PonsV2LauncherToken $PURSUIT

Risks (5)

• HighOne funder's 6 wallets bundled 16% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  6 wallets funded by the same address 0xe68d…1934 bought 16% of the supply together (blocks 105236491, 105236496, 105236487). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0xe68d0bbc023de3febda04f413db23ce9c5ea1934: 6 wallets, pctSupply 15.99

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighCreator-declared wallets bought 25% of supply at launchinsidersDeterministic

  4 wallet(s) linked to the team (declared by the creator at launch, exempt from the snipe tax) bought 25% of the supply in the first blocks — an insider allocation that real buyers did not get. They now hold 0.33%, so current dump pressure from them is low; most of it has already been sold.

  Evidence

  • on-chaininsiders: 4 wallets, fundedBy declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0x96da40cc87b545c5f3cdfe21a2bd24022ced75f4), bought at launch 25%, pctSupplyHeldNow 0.327
  • on-chaintoken.bundles[0]: block 105236451, wallets 0x07628da48cc772a5a54581024df8a6ea601fcb54, 0x3fb0e563afe9517e821cba5cb2ba44a64ad1d863, 0x7acb2246a3a1321c2e64fa7cd2de643288921d41, pctSupply 25
  • on-chaintoken.insiders: declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve), pctSupplyHeldNow 0.327
  • on-chainDeployer 0x96da40cc87b545c5f3cdfe21a2bd24022ced75f4 holds 0.327% now

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• HighLaunch sniped: 16 wallets took 62.6% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 16 wallets bought 62.6% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 2.31% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=16, pctSupplyBought=62.5569, pctSupplyHeldNow=2.3065
  • on-chaintoken.snipers: pctSupplyBought 62.5569, pctSupplyHeldNow 2.3065
  • on-chaintoken.clusters: funder 0x88d25c861938a91af4ad57ad964a8fcc6c6351d3, 5 wallets, pctSupplyHeldNow 8.3387
  • on-chaintoken.clusters: funder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef, pctSupplyHeldNow 3.6394
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x32369e24a1e1d6f8dd6dc495ad7a3500bb6b6cff6be03410f6848584fe74fa3e liquidityUsd 28859

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowEach pool swap pays about 3% in fees (1% protocol, 2% creator)feesAI

  The graduated pool uses the Pons hook PonsV2MemeHook. After each swap, the hook takes hookFeeBps plus the pool's creatorTaxBps from the swap output. Facts show 1% and 2%, which matches the launchpad note of 3% on buys and on sells. The fee terms are copied into the pool's own record when the pool is registered, and _afterSwap reads those stored values. So the hook owner's live setters (for example setHookFeeBps up to 10%) do not change the fee on this existing pool. The creator tax goes entirely to the creator. The 1% fee is split 30% to the protocol and the rest to the creator, with an optional buyback slice. The hook only has beforeInitialize, afterSwap and afterSwapReturnDelta permissions. It has no beforeSwap logic and no code that blocks particular sellers.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L444-L485
    Show source

    function _afterSwap(address, PoolKey calldata key, SwapParams calldata params, BalanceDelta delta, bytes calldata)
            internal
            override
            returns (bytes4, int128)
        {
            // The conversion and buyback legs swap against this same pool, but
            // they are never taxed here: v4-core skips a pool's hooks when the
            // hook itself is the caller (Hooks.afterSwap). Were that not so, the
            // skim would come out of the buyback before it reached the vault.
            PoolId poolId = key.toId();
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L364-L378
    Show source

    launches[poolId] = LaunchInfo({
                registered: true,
                memecoinIsCurrency0: memecoinIsCurrency0,
                memecoin: memecoin,
                quoteToken: quoteToken,
                creator: creator,
                buybackCreatorRecipient: buybackCreatorRecipient,
                protocolFeeRecipient: policy.protocolFeeRecipient,
                creatorTaxBps: creatorTaxBps,
                protocolFeeShareBps: policy.protocolFeeShareBps,
                buybackBurnBps: policy.buybackBurnBps,
                hookFeeBps: policy.hookFeeBps,
                maxInternalPriceImpactBps: policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps,
                buybackEnabled: buybackEnabled
            });

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L184-L201
    Show source

    function getHookPermissions() public pure override returns (Hooks.Permissions memory) {
            return Hooks.Permissions({
                beforeInitialize: true,
                afterInitialize: false,
                beforeAddLiquidity: false,
                afterAddLiquidity: false,
                beforeRemoveLiquidity: false,
                afterRemoveLiquidity: false,
                beforeSwap: false,
                afterSwap: true,
                beforeDonate: false,
                afterDonate: false,
                beforeSwapReturnDelta: false,
                afterSwapReturnDelta: true,
                afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta: false,

  • on-chainlaunchpad.fees: buyPct 3, sellPct 3; curve feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=200

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowPons protocol owner keeps admin powers over shared launch contractsownershipAI

  Address 0x263e…19Dd owns PonsV2MemeHook, PonsV2LaunchFactory, PonsV2BuybackVault and PonsV2LaunchLocker. Hook ownership cannot be renounced. **On the hook, the owner can:** - change the fee policy for future launches (hook fee capped at 10%, protocol share capped at 50%); - change the protocol fee recipient for future launches; - replace the fee-sweep operator, the trusted address that converts accrued fees; - call rescuePoolFees, which pays pending fees to this pool's stored protocol recipient and creator — not to the owner. **On the factory:** the owner has rescue functions (rescueCurveFees, rescueSweptGraduation, forceSweptGraduation) and can redirect a creator fee recipient. The factory source was omitted, so the full limits of these powers are unknown. The existing pool's fee terms are stored per pool, so none of these powers can raise this pool's swap fee or block sells, based on the code shown.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L235-L278
    Show source

    function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }
    
        function setProtocolFeeShareBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > MAX_PROTOCOL_FEE_SHARE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
            protocolFeeShareBps = bps;
            emit ProtocolFeeShareUpdated(bps);
        }
    
        function setBuybackBurnBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > BASIS_POINTS) revert InvalidBps();
            buybackBurnBps = bps;
            emit BuybackBurnBpsUpdated(bps);
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
    Show source

    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L384-L397
    Show source

    /**
         * @notice Updates who receives this pool's creator fee share. Restricted
         * to the factory, which gates both self-service creator transfers and
         * protocol-owner overrides before forwarding here, so this contract only
         * needs to trust one caller.
         */
        function setCreatorFeeRecipient(PoolId poolId, address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            LaunchInfo storage info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(poolId, info.creator, newRecipient);
            info.creator = newRecipient;
        }

  • on-chainPonsV2LaunchFactory owner=0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK = 259200

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (5)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 1.0% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  1.0% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 11 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-05. Burned by: the deployer 0x96da…75f4 (1%, 1 burn); holder 0x5d75…305e (0.05%, 10 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x5de206d1b29364e7a543f7a5d388ca3e2dc25b81
  • on-chaintoken.burns.by: 0x96da40cc87b545c5f3cdfe21a2bd24022ced75f4 kind deployer pct 1
  • on-chaindeployerSoldPct 0

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powersownershipAI

  PURSUIT is the standard Pons V2 launch template: an OpenZeppelin ERC-20 plus voluntary burn. It has no owner, no mint after deployment, no fee, no blacklist and no pause. The whole supply was minted once, to the bonding curve, in the constructor. The stored deployer address is reference data only and gives no special rights. Slither reported no issues. No one can change how transfers of this token work.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L44-L71
    Show source

    constructor(
            string memory name_,
            string memory symbol_,
            string memory logo_,
            string memory description_,
            Socials memory socials_,
            address deployer_,
            address curve_,
            address launchFactory_,
            uint256 supply_
        ) ERC20(name_, symbol_) {
            if (deployer_ == address(0) || curve_ == address(0) || launchFactory_ == address(0)) {
                revert ZeroAddress();
            }

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • on-chainprivileges = [] ; isProxy = false
  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveBuy, sell and transfer all work with 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  A real buy and sell were simulated on the graduated Uniswap v4 pool. Both succeeded at the expected amounts. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell one hour later also worked. Token-level buy, sell and transfer tax are all 0%. The pool-level hook fee is already included in the quotes.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation: canBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
  • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell
  • forksell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is held by the Pons LP lockerliquidityAI

  The graduated Uniswap v4 pool reports 100% of its LP locked and none held by the deployer. The Pons locker 0x2674…4952 also holds 8.16% of the token supply. The locker's source was not provided. Its owner, 0x263e…19Dd (the Pons protocol owner), can call setFactory. Whether the locker or the factory can ever release the LP position or the locked tokens could not be verified.

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity 0x32369e24a1e1d6f8dd6dc495ad7a3500bb6b6cff6be03410f6848584fe74fa3e: lpLockedPct 100, lpHeldByDeployerPct 0
  • on-chainExcluded from concentration: 0x267444d099b10fb5ed7c3cc7b7c767adca574952 (LP locker) 8.1632%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveOfficial site and X name this exact contractwebsiteAI

  The official token page says this Robinhood Chain address is the only $PURSUIT contract and links the block explorer page for the same address as the token under review. That matches the X bio address given for @PursuitTools. It does not prove the product works or that the team is identified.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://pursuit.tools/token-info
    Show source

    This is the only official $PURSUIT contract. Check it character by character before you trust any other address.

  • webhttps://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x5de206D1B29364E7a543F7a5D388cA3E2DC25b81
    Show source

    https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x5de206D1B29364E7a543F7a5D388cA3E2DC25b81

  • on-chaintarget = 0x5de206d1b29364e7a543f7a5d388ca3e2dc25b81

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5

Notes (3)

• InfoWebsite offers no claim or airdrop and warns against themwebsiteAI

  A scripted test of pursuit.tools/token-info found no claim, presale or airdrop. The only wallet interaction was a sign-in message (SIWE), which sends no transaction. The wallet's balance did not change. The site's own token text says any $PURSUIT presale, claim or airdrop is a scam. The test is marked 'failed' only because there was no claim to perform. The domain was registered on 2026-11-01, two days before the token was deployed.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests claim: personal_sign (SIWE login), 0 tx, wallet no balance change
  • webhttps://pursuit.tools/token-info
    Show source

    Any site offering a $PURSUIT presale, claim or airdrop is a scam.

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt 2026-11-01T10:12:22.469Z

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoSite, X account and token all launched the same week; team anonymoussocialAI

  The domain, X account, and token are all a few days old and the posts seen are about Pursuit, not an older unrelated brand. That fits a new project, not a renamed account. Followers are a few hundred and likes on posts are in the same range, so the follower count does not look bought. Nobody identified in the material is named as the team.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://pursuit.tools/
  • on-chaindeployedAt = 2026-11-03T17:31:12.000Z
  • Xhttps://x.com/PursuitTools/status/2118181468698800323
    Show source

    Built in public. 21 free tools live on $Pursuit today.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5

• InfoNo third-party scam warnings found; replies are generic outreachsocialAI

  Recent mentions are mostly people asking for DMs, collabs, or saying the project will go to the moon. That is not independent proof the tools work, and it is also not a cluster of paid identical shill posts or third-party rug warnings. A search for the ticker and contract did not return posts that actually accuse this token of being a scam or honeypot. Deployer history in the given facts is empty, so prior rugs by this deployer are unverified either way.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/MrJeff_Ai/status/2118254031546278045
    Show source

    @PursuitTools I love your project send me DM let's take your project to the moon

  • Xhttps://x.com/AltcoinMiyagi/status/2118301136293937169
    Show source

    @PursuitTools $PURSUIT to millions

  • on-chaindeployerHistory = []

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7