liquidity uniswap-v4 pools liquidityUsd
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    "liquidityUsd": 1

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowPons factory owner can redirect creator fees and rescue graduation fundsownershipAI

  The bonding curve's privileged caller is the Pons factory 0x7eD5…EC7e, owned by 0x263e…19Dd. Through the factory, that owner can: - call rescueCurveFees / rescueFees, which pays pending fees directly to the fixed protocol and creator recipients; - change the creator fee recipient (a 72h timelock appears for the self-service path); - toggle buyback; - call rescueSweptGraduation, which sends graduation tokens and ETH out, with GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 7 days. The factory source was omitted, so the recipient of rescueSweptGraduation cannot be confirmed. The curve itself cannot be paused. Its fee rates are immutable, and its trading reserves can only leave through graduate(), which requires the sellable allocation to be exhausted.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L598-L639
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    function graduate(address recipient) external onlyFactory returns (uint256 quoteOut, uint256 tokenOut) {
            if (graduated) revert AlreadyGraduated();
            if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            if (!readyToGraduate()) revert NotReadyToGraduate();
    
            // Halt trading before the sweep, not after. The sweep pays the escrow,
            // and a quote asset with a transfer callback can re-enter buy() or
            // sell() from inside that payment. This function is deliberately not
            // nonReentrant so it stays callable from within buy()'s own guarded
            // scope, so the flag is the only thing closing that window. Reentering
            // while it was still false repopulated the fee buckets after they had
            // been zeroed, leaving balances with no quote behind them once the
            // reserve was handed over, and no way to ever sweep them.
            //
            // Safe to set here: readyToGraduate() is already evaluated above, and

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L850-L871
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    function rescueFees() external onlyFactory returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount) {
            uint256 pending = quoteFeeBalance;
            uint256 tax = creatorTaxBalance;
            if (pending == 0 && tax == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
    
            protocolAmount = (pending * protocolFeeShareBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            creatorAmount = pending - protocolAmount + tax;
    
            quoteFeeBalance = 0;
            // Symmetrical with the sweep. This pays the creator their whole
            // bucket, earmark included, so leaving the earmark behind would let a
            // settled claim survive into the next accrual and divert fees the
            // creator has not earned yet into the vest.
            buybackQuoteBalance = 0;
            creatorTaxBalance = 0;

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L343-L347
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    function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(deployer, newRecipient);
            deployer = newRecipient;
        }

  • staticlaunchpad-factory fn rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) [owner] @PonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1286 — sends tokens out, sends ETH
  • on-chainlaunchpad-factory param GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 604800; owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowOther Metrion app contracts are unverified and admin-controlledotherAI

  The dApp references several contracts that are all unverified: - a vault implementation 0x858E…2Ea0, with setTipBps and withdrawToken; owner listed as renounced; - a controller/registry 0x5C76…df8f, owner 0x06a8…f6E8, with setShareBps; - a registry 0xB62B…1B23, with setFee and withdraw; - a streaming contract 0x6d78…89cF; - a vault factory 0xA42c…250b. These are only relevant to users who deposit into the Metrion app, not to token holders. Their fee caps and timelocks (DELAY / GRACE_PERIOD functions exist) cannot be verified.

  Evidence

  • staticrelated registry 0x5C7647806d77e8077B1B3007218dd5dAe149df8f owner=0x06a8E85459Be9FE4D63199F34C50CCCd25A9f6E8 fn setShareBps(uint16)
  • staticrelated registry 0xB62B6b66a8F417a7E82e96570CC8eCfcBC141B23 fn setFee(uint16), withdraw(address)
  • staticrelated vault 0x858E56B476FA0F405124C66e4328cEfCe5Ba2Ea0 fn withdrawToken(address,address,uint256), setTipBps(uint16)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (3)

• PositiveBuy, sell and transfer-then-sell all work in simulationhoneypotAI

  A real buy and sell on the bonding curve succeeded. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell after 1 hour worked. The token has no transfer restrictions. One normal launchpad behaviour to know about: the curve refuses sells once the sellable allocation is used up but graduation has not completed yet. In that state anyone can trigger graduation, and trading then moves to the Uniswap v4 pool.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation canBuy=true, canSell=true, transferTaxPct=0
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    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L547
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    if (graduated || readyToGraduate()) revert CurveGraduated();

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveToken is the standard Pons template with no owner powersownershipAI

  PonsV2LauncherToken is plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus Burnable. Its fixed supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. It has: - no owner; - no mint, pause, blacklist or fee logic; - no override of _update. The 'deployer' field is reference data only.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
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    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
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    _mint(curve_, supply_);

  • staticslither: issues = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveX account and domain were created months before the tokensocialAI

  The project X account and the website domain were both created on 2026-07-24, about three months before the token was deployed on 2026-11-04. The account is verified, has only 16 followers and 2 following, and recent posts have 0–3 likes, so the audience size matches the engagement. That pattern does not look like a same-day throwaway or a bought account with fake followers. No older posts were returned, so a prior unrelated history cannot be ruled out from this material.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/0xMetrion/status/2118095852833251351
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    Give your pool a payroll. Metrion is live on Robinhood Chain. ... CA: 0x5eb674dcf0d6b4398d143a90642a905391e91c92

  • webhttps://metrion.network/
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    Metrion streams a Uniswap v4 pool's swap fees to keepers, LPs and contributors, in ETH, by the second, on Robinhood Chain.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (3)

• LowFixed 3.25% curve fee, 2.25% of it goes to the creatorfeesAI

  Every buy and sell on the curve pays a 1% protocol/creator fee plus a 2.25% creator tax, both on the ETH side. Both rates are immutable for this launch and capped at 20% combined by the curve constructor. Nobody can raise them. The simulation measured 3.23% on buy and 3.25% on sell. The creator has accrued about 0.0145 ETH of tax so far.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L109-L114
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    uint256 public immutable feeBps;
        // Creator-chosen at launch, capped by the protocol at launch time. Kept
        // entirely separate from feeBps: it is layered on top of the base trade
        // fee, not part of the protocol/buyback/creator split, and is paid to
        // the creator in full.
        uint256 public immutable creatorTaxBps;

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L222
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    if (feeBps_ + creatorTaxBps_ > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidFeePolicy();

  • forksimulation buyTaxPct 3.23 / sellTaxPct 3.25

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoOne-page site with no docs, named team or lock proofwebsiteAI

  metrion.network repeats the payroll-hook pitch and says the fee is capped in bytecode, but the fetched page has no docs, team names, audit, or lock proof. The fee-cap line is a website claim only; this review was not given hook source to check it. A lock link in an X post could not be opened, so the 'team tokens are locked' claim is unverifiable, not confirmed and not contradicted.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://metrion.network/
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    Existing pools join through a fee vault, new pools through MetrionHook, with the fee capped in bytecode.

  • Xhttps://x.com/0xMetrion/status/2118106822318203335
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    Team Tokens are locked, https://t.co/uyUNc65HCh

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoScanner bot scores are unverified and use outdated holder countssocialAI

  Larpcheckbot called the narrative partly real and said payroll use and the bytecode fee cap were unconfirmed, and that launch buyers dumped. Those are bot allegations, not facts. Its snapshots said 51–52 holders; the basics given here show 92 holders, top 10 about 25.6%, and an empty deployer history, so the holder figure is outdated and no prior rugs by this deployer are in the facts. A keyword search did not return third-party scam or rug posts about this token.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/Larpcheckbot/status/2118116943160881257
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    Metrion · TOTAL 46/100 · NARRATIVE: PARTLY REAL 42 · COIN: NEUTRAL 50 Real contracts, no live use yet

  • Xhttps://x.com/Larpcheckbot/status/2118106713010094581
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    $Metrion · TOTAL 45/100 · NARRATIVE: PARTLY REAL 48 · COIN: SKETCHY 42 (insiders 7%)

  • on-chainholdersCount=92; top10Pct=25.6339; deployerHistory=[]
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    target 0x5eb674dcf0d6b4398d143a90642a905391e91c92 PonsV2LauncherToken deployer 0xD7cdBD82E852b8f81F036b5F280e6eF085E7bcE7

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol