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Robinhood Chain·Scanned 06 Nov 2026, 20:43 UTC

PonsV2LauncherToken $OZONE

0x112222b62433f31b302c00ecf78c0071944414b5

Verdict

Caution

63/100 safety

Token has no owner powers and is fixed supply; sells work at ~4% curve fee; 27.6% was sniped at launch, liquidity ~$763

The OZONE token contract is a standard Pons template: fixed supply and no owner powers, and buying and selling work with about a 4% launchpad fee. The main risks are around the token itself. Snipers and coordinated bundles bought about 27.6% of supply at launch, and one sniper-linked wallet still holds 7.2% against only about $763 of liquidity. The project is an anonymous same-day launch whose 'Orbio-backed' story is not confirmed by the real Orbio project. The bonding curve holding the reserves is also unverified.

Score breakdown

  • Contract
    85
  • Token
    45
  • Social / X
    40
  • Website
    50

Higher is safer · 0 = worst · 100 = best

Yes
4%
None (no owner role)
0% / 0%

NarrativeSteady

Trend scout · Grok 4.7 · X search via twitterapi.io

46/100 heat

A separate score, not part of the safety score: hype never makes a contract safer.

  • AI agents
  • onchain finance
  • tokenized stocks
Fit
Core: the product is this narrative
Buzz
Mixed29 posts from 23 accounts; 0% of authors have accounts under 30 days old; 21 post(s) with engagement that does not fit the follower count.
Momentum
Project mentions jumped from about 1 to roughly 818 week over week (rough, one page of posts, so a one-day burst can distort it); AI-agent talk was roughly flat to lower (~2646 vs ~4897).

Orbio Zone says it is an agent workspace for Robinhood Chain with live tools for stock tokens, lending rates and wallets. Talk spiked on one day from almost nothing, but most posts are zero-like collab replies with a few views, plus a couple of $OZONE callouts. Broader AI-agent talk is not rising.

Posts and accounts (5 posts)
  • @cyberbulk911 · 06 Nov 2026, 12:43 UTC

    “Huge gem found. $OZONE // part of orbio ecosystem.”

  • @KaraAshLudwig · 06 Nov 2026, 12:23 UTC

    “The future of onchain finance is autonomous agents with live market context”

  • @Annatrader22 · 06 Nov 2026, 13:28 UTC

    “Be early or step aside $OZONE TG ENTRY”

  • @_Niss0 · 06 Nov 2026, 20:36 UTC

    “This is looking sharp! Would be happy to collaborate”

  • @manco1954 · 06 Nov 2026, 12:43 UTC

    “agents plugging into real-time intel could actually shift onchain behaviors”

Who pushes it

Competing for the same narrative

Walk As Bot, DEPLOYR, Motes

Posts, last 7 days vs the 7 before

  • project: ~818 vs 1 (up 818.0× (rough))
  • AI agents: ~2646 vs 4897 (flat (rough))
  • tokenized stocks: ~2840 (no comparison)

~ = estimated from one page of results

Measured in code from 29 posts by 23 accounts: 0% fresh accounts (< 30 days), 0% near-copies, top 3 accounts wrote 21%.

X posts searched from 2026-10-07 to 2026-11-07 (UTC). Post links come only from the X search results.

Key findings

  • MediumLaunch sniped: 24 wallets took 27.6% of supply in 10 seconds
  • MediumUnverified bonding curve holds 67% of supply and all reserves
  • MediumTiny liquidity (~$763) and 36 holders; one linked wallet holds 7.2%
  • MediumClaimed link to the real Orbio project is unconfirmed by Orbio
  • GoodToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powers

What would change the verdict

  • Lowers safety:The wallet linked to a launch sniper sells its 7.2% into the thin ~$763 curve → down
  • Raises safety:The bonding curve source is verified and shows its admin functions are factory-only → contract score up

Unlock PRO for this project

A one-time payment adds hourly re-checks for good, a 7-day watch, questions to the jury, the launch map and deeper social forensics.

Post on XView on explorer ↗

Findings

14 findings

Risks (8)

  • MediumLaunch sniped: 24 wallets took 27.6% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

    The launch was captured: 24 wallets bought 27.6% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0.89% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

    Evidence

    • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=24, pctSupplyBought=27.5986, pctSupplyHeldNow=0.8928
    • on-chainsnipers.pctSupplyBought = 27.5986; snipers.pctSupplyHeldNow = 0.8928
    • on-chainbundles: block 107573120 commonFunder 0x53091256ebd2d8aa37b45536a5fd864ca764f32f pctSupply 4.8816; block 107573124 commonFunder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef pctSupply 1.9128
    • on-chainclusters: funder 0xd29c85f15df544ba632c9e25829fd29d767d7978 wallets 0x2438833348fc5933f40e6d175983884c185acfb7, 0xe64785f0611ed19e9567f38f9ae076385b76a7dd pctSupplyHeldNow 7.223

    Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • MediumUnverified bonding curve holds 67% of supply and all reservesotherAI

    All buys and sells currently go through the bonding curve 0xe2B2…F7Ba. It holds 66.92% of supply and the ETH reserves, and its source is not verified on the explorer. Its function table includes admin-looking functions: sweepFees, rescueFees, setCreatorFeeRecipient, setBuybackEnabled, initialize(address) and graduate(address). We cannot see who may call them. The factory source shows the factory calls rescueFees, setCreatorFeeRecipient, setBuybackEnabled, exemptFromSnipeTax, initialize and graduate. That strongly suggests these are factory-only, matching the Pons design. This cannot be confirmed from verified curve code. The simulation shows the curve behaves normally today.

    Evidence

    • on-chainrelatedContracts: bonding curve 0xe2B2424B9aecFC1C6c092346D3977447A80eF7Ba verified=false
    • on-chaintopHolders: 0xe2B2424B9aecFC1C6c092346D3977447A80eF7Ba pct 66.9245 (bonding curve)
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1222-L1226
      Show source
      function rescueCurveFees(address token) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {
              LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token];
              if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound();
              PonsV2BondingCurve(payable(launch.curve)).rescueFees();
          }
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L839-L847
      Show source
      PonsV2BondingCurve(curve).initialize(token);
      
              // The creator's own addresses never count as snipers on their own
              // launch: an atomic dev buy lands in the launch second, exactly when
              // the tax peaks, and would otherwise be consumed by it.
              PonsV2BondingCurve(curve).exemptFromSnipeTax(originalDeployer);
              if (creatorFeeRecipient != originalDeployer) {
                  PonsV2BondingCurve(curve).exemptFromSnipeTax(creatorFeeRecipient);
              }

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

  • MediumTiny liquidity (~$763) and 36 holders; one linked wallet holds 7.2%liquidityAI

    The curve has about $763 of liquidity and the token has only 36 holders. Even moderate sells, such as the 7.2% cluster, would move the price sharply. Buyers should expect high price impact.

    Evidence

    • on-chainliquidity: pons-v2-bonding-curve 0xe2B2424B9aecFC1C6c092346D3977447A80eF7Ba liquidityUsd 763
    • on-chainholdersCount = 36

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • MediumClaimed link to the real Orbio project is unconfirmed by Orbioclaims-mismatchAI

    OZONE is marketed as Orbio Zone / part of the Orbio ecosystem, including a claim that it is backed by the Orbio dev. The established project is orbio.so (@orbiodotso, ~10.9k followers, site live since at least August 2026). A search of that account for OZONE, orbio.zone, and GetOrbioZone returned nothing. Holders can confuse this same-day Pons token with the unrelated Orbio product. The 'backed by orbio dev' line is a third-party post, not a statement from @orbiodotso, so that backing is unverified.

    Evidence

    Confirmed by: grok-4.7

  • LowPons factory owner can redirect creator fees after a 3-day timelockownershipAI

    The Pons factory owner 0x263e…19Dd can propose a new creator-fee recipient for any launch. The change takes effect only after a 3-day timelock and must be executed within the following 3 days. The owner can also disable (but not enable) buyback-and-lock. These powers affect where the 3% creator tax and vested buyback tokens go. They do not touch holder balances or the ability to trade. Factory ownership cannot be renounced.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L946-L957
      Show source
      function setCreatorFeeRecipient(address token, address newRecipient) external onlyOwner {
              LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token];
              if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound();
              if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
      
              uint256 effectiveAt = block.timestamp + CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK;
              uint256 expiresAt = effectiveAt + CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_EXECUTION_WINDOW;
              pendingCreatorFeeRecipient[token] =
                  PendingCreatorFeeRecipient({newRecipient: newRecipient, effectiveAt: effectiveAt, expiresAt: expiresAt});
      
              emit CreatorFeeRecipientChangeProposed(token, launch.creatorFeeRecipient, newRecipient, effectiveAt, expiresAt);
          }
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L99
      Show source
      uint256 public constant CREATOR_FEE_RECIPIENT_TIMELOCK = 3 days;
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L904-L921
      Show source
      function setBuybackEnabled(address token, bool enabled) external {
              LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token];
              if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound();
              bool isCreator = msg.sender == launch.creatorFeeRecipient;
              bool isOwner = msg.sender == owner();
              if (!isCreator && !isOwner) revert NotBuybackController();
              // Enabling spends the creator's bucket, so only the creator may enable.
              if (enabled && !isCreator) revert NotBuybackController();
      
              launch.buybackEnabled = enabled;
              if (launch.phase == GraduationPhase.NotGraduated) {
                  PonsV2BondingCurve(launch.curve).setBuybackEnabled(enabled);
              } else if (launch.phase == GraduationPhase.PoolCreated) {
                  memeHook.setBuybackEnabled(_poolIdFor(token, launch), enabled);
              }
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L630-L632
      Show source
      function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
              revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
          }

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • LowFactory owner has an emergency path to sweep reserves if graduation failsliquidityAI

    At graduation, the curve's reserves move into the factory and are then seeded into a locked, full-range Uniswap v4 position. Anyone can trigger the seeding step. The owner can force-sweep a curve only when the seed check says it cannot be seeded. The owner can send swept reserves to an arbitrary recipient only after a 7-day delay, and only if nobody has seeded the pool by then. This is a bounded emergency path, but if used, the funds go to one address for off-chain distribution.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1109-L1123
      Show source
      function forceSweptGraduation(address token) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {
              LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token];
              if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound();
              if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.NotGraduated) revert WrongGraduationPhase();
              PonsV2BondingCurve curve = PonsV2BondingCurve(launch.curve);
              if (!curve.readyToGraduate()) {
                  revert PonsV2BondingCurve.NotReadyToGraduate();
              }
              if (_graduationSeedable(token, launch, curve.realQuoteReserve(), curve.tokenReserve())) {
                  revert GraduationStillViable();
              }
      
              _sweepCurve(token, launch, curve);
              emit LaunchForceSwept(token);
          }
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1254-L1285
      Show source
      function rescueSweptGraduation(address token, address recipient) external onlyOwner nonReentrant {
              LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token];
              if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound();
              if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.Swept) revert WrongGraduationPhase();
              if (recipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
      
              uint256 availableAt = launch.sweptAt + GRADUATION_RESCUE_DELAY;
              if (block.timestamp < availableAt) revert GraduationRescueTooEarly(availableAt);
      
              uint256 quoteAmount = launch.sweptQuote;
              uint256 tokenAmount = launch.sweptTokens;
              address pairToken = launch.pairToken;
      
              launch.sweptQuote = 0;
              launch.sweptTokens = 0;
    • codePonsV2LaunchFactory.sol:L1193-L1211
      Show source
      function createGraduatedPool(address token) external nonReentrant returns (uint256 positionId) {
              if (address(graduationExecutor) == address(0)) revert GraduationExecutorNotSet();
              LaunchedToken storage launch = _launchedTokens[token];
              if (!launch.exists) revert TokenNotFound();
              if (launch.phase != GraduationPhase.Swept) revert WrongGraduationPhase();
      
              uint256 sweptQuote = launch.sweptQuote;
              _assertGraduationSeedable(token, launch, sweptQuote, launch.sweptTokens);
              uint256 tokenAmount = _lockExcessGraduationTokens(token, launch, sweptQuote, launch.sweptTokens);
      
              launch.sweptQuote = 0;
              launch.sweptTokens = 0;
              launch.sweptAt = 0;
              launch.phase = GraduationPhase.PoolCreated;

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • LowLocker and buyback vault owner can switch their trusted factoryownershipAI

    The owner 0x263e…19Dd can call setFactory on the LP locker and the buyback vault. A replaced factory would gain the factory-only powers: locking positions or tokens, and calling updateCreatorRecipient on the vault, which redirects who receives vested buyback tokens. The function tables show no unlock or withdraw function on the locker. However, the locker and vault sources were omitted, so the full effect cannot be verified.

    Evidence

    • on-chainLP-locker setFactory(address) [owner] @PonsV2LaunchLocker.sol:L60-L66; owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd
    • on-chainbuyback-vault setFactory(address) [owner] @PonsV2BuybackVault.sol:L98-L104; updateCreatorRecipient(address,address) [factory]

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • LowUnlabelled caller posts promise 100k and claim 'Orbio dev' backingsocialAI

    @cyberbulk911 (website field set to orbio.so) posted the contract within minutes of deploy, called it a gem, said the last call did 20x, and said 'see you on 100k' / 'backed by orbio dev'. Those posts do not say they are paid. The same account was calling other tiny Pons-ecosystem tokens the day before, including a claim that another dev's last coin hit 800k. Treat the price and backing lines as promotion, not facts.

    Evidence

    Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (2)

  • PositiveToken is a fixed-supply template with no owner powersotherAI

    OZONE is the standard PonsV2LauncherToken template: plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Burnable. There is no owner, mint function, fee, blacklist, pause or transfer hook. The entire supply is minted once, in the constructor, to the bonding curve. The deployer field is reference data only and gives no privileges. Burn and burnFrom only destroy the caller's own tokens or tokens they have an allowance for. Slither reported no issues.

    Evidence

    • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
      Show source
      contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
    • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L70
      Show source
      _mint(curve_, supply_);
    • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
      Show source
      function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
              if (from == address(0)) {
                  // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                  _totalSupply += value;
              } else {
                  uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                  if (fromBalance < value) {
                      revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                  }
                  unchecked {
                      // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                      _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                  }
              }
    • on-chaincontract.privileges = [] ; isProxy = false
    • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = []

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • PositiveBuys, sells and transfers work in simulation at ~4% curve feehoneypotAI

    On a fork, a real buy and sell on the bonding curve both succeeded. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell one hour later worked. The effective tax was about 4% each way: a 1% protocol fee plus a 3% creator tax charged by the curve, not the token. Plain transfers have no tax. The anti-snipe tax has already decayed to 0.

    Evidence

    • forksimulation: canBuy=true, buyTaxPct=3.99, canSell=true, sellTaxPct=4, transferTaxPct=0
    • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok
    • on-chaincurve: graduated=false, feeBps=100, creatorTaxBps=300, snipeTaxNow=0bps over 3s

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (4)

  • LowSame-day anonymous X account with no named teamsocialAI

    The X account, the orbio.zone domain, and the token were all created on 2026-11-06. The account has about 90 followers and posts only product copy. No person is named on the site or in the bio, so 'who is behind this' cannot be checked. A quiet new launch is not itself a rug, but there is no doxx or prior history to rely on.

    Evidence

    Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5

  • InfoCreator wallet holds no tokens and has not soldinsidersAI

    The creator 0x312d…3f2a is the only declared snipe-tax-exempt insider. It currently holds 0% of supply, and its sold percentage is recorded as 0. No deployer launch history was found.

    Evidence

    • on-chainDeployer 0x312da052bf26fc030d8713ec1e9cd21e50143f2a holds 0% now; deployerSoldPct = 0; deployerHistory = []

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

  • InfoWebsite domain is same-day; app is read-only and asks only a free sign-inwebsiteAI

    orbio.zone was registered on 2026-11-06T02:02, about 10 hours before the token was deployed. It has no Wayback history. The site describes an agent workspace or MCP tools. The dApp test found no mint or redeem features; the AI driver reported all tools are read-only. The only wallet action was a free sign-in message, which moved no funds and made no approvals. These test failures reflect features that do not exist, not a failed withdrawal.

    Evidence

    • on-chainsite.domainCreatedAt = 2026-11-06T02:02:31.337Z; waybackSnapshots = []
    • forkdappTests mint step: personal_sign (SIWE login)
      Show source
      Signing is free: it sends no transaction and moves no funds.
    • forkdappTests redeem
      Show source
      Orbio Zone is a read-only MCP server / agent workspace and does not accept deposits or support redeeming funds.

    Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

  • InfoWebsite still shows an unfilled $TICKER placeholderwebsiteAI

    The access section tells visitors to hold $10 of $TICKER rather than $OZONE. That is an unfinished template string, not a fee or drain. It does not match the ticker used on X.

    Evidence

    • Show source
      Hold , open everything.
      $10 of $TICKER
      No subscription and no card.

    Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Score breakdown

Higher is safer. The overall is the weighted average of the assessed parts, then capped by hard facts.

  • Contract

    weight 45%
    85

    The token is a verified, immutable Pons template with no owner powers and sells work, but the bonding curve that holds the reserves is unverified.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • Verified fixed-supply ERC20 with no owner, mint, blacklist or pause
    • Not a proxy; Slither found no issues
    • Fork simulation: buy, sell and transfer-then-sell all work
    • About 4% curve fee each way, 0% on plain transfers

    Lowered the score

    • Bonding curve holding 67% of supply is unverified
    • Pons factory owner keeps timelocked control over fee routing and emergency rescue
    • Locker and vault owner can change which factory they trust
  • Token

    weight 30%
    45

    Launch fairness was poor (27.6% sniped, including funded bundles), one linked wallet still holds 7.2%, and liquidity is tiny.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • Creator wallet holds 0% and has not sold
    • Snipers now hold under 1%

    Lowered the score

    • 24 sniper wallets bought 27.6% of supply in 10 seconds
    • Several same-block bundles share a common funder
    • Wallet linked to a sniper holds 7.2%
    • Only about $763 of liquidity and 36 holders
  • Social / X

    weight 15%
    40

    The X account is a same-day anonymous account, and the 'Orbio-backed' promotion comes from an unlabelled gem-caller, not the real Orbio project.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • No third-party rug or honeypot warnings found

    Lowered the score

    • X account, domain and token were all created the same day
    • No named team
    • Name overlaps the established Orbio project, which has not confirmed any link
    • Caller posts promise 100k with no ad label
  • Website

    weight 10%
    50

    The site is a brand-new, read-only agent tool that asked only for a free sign-in, but it is unfinished and its access claims are unverified.

    Why this score

    Raised the score

    • Only wallet action is a free sign-in message, with no transaction or approval
    • Claim of launching on Pons is confirmed

    Lowered the score

    • Domain registered the same day as the token, with no history
    • Leftover $TICKER placeholder on the site
    • Token-gated access claims cannot be verified