PonsV2LauncherToken $ZKBLAST

Risks (15)

• HighClaim contradicted: Token utility involves an automated buyback and burn mechanism funded by protocol revenue.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  The project claims buyback & burn, but none of the 4 burn(s) seen was preceded by a buy from a pool in the same transaction (1.1% of supply burned in total).

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117335389220540553
    Show source

    ZKBLAST token utility is TBA. We're planning an automated buyback & burn mechanism using protocol revenue.

  • on-chainTransfer events of 0x3f9ff9f1d40369f99c281375bd19d6ecbebfecd7 to burn addresses + balanceOf(0x…dEaD)

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighClaim contradicted: 99% of eligible protocol fees flow into the Assistance Fund for automated $ZKBLAST buybacks and permanent burns.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  The project claims buyback & burn, but none of the 4 burn(s) seen was preceded by a buy from a pool in the same transaction (1.1% of supply burned in total).

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2118031766074384718
    Show source

    99% of eligible protocol fees are planned to flow into our Assistance Fund for automated $ZKBLAST buybacks and permanent burns.

  • on-chainTransfer events of 0x3f9ff9f1d40369f99c281375bd19d6ecbebfecd7 to burn addresses + balanceOf(0x…dEaD)

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighPosted 0.30% fee contradicted by the actual 2.9% feeclaims-mismatchAI

  The bonding curve charged 2.9% per buy or sell—1% protocol fee plus 1.9% creator tax—not a 0.30% fee with a 50% creator split. After graduation, the pool hook also has an owner-settable 1% hook fee and an owner-settable protocol share.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117507950411644930
    Show source

    fees that actually pay creators 0.30% trade fee 50% of fees go to creators

  • on-chainlaunchpad.fees: buyPct = 2.9, sellPct = 2.9
    Show source

    protocol fee 1%; creator tax 1.9%; launch snipe tax decays to 0 over 3s (now 0 bps)

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook hookFeeBps = 100 (1%)
    Show source

    settableBy: setHookFeeBps(uint256) [owner]; bounds: bps <= MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS=1000

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook protocolFeeShareBps = 3000 (30%)
    Show source

    settableBy: setProtocolFeeShareBps(uint256) [owner]

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5

• HighPosted '80% on curve, WHYPE on HyperEVM' contradicted on-chainclaims-mismatchAI

  The token constructor minted the entire supply to the bonding curve, not 80%, and the curve used the chain's native quote asset rather than WHYPE. The target is on Robinhood Chain, not HyperEVM.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117507950411644930
    Show source

    every curve is paired with WHYPE, native to HyperEVM 80% of supply goes on the curve

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L42-L70
    Show source

    * @notice Creates a v2 launch token and mints its entire supply to the bonding curve.
         */
        constructor(
            string memory name_,
            string memory symbol_,
            string memory logo_,
            string memory description_,
            Socials memory socials_,
            address deployer_,
            address curve_,
            address launchFactory_,
            uint256 supply_
        ) ERC20(name_, symbol_) {
            if (deployer_ == address(0) || curve_ == address(0) || launchFactory_ == address(0)) {
                revert ZeroAddress();

  • on-chainPonsV2BondingCurve pairToken = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 (zero address)
    Show source

    isNativeQuote = true

  • on-chainchain = eip155:4663
    Show source

    Robinhood Chain

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5

• MediumOne funder's 6 wallets bundled 7.22% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  6 wallets funded by the same address 0xf70d…dbef bought 7.22% of the supply together (block 100305936). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef: 6 wallets, pctSupply 7.22

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumLaunch sniped: 26 wallets took 40.6% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 26 wallets bought 40.6% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=26, pctSupplyBought=40.623, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought=40.623, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chainbundles block 100305936 commonFunder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupply 7.2184
  • on-chaincurve snipeTaxStartBps = 9900, snipeTaxSeconds = 3

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumA third of main-pool liquidity is unlocked and can be pulledliquidityAI

  In the graduated pool 0xc9f929c5…, 67.03% of position liquidity is held by the Pons LP locker. A single other holder, 0xfc68…ce5f, holds 32.97% of position liquidity and is not shown as locked. That holder can remove its liquidity at any time, which would cut market depth by roughly a third (pool ≈ $49.5k). The three other ZKBLAST v4 pools have 0% locked LP, but they are small ($8.4k, $70 and $7).

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity pool 0xc9f929c5630ce70033ef88584abe3c438a177246dd30097de8467e9db2ef7bc5: lpLockedPct=67.0348, liquidityUsd=49519
  • on-chaintoken.notes
    Show source

    v4 position liquidity other holders: 0xfc68b4335b81295ae868b7c1e834ffaa796dce5f 32.9651%

  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x3075e36b750e2f4b32817dd2de0b12a26844319781300c5062faccb45a96a363: lpLockedPct=0, liquidityUsd=8428

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumOne address owns the Pons hook, factory, vault and lockerownershipAI

  Address 0x263e…19Dd owns the PonsV2MemeHook, PonsV2LaunchFactory, PonsV2BuybackVault and PonsV2LaunchLocker. Ownership of the hook cannot be renounced. Over the hook it can: - change the fee sweep operator (the address that converts and distributes accrued fees, with the power to choose slippage minimums); - call rescuePoolFees, which pays pending fees to the pool's snapshotted protocol and creator recipients, not to an arbitrary address; - change fee policy for future launches. Through the factory it can override creator fee recipient changes; the factory's recipient change has a 3-day timelock. The factory owner also has rescueCurveFees / rescueSweptGraduation / forceSweptGraduation, whose source was omitted. Nothing found lets this owner block swaps or take holders' tokens. However, it is a single address with no visible multisig or timelock on most setters, so holders rely on Pons as an operator.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L235-L237
    Show source

    function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L274-L278
    Show source

    function setFeeSweepOperator(address operator) external onlyOwner {
            if (operator == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            feeSweepOperator = operator;
            emit FeeSweepOperatorUpdated(operator);
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
    Show source

    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L390-L397
    Show source

    function setCreatorFeeRecipient(PoolId poolId, address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            LaunchInfo storage info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(poolId, info.creator, newRecipient);
            info.creator = newRecipient;
        }

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; PonsV2LaunchFactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd
  • on-chainfactory CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK = 259200

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumSite claims it is operational but lists zero pools and no contractswebsiteAI

  The homepage and docs call the protocol operational and point at DLMM, DAMM, a vault, and a contract directory. The visible pages still show zero indexed pools, zero validated markets, a pending indexer, and “Loading deployment manifests…”. Addresses are not on the page, so the live-infrastructure story cannot be checked from the website.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/
    Show source

    Pools
    0 indexed
    Validated pool registry

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/
    Show source

    0 validated markets

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/docs
    Show source

    Loading deployment manifests…

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/launch
    Show source

    Status
    operational

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowWebsite's swap and shielded features could not be testedclaims-mismatchAI

  The website (domain registered 2026-10-20) describes DLMM/DAMM pools, perps and a ZK shielded vault. The token itself is a plain Pons memecoin with no link to such infrastructure. In scripted UI tests on a fork, the site only requested a SIWE login signature. Neither the swap nor the reverse-swap flow produced any transaction before the time cap. No harmful approvals or signatures were observed, but the advertised product could not be verified.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests: Swap — observed
    Show source

    wallet no balance change; 0 tx (none). No successful transaction was made for this goal (timeout).

  • forkdappTests: Reverse Swap — error
    Show source

    could not complete "Reverse Swap" in the UI (timeout: goal time cap reached)

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-10-20T13:36:02.651Z

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol · Disputed by: grok-4.7

• Low'Without exposure' slogan overstates the privacy in the site's docsclaims-mismatchAI

  The X account and site slogan sell private liquidity and shielded trading. The same site says a ZK proof does not hide a public transfer, and lists deposit sender, amount, withdrawal recipient, and timing as still visible. Holders should not treat $ZKBLAST as a privacy coin or as proof that using the app hides their trades.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2118031766074384718
    Show source

    ZKBLAST × ELYSIUM. Coming soon. Liquidity Without Exposure.

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/
    Show source

    A zero-knowledge verifier does not make a public transfer private.

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/docs
    Show source

    Visible onchain: transaction timing, gas payer and public settlement effects required by the selected action.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowAnti-sniper declared live a day after 'still building'claims-mismatchAI

  On 3 Nov the account said anti-sniper protection was still being built and still needed testing and mainnet deployment. On 4 Nov it said the same protection “is now live” on Robinhood Chain mainnet, while also calling the post a demo. That is a readiness claim holders cannot take at face value from the posts alone.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117676683536875796
    Show source

    Currently building the smart contract infrastructure. Next: Testing, security review, and mainnet deployment.

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117861079678324888
    Show source

    INSPIRED ANTI-SNIPER PROTECTION IS NOW LIVE ON ZKBLAST.

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117861079678324888
    Show source

    In this demo, we're showcasing how anyone can launch a token with anti-sniper protection enabled.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowX account created on launch day; team not namedsocialAI

  @zkblast9 was created on 28 Oct 2026, hours before this PonsV2LauncherToken was deployed. The bio matches the contract address and the site, so it does not look like a renamed old account. No person is named. A FOMO team-tag application is only “submitted”, not shown as a verified developer profile, so the team is still unverifiable.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117523321155907955
    Show source

    $ZKBLAST IS ON @fomo. Team account live. 0.5% supply held on-platform. Team tag application submitted.

  • webhttps://zkblast.tech/
    Show source

    @zkblast9

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• LowNear-identical caller posts promote the tokensocialAI

  Several accounts posted the contract with similar “shared in TG / Nx” calls. That is paid-style hype, not proof the token cannot be sold. No credible third-party rug or honeypot write-up turned up in search; one bare “is a scam” reply had no evidence.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/Legend_Britney/status/2117924870356926945
    Show source

    $ZKBLAST delivered a solid move! 🚀
    
    Shared with my TG community at just $28K MCAP and later climbed to $184K MCAP!

  • Xhttps://x.com/Massivepumpmast/status/2117924019546567083
    Show source

    $ZKBLAST was shared with my TG community at $28K MCAP and later climbed to $184K

  • Xhttps://x.com/trenchwithmo/status/2118021845425475952
    Show source

    Cooked 24X in my private group on $ZKBLAST 
    
    0x3f9ff9f1d40369f99c281375bd19d6ecbebfecd7

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowClaimed 50% creator LP share not seen in the poolclaims-mismatchAI

  The observed graduated pool does not show a 50/50 creator allocation: 67.0348% of its position liquidity is locked and 32.9651% is held by another address. No creator-controlled 50% position appears in the supplied LP accounting.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/zkblast9/status/2117507950411644930
    Show source

    50% of graduated LP goes to creators

  • on-chainliquidity for pool 0xc9f929c5630ce70033ef88584abe3c438a177246dd30097de8467e9db2ef7bc5
    Show source

    lpBurnedPct: 0, lpLockedPct: 67.0348, lpHeldByDeployerPct: 0

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0xc9f929c563… position liquidity
    Show source

    other holders: 0xfc68b4335b81295ae868b7c1e834ffaa796dce5f 32.9651%

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol · Disputed by: claude-opus-5.5

Positive signals (4)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 1.1% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  1.1% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 4 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-04. Burned by: the deployer 0x1c5b…65dd (1.1%, 1 burn); holder 0x5d75…305e (0.0%, 3 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x3f9ff9f1d40369f99c281375bd19d6ecbebfecd7

  Confirmed by: facts

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powersownershipAI

  PonsV2LauncherToken is plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 + ERC20Burnable. It has no owner, no mint function after construction, no fee, no blacklist, no pause and no transfer hooks. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. The stored deployer address is reference data only and gives no privileges. Nobody can change token balances or block transfers at the token level.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
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    _mint(curve_, supply_);

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
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    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = [] ; privileges = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveBuy, sell and transfer all work with 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  A real buy and sell on the graduated Uniswap v4 pool succeeded at the expected amounts. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell one hour later worked. No honeypot behaviour was found.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation: canBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
    Show source

    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell

  • forksimulation notes
    Show source

    sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositivePons LP locker holds 67% of main-pool liquidityliquidityAI

  67% of the main pool's position liquidity is held by the Pons LP locker. The locker also holds 8.16% of token supply. Its function table shows only factory-gated lock functions (lockPosition, lockTokenSupply) and no withdraw or release function. The locker source was omitted, so its unlock terms cannot be confirmed.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintopHolders: 0x267444D099b10fB5Ed7c3Cc7B7c767AdcA574952 (LP locker) 8.1632%
  • on-chainPonsV2LaunchLocker function table: lockPosition [factory], lockTokenSupply [factory], setFactory [owner]

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (3)

• Low2.9% pool swap fee, locked in for this poolfeesAI

  On every swap in the graduated pool, the PonsV2MemeHook takes its hook fee (1%) plus the creator tax (1.9%) from the swap's output/input leg via afterSwapReturnDelta. The simulation folds this into the quote, which is why the token-level tax shows as 0%. The hook fee is split 30% to the protocol and 70% to the creator bucket (part of which may go to a 5-year buyback vest). The creator tax goes entirely to the creator, the deployer 0x1C5B…65dd. These rates are snapshotted into the pool record at registration and read from that record on every swap. The hook owner's setters (setHookFeeBps, setProtocolFeeShareBps, etc.) only change the policy for future launches, so they cannot raise this pool's fee. The combined fee was capped at 20% at registration.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L465-L484
    Show source

    uint256 feeAmount = (unspecified * info.hookFeeBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            uint256 taxAmount = (unspecified * info.creatorTaxBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            uint256 totalAmount = feeAmount + taxAmount;
            if (totalAmount == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            address feeCurrencyAddr = Currency.unwrap(feeCurrency);
            _takeExact(feeCurrency, feeCurrencyAddr, totalAmount);
            if (feeAmount != 0) {
                pendingFees[poolId][feeCurrencyAddr] += feeAmount;
                if (info.buybackEnabled) {
                    // The buyback comes out of the creator's bucket alone, so it
                    // is measured against what remains after the protocol's share.
                    uint256 creatorSlice = feeAmount - (feeAmount * info.protocolFeeShareBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
                    pendingBuyback[poolId][feeCurrencyAddr] += (creatorSlice * info.buybackBurnBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
                }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L364-L378
    Show source

    launches[poolId] = LaunchInfo({
                registered: true,
                memecoinIsCurrency0: memecoinIsCurrency0,
                memecoin: memecoin,
                quoteToken: quoteToken,
                creator: creator,
                buybackCreatorRecipient: buybackCreatorRecipient,
                protocolFeeRecipient: policy.protocolFeeRecipient,
                creatorTaxBps: creatorTaxBps,
                protocolFeeShareBps: policy.protocolFeeShareBps,
                buybackBurnBps: policy.buybackBurnBps,
                hookFeeBps: policy.hookFeeBps,
                maxInternalPriceImpactBps: policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps,
                buybackEnabled: buybackEnabled
            });

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L352
    Show source

    if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();

  • on-chainlaunchpad.fees
    Show source

    protocol fee 1%; creator tax 1.9%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoCreator wallet holds 0% and burned about 1.1% of supplyinsidersAI

  The deployer/creator 0x1C5B…65dd was declared at launch (and was exempt from the snipe tax). It now holds 0%, and the facts report deployerSoldPct = 0. It burned 1.1427% of supply. The creator still earns the 1.9% creator tax plus a share of hook fees on every swap.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.notes
    Show source

    Deployer 0x1c5b99c2d3809b18a8b8324766c93585f3be65dd holds 0% now

  • on-chainburns.by: deployer 0x1c5b99c2d3809b18a8b8324766c93585f3be65dd pct 1.1427

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoScanner bot alleges overstated privacy claims (unverified)claims-mismatchAI

  LarpCheck posts are allegations, not chain facts from this review. They line up with the site’s own narrower privacy text: contracts may exist, but “without exposure” overstates what stays hidden. They also allege a launch dump and that anti-sniper settings were not on the live config; those wallet claims are not in the facts given here and stay unverified.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/Larpcheckbot/status/2117982409069076494
    Show source

    Real but overstated protocol; launch dumped into the pool, top 10 hold 25%.

  • Xhttps://x.com/Larpcheckbot/status/2117988983737143617
    Show source

    The launchpad contracts are deployed and a test launch ran, but the anti-sniper protection itself was never tested; the post calls it a demo, and the launch config exposes no such setting.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol