PairLaunchToken $PAIR

Risks (5)

• HighDump risk: launch wallets still hold 34.9% of supplyholdersDeterministic

  Sniper / insider / bundled launch wallets still hold about 34.9% of the supply. If they sell, the price can collapse — current dump pressure is HIGH.

  Evidence

  • on-chainheld now: snipers 34.9172%, insiders 0%, clusters 15.88%

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumLaunch sniped: 26 wallets took 35% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 26 wallets bought 35% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 34.9% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is HIGH.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=26, pctSupplyBought=35.0028, pctSupplyHeldNow=34.9172
  • on-chaintoken.snipers: windowBlocks=100, pctSupplyBought=35.0028, pctSupplyHeldNow=34.9172
  • on-chaintoken.bundles: block 107569809 wallets 0xd90973f4afcaffef2cdd8f7a45d26c935d7c863b, 0x1a1c1a261feff6a212cad16dce268e6b93a675aa, 0x67166ec3ae38acece24c535d6347dac0af7aeb5b, 0xfc9a73bcc05846df8e74af1e2d39f839a5976939 pctSupply 6.655

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumSeveral sniper wallets were funded by the same few walletsinsidersAI

  Five funder wallets each funded 2 to 3 of the sniper or bundle wallets. For example, 0xd29c…7978 funded three wallets that now hold 4.49%. Across the five clusters about 15.9% of supply is held. This suggests a few actors are spreading large positions over many wallets. Funding lookups were capped at 25 of 29 wallets, so the real clustering may be larger.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.clusters funder 0xd29c85f15df544ba632c9e25829fd29d767d7978 wallets 0xd1f7d991199a6ef4aa373585f9f85477468a8b2a, 0xd90973f4afcaffef2cdd8f7a45d26c935d7c863b, 0x0aec4305d10906efa7efa29efe7fc155f9811e6c pctSupplyHeldNow 4.4914
  • on-chaintoken.clusters funder 0xa8ad2e87e2043711d8bec77e8bc3e2683c0ab6bd pctSupplyHeldNow 3.9239
  • on-chainFunding lookups capped at 25/29 wallets

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowLaunch hook charges a fixed swap fee to platform and creatorfeesAI

  The main pool's hook (0x92Aa…68Cc) takes a fee in the quote currency on every swap using its return-delta permissions. The fee goes to PairFeeVault, which credits a share to an immutable platform recipient (0x2BaE…2123) and a share to the creator's recipient. The creator extra tax is set once at registration and capped at 900 bps (9%). The fee schedule changes with time since launch through PairFeeMath, whose source was not provided. There is no setter, so nobody can raise the fee after launch. Buyers using the Pair router or the Universal Router who are on the creator's declared exemption list get a discount, but only on buys in the first 3 seconds.

  Evidence

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L135-L146
    Show source

    if (
                pools[id].token != address(0) || exemptions.length > 64 || creator == address(0) || token == quote
                    || extra > 900 || address(key.hooks) != address(this) || key.fee != 0
                    || (key.tickSpacing != 200 && key.tickSpacing != 1)
                    || Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) >= Currency.unwrap(key.currency1)
            ) revert Invalid();
            bool token0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == token;
            if (
                (token0 ? Currency.unwrap(key.currency1) : Currency.unwrap(key.currency0)) != quote
                    || (!token0 && Currency.unwrap(key.currency1) != token)
            ) revert Invalid();
            pools[id] = Config(token, quote, uint64(block.timestamp), extra, token0, false, initialPrice);

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L259-L273
    Show source

    if (params.amountSpecified == 0 || params.amountSpecified == type(int256).min) revert Invalid();
            bool buy = params.zeroForOne != p.token0;
            bool discounted = buy && block.timestamp < uint256(p.launchedAt) + 3 && _isExempt(id, sender, params);
            (, uint16 bonus, uint16 rate) =
                PairFeeMath.rates(p.creatorTaxBps, block.timestamp - p.launchedAt, buy, discounted);
            bool quoteSpecified = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == buy;
            uint256 fee;
            if (quoteSpecified) {
                fee = params.amountSpecified < 0
                    ? PairFeeMath.fromGross(uint256(-params.amountSpecified), rate)
                    : PairFeeMath.onTop(uint256(params.amountSpecified), rate);
            }
            if (fee > uint256(uint128(type(int128).max))) revert AmountTooLarge();
            cached = SwapCache(keccak256(abi.encode(sender, id, params, data)), fee, rate, bonus, buy, quoteSpecified);
            return (IHooks.beforeSwap.selector, toBeforeSwapDelta(int128(uint128(fee)), 0), 0);

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L310-L315
    Show source

    if (fee != 0) {
                (uint256 platform, uint256 creator, uint256 bonus) = PairFeeMath.split(fee, p.creatorTaxBps, s.bonus);
                // Quote-backed claims settle alongside the swap, including a new pool's first buy.
                manager.mint(address(vault), uint256(uint160(p.quote)), fee);
                vault.credit(id, platform, creator, bonus);
            }

  • codePairFeeVault.sol:L82-L92
    Show source

    function _credit(bytes32 id, uint256 platform, uint256 creator, uint256 bonus) private {
            if (!registered[id]) revert Invalid();
            address asset = quote[id];
            uint256 total = platform + creator;
            uint256 next = liabilities[asset] + total;
            if (manager.balanceOf(address(this), uint256(uint160(asset))) < next) revert Invalid();
            liabilities[asset] = next;
            claimable[id][platformRecipient] += platform;
            claimable[id][creatorRecipient[id]] += creator;
            emit FeesAccrued(id, asset, creatorRecipient[id], platform, creator, bonus);
        }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowPool factory source unavailable, so its admin powers are unverifiedotherAI

  In afterSwap, when the curve's quote counter reaches its threshold, the hook calls factory.graduateV4(). Adding liquidity before activation also asks factory.locker(). The factory (0x20aa…b281) is immutable in the hook, but its source was omitted. Its admin powers cannot be checked: it has an immutable administrator 0x6516…005a and an economicsSigner. If graduateV4 could revert, the swap that crosses the threshold would revert. The simulation shows trading working today.

  Evidence

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L317-L327
    Show source

    uint256 threshold = curveThreshold[id];
            if (threshold != 0 && !curveGraduated[id]) {
                // A sell pays out only quote that earlier buys put in, so this never floors in practice. Flooring at zero
                // keeps the counter from ever being able to revert a sell.
                uint256 counted = curveQuote[id];
                curveQuote[id] = s.buy ? counted + quoteAmount : (quoteAmount < counted ? counted - quoteAmount : 0);
                if (curveQuote[id] >= threshold) {
                    curveGraduated[id] = true;
                    IPairV4Graduation(factory).graduateV4(p.token);
                }
            }

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L193-L198
    Show source

    function _seeding(address sender) private view returns (bool) {
            address locker = IPairLockerFactory(factory).locker();
            if (sender == locker) return true;
            IPairPositionSeeder seeder = IPairPositionSeeder(locker);
            return sender != address(0) && sender == seeder.positions() && seeder.seeding();
        }

  • on-chainPairV4Factory param administrator = 0x6516E8dcaA228CE98a7932Cc8EB4b2540854005a; economicsSigner = 0xbCc830E6Ed38236df56Ab414e43C03Bb630e64C9

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (3)

• PositiveFixed-supply token with no owner, mint, fee or blacklist powersownershipAI

  PairLaunchToken is plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Permit. The full supply of 1,000,000,000 tokens is minted once in the constructor. The only added function is burn(), which burns the caller's own tokens. There is no owner, no mint after deploy, no fee, no blacklist, no pause and no proxy, so nobody can change how the token itself behaves. Slither reported no issues.

  Evidence

  • codePairLaunchToken.sol:L6-L20
    Show source

    /// @notice Fixed supply, ordinary transfers. No wallet cap, holding tax, blacklist or mint authority.
    contract PairLaunchToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit {
        uint256 public constant INITIAL_SUPPLY = 1_000_000_000 ether;
    
        constructor(string memory name_, string memory symbol_, address liquidityOwner)
            ERC20(name_, symbol_)
            ERC20Permit(name_)
        {
            _mint(liquidityOwner, INITIAL_SUPPLY);
        }
    
        function burn(uint256 amount) external {
            _burn(msg.sender, amount);
        }
    }

  • on-chaincontract.isProxy = false; privileges = []
  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveBuys and sells work in simulation at 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  A real buy and sell on the Uniswap v4 pool both succeeded. Token-level tax was 0% on buy, sell and transfer. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell one hour later worked. The swap fee charged by the launch hook is included in the quotes. No code path in the token or the hook blocks sellers once the pool is active.

  Evidence

  • forkcanBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
  • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is burned and cannot be withdrawnliquidityAI

  In the main pool, 100% of the v4 position liquidity belongs to 0x...dEaD, so nobody can withdraw it. The hook has no beforeRemoveLiquidity permission, so it cannot stop liquidity removals in other positions either.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x289aac1a4d…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dead [burned: burn address] 100%
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x289aac1a4d7719f5f8bd30fa51da5e7bb903e251d99a621afc7b31d0a2e6b2e9 lpBurnedPct=100, liquidityUsd=74109
  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L115-L122
    Show source

    function getHookPermissions() public pure returns (Hooks.Permissions memory p) {
            p.beforeInitialize = true;
            p.beforeAddLiquidity = true;
            p.beforeSwap = true;
            p.afterSwap = true;
            p.beforeSwapReturnDelta = true;
            p.afterSwapReturnDelta = true;
        }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (5)

• LowPair treasury can withdraw its separate backstop ETH at willotherAI

  PairBackstop says the owner can take back only uncommitted ETH. In practice withdraw() lets owner 0x6516…005a send any amount of its balance anywhere. This only affects Pair's separate pair-pool reserve top-ups, not this token's pool or LP. Holders should not count on the backstop as a guarantee.

  Evidence

  • codePairBackstop.sol:L74-L80
    Show source

    function withdraw(uint256 amount, address to) external {
            if (msg.sender != owner || to == address(0)) revert Unauthorized();
            (bool ok,) = to.call{value: amount}("");
            if (!ok) revert Invalid();
            emit Withdrawn(to, amount);
        }
    }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoHook and fee vault have no owner and fixed wiringotherAI

  PairLaunchHook and PairFeeVault have no owner variable. Their manager, factory, router, vault and platformRecipient are all immutable. The factory-only functions (register, prepareGraduation, registerV4Curve, activatePool) are one-shot per pool: they revert if already set and only move a pool forward. None of them can pause an active pool or redirect fees. Fee claims are pull-based and backed by v4 claim balances that are checked against liabilities.

  Evidence

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L44-L47
    Show source

    IPoolManager public immutable manager;
        address public immutable factory;
        address public immutable router;
        PairFeeVault public immutable vault;

  • codePairLaunchHook.sol:L200-L211
    Show source

    function registerV4Curve(bytes32 id, uint256 threshold) external {
            if (msg.sender != factory) revert Unauthorized();
            if (pools[id].token == address(0) || active[id] || curveThreshold[id] != 0 || threshold == 0) revert Invalid();
            curveThreshold[id] = threshold;
        }
    
        function activatePool(bytes32 id) external {
            if (msg.sender != factory) revert Unauthorized();
            if (!pools[id].initialized || active[id]) revert Invalid();
            active[id] = true;
            delete graduationPrice[id];
        }

  • codePairFeeVault.sol:L11-L14
    Show source

    IPoolManager public immutable manager;
        address public immutable factory;
        address public immutable hook;
        address public immutable platformRecipient;

  • codePairFeeVault.sol:L94-L104
    Show source

    function claim(bytes32 id, address recipient) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 amount) {
            if (recipient == address(0) || !registered[id]) revert Invalid();
            amount = claimable[id][msg.sender];
            if (amount == 0) revert Invalid();
            claimable[id][msg.sender] = 0;
            liabilities[quote[id]] -= amount;
            claiming = true;
            manager.unlock(abi.encode(uint8(0), quote[id], recipient, amount, address(0)));
            claiming = false;
            emit Claimed(id, msg.sender, recipient, quote[id], amount);
        }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoSmall side pools have liquidity that owners can withdrawliquidityAI

  Three other v4 pools for PAIR (about $5.6k, $710 and $247) have liquidity held by ordinary wallets that can withdraw it at any time. These are minor venues; the main $74k pool has burned liquidity.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x2b8b9241b0…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x7268612153394b0a3212c8ee55d5acf4f7ad3419 [other: wallet (unlocked)] 26.5139%
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x2b8b9241b0cb150debc10c641ff0926a59bde67a3102ec52ff720786526e6d18 liquidityUsd=5574 lpBurnedPct=0 lpLockedPct=0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoWebsite domain is 10 days old; launch flow could not be testedwebsiteAI

  The pair.cx domain was registered on 2026-10-27, about 10 days before analysis. The scripted 'Launch a coin' website test timed out with no transaction, no approval and no balance change. That does not show a fund-handling problem; the UI flow simply could not be verified.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://pair.cx/
    Show source

    Pair: launch on Robinhood Chain, pair with a coin from any chain

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-10-27T22:21:44.000Z
  • forkdappTests 'Launch a coin': timeout — goal time cap reached; 0 tx

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoWeek-old anonymous X account with no named teamsocialAI

  Pair’s X account and domain both appeared about a week before the token went live. The account has 57 followers and three posts, all from launch day, and neither the profile nor the site names a person, company, docs, or audit. That is a young anonymous launch, not by itself proof of a rug. There is no deployer history in the facts given, and search did not turn up credible third-party scam reports about this contract.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/pair_cx/status/2118678475565408418
    Show source

    Pair is live on Robinhood Chain, and the creator picks it. ... CA: 0x3024d06034a3fc1faf85f11fabb491c25ff7e5fd

  • webhttps://pair.cx/
    Show source

    Launch your coin on Robinhood Chain and pair it with ETH, a Robinhood token, or SOL and other top coins from Solana, Ethereum, Base and BNB Chain. Every coin trades on Uniswap v4.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol