PonsV2LauncherToken $GH0ST

Risks (10)

• CriticalWithdrawing through the dApp failed ("get the money back out (withdraw, sell or exit)")honeypotDeterministic

  We ran the project's own dApp on a local fork. The "get the money back out (withdraw, sell or exit)" step did not work. Expected: Withdrawing returns the deposited funds to the wallet (minus any documented fee).. Observed: wallet no balance change; 0 tx (none). No successful transaction was made for this goal (timeout). | driver: timeout — goal time cap reached. Money deposited may be impossible to take out.

  Evidence

  • forkdApp test "get the money back out (withdraw, sell or exit)" on a local fork (https://gh0st.fyi/legacy)
    Show source

    wallet no balance change; 0 tx (none). No successful transaction was made for this goal (timeout). | driver: timeout — goal time cap reached

  • forkuse the main action of the app (deposit, buy or open a position): step tx beginConstrained ok
    Show source

    wallet balance did not decrease — nothing was actually deposited

  • forkget the money back out (withdraw, sell or exit)
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    timeout: goal time cap reached

  • on-chainS0ULAgent gh0stToken = 0x2eb2849cDE7957b86d0dFD4B59e450a9F9D15559 (immutable)

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• HighToken's pool uses an unverified v4 hook that can change swap amountshoneypotDeterministic

  A Uniswap v4 pool of this token (pool.hooks (0x462eea4c…)) runs hook 0x5b90…e0cC on every swap (beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta). The hook's source code is not verified, so it cannot be checked whether it blocks sells for some wallets or later, or takes a hidden fee — its ReturnDelta permissions allow changing the amounts traders get. A passing sell simulation only shows it works for our test wallet right now.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool hook 0x5b907B52eAcBCeE78F2C56A6e74F5cf04A96e0cC permission bits: beforeInitialize, beforeSwap, afterSwap, beforeSwapReturnDelta, afterSwapReturnDelta
  • on-chainv4-hook 0x5b907B52eAcBCeE78F2C56A6e74F5cf04A96e0cC verified=false owner=0x2f7CE7eeF4b091E0827dA1E8C2E10D061d95d180; fn setPaused(bool), setFee(bytes32,uint24)
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0xcdafeea66f3300eb9f96a2f93f70a3c82bd88edc6e97048a4733234b94a0e7bc liquidityUsd=10

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7

• MediumToken's pool uses an unverified v4 hookhoneypotDeterministic

  A Uniswap v4 pool of this token (pool.hooks (0x90fbab7e…)) runs hook 0x25E6…5040 on every swap (afterInitialize, afterSwap). The hook's source code is not verified, so it cannot be checked whether it blocks sells for some wallets or later, or takes a hidden fee. A passing sell simulation only shows it works for our test wallet right now.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool hook 0x25E6366C490225358625d941C7B147360b155040 permission bits: afterInitialize, afterSwap

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumOne funder's 2 wallets bundled 5.17% of supplysnipersDeterministic

  2 wallets funded by the same address 0x037a…a58e bought 5.17% of the supply together (block 93673576). Spreading one buyer over many wallets hides how much a single entity controls.

  Evidence

  • on-chainbundles with commonFunder 0x037a28654af107a41f86536134f264dd6a05a58e: 2 wallets, pctSupply 5.17

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumOne Pons admin controls the launchpad hook, factory, vault and lockerownershipAI

  Address 0x263e…19Dd owns PonsV2MemeHook, PonsV2LaunchFactory, PonsV2BuybackVault and PonsV2LaunchLocker. Hook ownership cannot be renounced. On the hook it can do the following: - Change fee policy for future launches. - Change the sweep operator that converts and distributes fees (no timelock). - Call rescuePoolFees, which pays pending fees directly to this pool's snapshotted protocol and creator recipients. None of these hook powers can block GH0ST trading or take holder tokens. The factory owner also has rescue functions (rescueCurveFees, rescueSweptGraduation) and can override the creator fee recipient. The factory source was omitted, so their exact limits could not be verified. This is launchpad-wide trust, not something specific to this token.

  Evidence

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd; PonsV2LaunchFactory owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd
  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L235-L237
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    function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L274-L278
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    function setFeeSweepOperator(address operator) external onlyOwner {
            if (operator == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            feeSweepOperator = operator;
            emit FeeSweepOperatorUpdated(operator);
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
    Show source

    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• MediumX bio claims a fully on-chain AI, but the site says it runs on ICPclaims-mismatchAI

  The X bio markets GH0ST as a "0-offchain" smart-contract transformer "live on Robinhood in 500 contracts." The project's own homepage says the larger Qwen voice runs inference on the Internet Computer, Robinhood only checks a threshold-signed result, and it does not prove every model step. Weight-contract counts on the site (48 for S0UL, 5,516 for the GPT-2 experiment) also do not match "500 contracts." Buyers who trust the bio can think a 1.7B model is executing entirely on Robinhood when the site says it is not.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/
    Show source

    Inference runs on ICP; the result arrives in a separate Robinhood transaction.

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/
    Show source

    Robinhood checks a threshold-signed result; it does not independently prove every model operation.

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/
    Show source

    PARAMETERS48 WEIGHT CONTRACTS

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• LowLaunch sniped: 10 wallets took 17.1% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 10 wallets bought 17.1% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=10, pctSupplyBought=17.0664, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought=17.0664, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chainbundles: block 93673577 pctSupply 9.1597; block 93673576 commonFunder 0x037a28654af107a41f86536134f264dd6a05a58e pctSupply 5.1725

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowDeployer sold 3.57%; wallets it funded still hold 0.61%insidersAI

  The deployer 0x8D6B…91c6 has sold 3.57% of supply. It now holds 0.12%. Two wallets it funded hold 0.61%. The amounts are small. Separately, the deployer burned 4.74% of supply across 10 burns, which reduced supply.

  Evidence

  • on-chaindeployerSoldPct=3.5685; Deployer 0x8d6b11cfdf079e27c17e05cb7ea81235887691c6 holds 0.1199% now
  • on-chaininsiders: wallets funded by 0x8d6b11cfdf079e27c17e05cb7ea81235887691c6 pctSupplyHeldNow=0.6086
  • on-chainburns by 0x8d6b11cfdf079e27c17e05cb7ea81235887691c6 kind=deployer pct=4.7448 count=10

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowOne funder controls a 3% wallet clusterholdersAI

  Two wallets funded by 0xf70d…dbef hold 3.03% combined. The largest non-infrastructure holder has 3.06%. There are 542 holders. Excluding the PoolManager, locker and burn address, no single holder dominates.

  Evidence

  • on-chainclusters: funder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupplyHeldNow=3.034
  • on-chainholdersCount=542; top non-infra holder 0x0e49931340da953c28a59b3c5cb734922c109484 3.0591%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowSite presents the AI brain as live while the homepage calls it a pilotwebsiteAI

  Whispers presents a live window into a Qwen3 1.7 billion parameter brain whose thoughts return to Robinhood. The homepage is more limited: one readable RH to ICP to RH pilot is verified, and the buy-triggered rollout is still underway. The live page also says each buy joins a line for a new thought. Animation is labeled an illustration, so this is overstated product status, not a hidden drain.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/whispers/
    Show source

    QWEN3 · 1.7 BILLION PARAMETERS

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/whispers/
    Show source

    Network activity is an illustration; readings are live.

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/
    Show source

    One readable pilot result is verified; the buy-triggered rollout is underway.

  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/live/
    Show source

    Each GH0ST buy joins the line for a new AI thought.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (5)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 5.0% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  5.0% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 24 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-02. Burned by: the deployer 0x8d6b…91c6 (4.7%, 10 burns); holder 0xb235…8c2b (0.06%, 3 burns); holder 0xaa37…bdd5 (0.06%, 3 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x2eb2849cde7957b86d0dfd4b59e450a9f9d15559

  Confirmed by: facts

• PositiveToken is a fixed-supply ERC-20 with no owner powersownershipAI

  GH0ST is the standard Pons V2 launchpad template. It is OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Burnable, with no owner, no mint after deployment, no fees, no blacklist and no pause. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. The 'deployer' field is reference data only and gives no privileges. Holders can only burn their own tokens, or tokens they have approved someone to burn.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
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    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
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    _mint(curve_, supply_);

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
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    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = [] ; privileges = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveFork test: buy, sell and transfer work with 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  On a fork, a real buy and sell through the graduated Uniswap v4 pool both returned exactly the expected amounts. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could sell, and selling one hour later also worked. The token itself charges 0% on buy, sell and transfer. The pool-level hook fee is covered in a separate finding.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation: canBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
  • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is permanently locked in the Pons lockerliquidityAI

  The main pool's liquidity position is 100% locked in PonsV2LaunchLocker. That contract has no withdraw or arbitrary-call function. Its owner can only perform a one-time factory wiring, which is already done. Liquidity therefore cannot be pulled by the creator or by the Pons admin. The locker also holds 8.19% of supply as a permanently locked remainder of the virtual reserves.

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x42ce003822cbaa9eb94e9e07ef8d988e5a998ded86b189fd4f3e25b68f001d01: lpLockedPct=100, lpHeldByDeployerPct=0
  • codePonsV2LaunchLocker.sol:L11-L20
    Show source

    /**
     * @title PonsV2LaunchLocker
     * @notice Permanently holds the graduated Uniswap V4 position NFT for every
     * pons v2 launch. Unlike v1's locker, there is no `collectFees()` here: fee
     * collection and distribution belong entirely to PonsV2MemeHook and
     * PonsV2FeeEscrow, since a V4 position accrues fees inside the singleton
     * PoolManager rather than on the NFT itself. This contract exposes no
     * withdrawal or arbitrary-call function, so locked liquidity can never be
     * removed by an administrator.
     */

  • codePonsV2LaunchLocker.sol:L60-L66
    Show source

    function setFactory(address factory_) external onlyOwner {
            if (factory != address(0)) revert AlreadyInitialized();
            if (factory_ == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            factory = factory_;
            emit FactorySet(factory_);
        }

  • codePonsV2LaunchLocker.sol:L109-L116
    Show source

    function lockTokenSupply(address token, uint256 amount) external onlyFactory {
            if (token == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
            if (amount == 0) return;
            IERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
            lockedTokenSupply[token] += amount;
            emit TokenSupplyLocked(token, amount);
        }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveTeam says it claimed a verified dev tag on FOMOsocialAI

  The project account says it moved GH0ST into a FOMO wallet and acquired a Team Tag for this contract. On FOMO that is a verified developer profile, which makes the team easier to identify in the app. Nothing in the given facts shows that wallet dumping.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/llmgh0st/status/2118209519188881757
    Show source

    Team Tag acquired on FOMO robinhood:0x2eb2849cde7957b86d0dfd4b59e450a9f9d15559

  • Xhttps://x.com/llmgh0st/status/2117665481515839555
    Show source

    Moving Some robinhood:0x2eb2849cde7957b86d0dfd4b59e450a9f9d15559 to team FOMO wallet to claim Team Tag in @fomo

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (2)

• LowEvery swap pays a fixed 2.5% pool fee to the protocol and creatorfeesAI

  The PonsV2MemeHook takes hookFeeBps plus creatorTaxBps from each swap's output or input in its afterSwap callback. For this pool that is 1% + 1.5%. The fee terms are snapshotted into the pool's LaunchInfo at registration, and afterSwap reads that snapshot, not the live owner settings. So if the hook owner later calls setHookFeeBps (max 10%), only new launches change, not this pool. Combined fees are also capped at 20% at registration. The hook only has beforeInitialize, afterSwap and afterSwapReturnDelta permissions. It has no beforeSwap logic that could block sellers. The fee money goes to the fee escrow for the protocol and creator. Part of the creator's share buys back GH0ST and locks it in the buyback vault for 5 years.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L444-L485
    Show source

    function _afterSwap(address, PoolKey calldata key, SwapParams calldata params, BalanceDelta delta, bytes calldata)
            internal
            override
            returns (bytes4, int128)
        {
            // The conversion and buyback legs swap against this same pool, but
            // they are never taxed here: v4-core skips a pool's hooks when the
            // hook itself is the caller (Hooks.afterSwap). Were that not so, the
            // skim would come out of the buyback before it reached the vault.
            PoolId poolId = key.toId();
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L364-L378
    Show source

    launches[poolId] = LaunchInfo({
                registered: true,
                memecoinIsCurrency0: memecoinIsCurrency0,
                memecoin: memecoin,
                quoteToken: quoteToken,
                creator: creator,
                buybackCreatorRecipient: buybackCreatorRecipient,
                protocolFeeRecipient: policy.protocolFeeRecipient,
                creatorTaxBps: creatorTaxBps,
                protocolFeeShareBps: policy.protocolFeeShareBps,
                buybackBurnBps: policy.buybackBurnBps,
                hookFeeBps: policy.hookFeeBps,
                maxInternalPriceImpactBps: policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps,
                buybackEnabled: buybackEnabled
            });

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L352
    Show source

    if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L184-L201
    Show source

    function getHookPermissions() public pure override returns (Hooks.Permissions memory) {
            return Hooks.Permissions({
                beforeInitialize: true,
                afterInitialize: false,
                beforeAddLiquidity: false,
                afterAddLiquidity: false,
                beforeRemoveLiquidity: false,
                afterRemoveLiquidity: false,
                beforeSwap: false,
                afterSwap: true,
                beforeDonate: false,
                afterDonate: false,
                beforeSwapReturnDelta: false,
                afterSwapReturnDelta: true,
                afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta: false,

  • on-chaincurve: graduated=true, feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=150

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoWebsite domain registered on launch day; on-chain link points to GitHubwebsiteAI

  The on-chain website social points to a GitHub repo, while the project site is gh0st.fyi. That domain was created on 2026-10-20, the same day as the token deployment. This is context only.

  Evidence

  • on-chainOn-chain socials: website=https://github.com/8tk8m2kv9f-lang/GH0ST
  • webhttps://gh0st.fyi/whispers/
    Show source

    Whispers — Inside the GH0ST brain

  • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt=2026-10-20T16:17:12.573Z; deployedAt=2026-10-20T18:54:55.000Z

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol