TH

Risks (8)

• HighClaim contradicted: The Swap Gateway routing contract (ThoriosFlow) charges no fees and retains no balance.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  Claimed 0% tax, but the simulation measured buy 4.0% / sell 4%.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://th90.si/
    Show source

    ThoriosFlow passes it to the Uniswap v3 router in the same call and leaves a receipt; it has no owner, no fee and keeps no balance.

  • forkmeasured buy 4.0% / sell 4%

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumOne funder's 8 wallets bundled 7.14% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  8 wallets funded by the same address 0x5309…f32f bought 7.14% of the supply together (block 106501635). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0x53091256ebd2d8aa37b45536a5fd864ca764f32f: 8 wallets, pctSupply 7.14

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumSource code is not verifiedotherDeterministic

  The contract source is not published on the explorer, so nobody can read what it really does. The analysis relies on bytecode only.

  Evidence

  • on-chainexplorer: no verified source for 0x55f9f963B348FDca9BA7c33F7148a91cCEFd745C

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumPons factory owner controls graduation rescue and executor settingsotherAI

  The bonding curve has no owner of its own, and its reserves can leave only through graduate(). That function is restricted to the factory and works only once the curve is sold out. However, the factory owner 0x263e…19Dd has several powers over this launch. They can call rescueSweptGraduation, which sends out tokens and ETH, after a 7-day GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY. They can call forceSweptGraduation and rescueCurveFees. They can replace the graduationExecutor and launchDeployer at any time with no timelock. The factory source was omitted, so it is unverified whether these paths could redirect migration liquidity away from the Uniswap v4 pool and LP locker. This is a launchpad-wide power held by the Pons protocol owner, not by the token creator.

  Evidence

  • on-chainPonsV2LaunchFactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd
  • staticfn rescueSweptGraduation(address,address) [owner] @PonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1286 — sends tokens out, sends ETH
  • staticparam GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY = 604800 (constant)
  • staticfn setGraduationExecutor(address) [owner]; fn setLaunchDeployer(address) [owner]
  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L598-L638
    Show source

    function graduate(address recipient) external onlyFactory returns (uint256 quoteOut, uint256 tokenOut) {
            if (graduated) revert AlreadyGraduated();
            if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            if (!readyToGraduate()) revert NotReadyToGraduate();
    
            // Halt trading before the sweep, not after. The sweep pays the escrow,
            // and a quote asset with a transfer callback can re-enter buy() or
            // sell() from inside that payment. This function is deliberately not
            // nonReentrant so it stays callable from within buy()'s own guarded
            // scope, so the flag is the only thing closing that window. Reentering
            // while it was still false repopulated the fee buckets after they had
            // been zeroed, leaving balances with no quote behind them once the
            // reserve was handed over, and no way to ever sweep them.
            //
            // Safe to set here: readyToGraduate() is already evaluated above, and

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumX posts present Rail and Record as live; site says not deployedclaims-mismatchAI

  The X account presents the Disbursement Rail and Evidence Record as working products (payouts to many wallets, on-chain graded price claims). The project's own pages say both were only written and tested on a copy of Robinhood Chain and will open on this site the moment they are deployed. The rail page is still 'Reading the rail…' and the record scoreboard says no graded claims yet. Anyone buying $TH for those utilities is ahead of what the site itself says is on chain.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/thorios90/status/2118223830586180057
    Show source

    Thorios⁹⁰ expands its execution infrastructure with the Disbursement Rail, enabling programmable distribution of ETH, USDG, and tokenized equities across multiple wallets through a single funded contract.

  • webhttps://th90.si/rail
    Show source

    The Disbursement Rail is written and tested on a copy of Robinhood Chain; it opens here the moment it is deployed.

  • webhttps://th90.si/record
    Show source

    The Evidence Record is written and tested on a copy of Robinhood Chain; it opens here the moment it is deployed.

  • webhttps://th90.si/record
    Show source

    No graded claims yet.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowLaunch sniped: 20 wallets took 23.5% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 20 wallets bought 23.5% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=20, pctSupplyBought=23.4693, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chainsnipers.pctSupplyBought = 23.4693, pctSupplyHeldNow = 0
  • on-chainbundles: block 106501635 commonFunder 0x53091256ebd2d8aa37b45536a5fd864ca764f32f pctSupply 7.136; block 106501638 commonFunder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupply 2.8416
  • on-chainclusters: funder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupplyHeldNow 2.7393; funder 0x53091256ebd2d8aa37b45536a5fd864ca764f32f pctSupplyHeldNow 1.64
  • on-chainDeployer 0x3669ba75ae3c204b3fd5582835481dd0310d0a80 holds 0% now

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• LowOnly about $2,475 of curve liquidity and 68 holdersliquidityAI

  The token has not graduated and trades only on the bonding curve, which holds about $2,475 in liquidity. Holders number 68. The website domain was registered on 2026-11-04, one day before the token launched on 2026-11-05. Even modest sells will move the price a lot. A PinkLock02 locker holds 3.047% of supply. The lock terms and owner are not in the material.

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity: pons-v2-bonding-curve pool 0x1b2c18a70304a74b30f73a5f35c491De8a699eAd liquidityUsd 2475; graduated=false
  • webhttps://th90.si/
  • on-chain0xbe0b139abc90723af76a89d3051f60ba1b64c8d9 (PinkLock02) 3.047%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowSite and posts disagree on stock-token count (45 vs 46)claims-mismatchAI

  The site, litepaper overview, and most posts say the model covers 46 Robinhood stock tokens. A launch post and the litepaper's Evidence Record section say 45. That does not by itself let anyone drain funds, but the published universe size is inconsistent.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://th90.si/
    Show source

    Reads live from 46 Robinhood stock tokens across 128 Uniswap v3 pools.

  • Xhttps://x.com/thorios90/status/2118229494041375157
    Show source

    Yours can be any of 45 stock tokens.

  • webhttps://th90.si/docs
    Show source

    Each of the 45 listed stock tokens grades on its deepest live pool whose oracle keeps at least 1,400 observations.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (2)

• PositiveToken was made from the fixed Pons template with no owner powersownershipAI

  FACTS show the token was created by the Pons launch deployer helper 0x3711…1A42. That verified helper deploys tokens only from the hard-coded PonsV2LauncherToken creation code via CREATE2. The creator therefore could not ship custom token logic. The selector list matches a plain launchpad template: ERC-20 functions, burn/burnFrom, metadata getters, and curve/launchFactory/deployer getters. It contains no mint, fee, blacklist, pause or owner setter. Limit: the token's own source is not verified on the explorer and the PonsV2LauncherToken source was not provided, so burnFrom's allowance check and similar details are assumed standard, not proven.

  Evidence

  • on-chainCreated by factory contract 0x3711ceA4feaDE896C913C68F01Eda97Cb06D1A42; tx sender 0x3669Ba75ae3c204B3Fd5582835481DD0310d0a80
  • codePonsV2LaunchDeployer.sol:L99-L109
    Show source

    function deployLaunch(LaunchDeployment calldata params)
            external
            onlyFactory
            returns (address token, address curve)
        {
            _requireMetadataWithinLimits(params);
    
            bytes32 salt = _launchSalt(params);
            curve = Create2.deploy(0, salt, _curveCreationCode(params));
            token = Create2.deploy(0, salt, _tokenCreationCode(params, curve));
        }

  • codePonsV2LaunchDeployer.sol:L170-L185
    Show source

    function _tokenCreationCode(LaunchDeployment calldata params, address curve) private view returns (bytes memory) {
            return abi.encodePacked(
                type(PonsV2LauncherToken).creationCode,
                abi.encode(
                    params.name,
                    params.symbol,
                    params.logo,
                    params.description,
                    params.socials,
                    params.originalDeployer,
                    curve,
                    factory,
                    params.supply
                )
            );

  • on-chaincontract.verified = false; functions: name, approve, totalSupply, transferFrom, decimals, burn, launchFactory, socials, balanceOf, curve, description, burnFrom, symbol, transfer, getTokenInfo, deployer, allowance, logo

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveBuys and sells work; the 4% cost is a fixed curve fee plus creator taxhoneypotAI

  The fork simulation bought and sold on the bonding curve. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and selling one hour later still worked. Transfer tax was 0%. The 3.97% buy and 4% sell cost is a 1% protocol fee plus a 3% creator tax. Both are immutable values set when the curve was deployed, so nobody can raise them. The curve also refuses any fee plus tax combination above 20%. The 99% snipe tax applied only during the first 3 seconds after launch and is now 0.

  Evidence

  • forkcanBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=3.97, sellTaxPct=4, transferTaxPct=0
    Show source

    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L109-L114
    Show source

    uint256 public immutable feeBps;
        // Creator-chosen at launch, capped by the protocol at launch time. Kept
        // entirely separate from feeBps: it is layered on top of the base trade
        // fee, not part of the protocol/buyback/creator split, and is paid to
        // the creator in full.
        uint256 public immutable creatorTaxBps;

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L219-L222
    Show source

    // The factory applies the same ceiling before deploying, but the curve
            // defends its own invariant rather than inheriting it: a combined fee
            // at or above the whole trade would break the quote accounting.
            if (feeBps_ + creatorTaxBps_ > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidFeePolicy();

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L315-L323
    Show source

    function currentSnipeTaxBps(address recipient) public view returns (uint256) {
            if (snipeTaxExempt[recipient]) return 0;
            uint256 startBps = snipeTaxStartBps;
            if (startBps == 0) return 0;
            uint256 elapsed = block.timestamp - launchedAt;
            uint256 window = snipeTaxSeconds;
            if (elapsed >= window) return 0;
            return startBps >> ((elapsed * 14) / window);
        }

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L541-L566
    Show source

    function sell(uint256 tokensIn, uint256 minQuoteOut, address recipient)
            external
            nonReentrant
            onlyInitialized
            returns (uint256 quoteOut)
        {
            if (graduated || readyToGraduate()) revert CurveGraduated();
            if (tokensIn == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
            if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    
            (uint256 quoteReserveBefore, uint256 tokenReserveBefore) = getReserves();
            IERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), tokensIn);
    
            uint256 grossQuoteOut = PonsV2BondingCurveMath.getAmountOut(tokensIn, tokenReserveBefore, quoteReserveBefore, 0);
            uint256 fee = (grossQuoteOut * feeBps) / BASIS_POINTS;

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (3)

• LowFactory can change the creator fee recipient; buyback is offfeesAI

  The creator 0x3669…0a80 receives the 3% creator tax and the creator share of the 1% fee through the fee escrow. The factory can change this recipient. Per the comments, it does so for a creator-initiated change behind a 3-day timelock, or for a protocol-owner override. The factory can also toggle the buyback-and-lock route, which is currently disabled. These settings only decide who receives fees. They cannot raise fees or touch trader reserves. rescueFees pays pending fees straight to the fixed recipients and does not take curve reserves.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L343-L363
    Show source

    function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(deployer, newRecipient);
            deployer = newRecipient;
        }
    
        /**
         * @notice Enables or disables this launch's buyback-and-lock fee route.
         * The factory authorizes both the current creator recipient and protocol
         * owner before forwarding the setting here.
         * @dev Applies to fees charged from here on, not to fees already pending.
         * Each trade earmarks its buyback slice as it is charged, so a toggle
         * cannot reach back and reroute value that accrued under the opposite
         * setting. Without that, a disable landing before a sweep would divert a
         * buyback the creator had already earned into their own payout, and an

  • codePonsV2BondingCurve.sol:L850-L871
    Show source

    function rescueFees() external onlyFactory returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount) {
            uint256 pending = quoteFeeBalance;
            uint256 tax = creatorTaxBalance;
            if (pending == 0 && tax == 0) revert ZeroAmount();
    
            protocolAmount = (pending * protocolFeeShareBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            creatorAmount = pending - protocolAmount + tax;
    
            quoteFeeBalance = 0;
            // Symmetrical with the sweep. This pays the creator their whole
            // bucket, earmark included, so leaving the earmark behind would let a
            // settled claim survive into the next accrual and divert fees the
            // creator has not earned yet into the vest.
            buybackQuoteBalance = 0;
            creatorTaxBalance = 0;

  • staticparam CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK = 259200 (constant); buybackEnabled = false

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoWebsite swap tool worked in a test but does not involve THwebsiteAI

  The dApp test used the project's ThoriosFlow contract to swap 0.01 ETH for 0.06515 TSLA through Uniswap v3. The swap succeeded, the wallet received the tokens, and no unexpected approvals appeared. This shows the site's swap tool works as described. It says nothing about TH itself.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests swap step: swap(tuple) to ThoriosFlow 0x59f5bf52cdf06da68ba1da5e260aca773a6291d1
    Show source

    wallet -0.01 ETH, +0.06515 TSLA

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoX account, domain and token all created within two days, anonymous teamsocialAI

  @thorios90 was created on 5 Nov 2026, about 90 minutes before the token was deployed. The domain was created the day before. Followers are 87 with ordinary single-digit likes, not a huge bought audience. No named people are on the site or in the bio, and a search of X did not turn up third-party scam, rug, or honeypot posts about this contract. There is simply no public track record yet. The facts layer also lists no prior tokens for the deployer.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/thorios90/status/2118217813102088482
    Show source

    0x55f9f963b348fdca9ba7c33f7148a91ccefd745c One market. One continuous model. Every fill becomes evidence.

  • on-chaindeployedAt=2026-11-05T05:43:06.000Z
    Show source

    X profile createdAt 2026-11-05T04:14:26.000Z; domainCreatedAt 2026-11-04; followers 87; deployerHistory []

  • webhttps://th90.si/
    Show source

    Follow @thorios90 on X November 5, 2026

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5