PonsV2LauncherToken $KYTE

Risks (9)

• HighClaim contradicted: A Uniswap v4 hook attached to the $KYTE/WETH pool directs a 0.10% fee from each swap to the FeeVault, with 30% going to stakers in WETH and 20% to buy back and burn $KYTE.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  The project claims buyback & burn, but none of the 1 burn(s) seen was preceded by a buy from a pool in the same transaction (2.3% of supply burned in total).

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/useKyte/status/2117327253814358270
    Show source

    A 0.10% fee from each eligible swap flows into the same FeeVault as Kyte's option fees → 30% of that goes to stakers, paid in WETH → 20% buys back and burns $KYTE

  • on-chainTransfer events of 0x072d88c2f31f568c0f4b8f613692eb489541ed45 to burn addresses + balanceOf(0x…dEaD)

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighClaim contradicted: Token buybacks are enforced with an on-chain 10-minute TWAP price floor.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  The project claims buyback & burn, but none of the 1 burn(s) seen was preceded by a buy from a pool in the same transaction (2.3% of supply burned in total).

  Evidence

  • webhttps://kyte.sh/
    Show source

    Buybacks must clear a 10-minute TWAP floor checked on-chain, so even a stolen keeper key cannot sell cheap.

  • on-chainTransfer events of 0x072d88c2f31f568c0f4b8f613692eb489541ed45 to burn addresses + balanceOf(0x…dEaD)

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighClaim contradicted: 20% of protocol fees collected in the FeeVault are used to buy back $KYTE on Uniswap v4 and burn it on-chain.claims-mismatchDeterministic

  The project claims buyback & burn, but none of the 1 burn(s) seen was preceded by a buy from a pool in the same transaction (2.3% of supply burned in total).

  Evidence

  • webhttps://kyte.sh/
    Show source

    20% Buy-and-burn Swapped for $KYTE on Uniswap v4 and burned, on-chain.

  • on-chainTransfer events of 0x072d88c2f31f568c0f4b8f613692eb489541ed45 to burn addresses + balanceOf(0x…dEaD)

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumLaunch sniped: 20 wallets took 31% of supply in 11 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 20 wallets bought 31% of the supply within 11 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 4.37% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=20, pctSupplyBought=31.0086, pctSupplyHeldNow=4.3697
  • on-chainsnipers: pctSupplyBought=31.0086, pctSupplyHeldNow=4.3697
  • on-chainbundle block 107452285: 3 wallets, pctSupply 7.2675
  • on-chaincluster funder 0xf70da97812cb96acdf810712aa562db8dfa3dbef wallets 0x879ceea9c1b363f2a02d95a77db1da29e9b36cac, 0x7f7c73aad4d210ec65bccb341df090cd63d49aaa, 0xb962c048f59b82b6a874cb37291ecbc6f266c925 pctSupplyHeldNow=5.6275

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• Medium10-minute timelock can redirect Kyte protocol feesownershipAI

  Most Kyte protocol contracts are governed by TimelockController 0xf8E6…2893, whose minimum delay is 600 seconds. Through it, whoever holds the proposer role can do the following. (1) Redirect FeeVault payouts: setDestinations accepts any non-zero addresses for the staking pool, buyback burner and ops safe. Fees meant for stakers and buyback could be sent to any wallet after 10 minutes. (2) Change the split between stakers, buyback and ops. The shares must sum to 100%, and stakers keep a minimum whose value is not shown. (3) Change KyteHook's feeVault to any address and its fee up to 1%. (4) Swap the BuybackBurner adapter and keeper. Holders would get only about 10 minutes of warning. The proposer and executor role holders are not shown in the material. None of this lets anyone touch tokens in holders' wallets.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTimelockController 0xf8E6fAF7e0E57bc91aD5C59B84FedE2Cab842893 getMinDelay = 600
  • codeFeeVault.sol:L36-L46
    Show source

    function setDestinations(address stakingPool_, address buybackBurner_, address opsSafe_) external onlyTimelock {
            if (stakingPool_ == address(0) || buybackBurner_ == address(0) || opsSafe_ == address(0)) {
                revert Errors.ZeroAddress();
            }
            emit Events.AddressChanged("stakingPool", stakingPool, stakingPool_);
            emit Events.AddressChanged("buybackBurner", buybackBurner, buybackBurner_);
            emit Events.AddressChanged("opsSafe", opsSafe, opsSafe_);
            stakingPool = stakingPool_;
            buybackBurner = buybackBurner_;
            opsSafe = opsSafe_;
        }

  • codeFeeVault.sol:L49-L59
    Show source

    function setSplit(uint16 stakers, uint16 buyback, uint16 ops) external onlyTimelock {
            if (uint256(stakers) + buyback + ops != Constants.BPS || stakers < Constants.MIN_STAKERS_BPS) {
                revert Errors.BadSplit();
            }
            emit Events.ParamChanged("stakersBps", stakersBps, stakers);
            emit Events.ParamChanged("buybackBps", buybackBps, buyback);
            emit Events.ParamChanged("opsBps", opsBps, ops);
            stakersBps = stakers;
            buybackBps = buyback;
            opsBps = ops;
        }

  • codeKyteHook.sol:L115-L124
    Show source

    function setFee(uint256 feeBps_) external onlyOwner {
            if (feeBps_ > MAX_FEE_BPS) revert FeeTooHigh();
            emit FeeChanged(feeBps, feeBps_);
            feeBps = feeBps_;
        }
    
        function setFeeVault(address feeVault_) external onlyOwner {
            emit FeeVaultChanged(feeVault, feeVault_);
            feeVault = feeVault_;
        }

  • on-chainBuybackBurner 0x8A9d128247D8c4512411CF9D0CdCAc5Acf86FB95 adapter = 0xFa17818515E946180b9767f9D9c40A09EE80dda6 (settable by setAdapter(address) [timelock])

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowTiny side pools have unlocked, withdrawable liquidityliquidityAI

  Three other Uniswap v4 KYTE pools have liquidity held by an unlocked wallet or an unlabelled contract. Their liquidity is tiny ($65, $1 and $0). Whoever holds it can withdraw at any time, so nobody should rely on these pools for trading.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x0901f486d5…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x25ccff436f17d0203c1cf4cfa56de1a9c59de314 [other: wallet (unlocked)] 100%
  • on-chainpool 0x0901f486d5cadd41883b3c45f8d254ab8bac05485bb437a4e2e4850c0ad70c4b liquidityUsd=65, lpLockedPct=0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowDocs list staking and buyback contracts for a different tokenclaims-mismatchAI

  The StakingPool 0x4eD4…Ef8b, BuybackBurner 0xAF34…42d9 and UniswapV4Adapter found on docs.kyte.sh are configured for token 0x3849…00aF, not KYTE 0x072D…Ed45. The contracts actually wired to KYTE are StakingPool 0xD725…d17f and BuybackBurner 0x8A9d…FB95, which the site's JS and FeeVault reference. Users following the docs could interact with the wrong contracts. The KYTE buyback burner has burned nothing so far (totalBurned = 0).

  Evidence

  • on-chainStakingPool 0x4eD46d734e3Ddd9BF21364B9DfFBb2Ee030CEf8b stakeToken = 0x3849DcF9FA77EC5c21D57d841a268E77830800aF
  • on-chainStakingPool 0xD7253a90fd43507F44cF0934F3D5d7432760d17f stakeToken = 0x072D88c2F31F568C0F4B8F613692eB489541Ed45
  • on-chainFeeVault 0x78c569A1137B78cB78F42c42B4B6C2b8F1E3dDef stakingPool = 0xD7253a90fd43507F44cF0934F3D5d7432760d17f; buybackBurner = 0x8A9d128247D8c4512411CF9D0CdCAc5Acf86FB95

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowStakers' claimed 20% minimum fee share could not be confirmedclaims-mismatchAI

  FeeVault is currently configured for a 30% staker share, but setSplit can change that share without the claimed 20% hard-coded floor. A buyer therefore cannot rely on stakers continuing to receive at least 20%.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://kyte.sh/
    Show source

    30% Stakers Paid in WETH to $KYTE stakers, once per epoch... Stakers share floor never below 20%

  • on-chainFeeVault stakersBps
    Show source

    value: 3000 (30%); settableBy: setSplit(uint16,uint16,uint16) [timelock]

  • codeFeeVault.sol:L49
    Show source

    function setSplit(uint16 stakers, uint16 buyback, uint16 ops) external onlyTimelock {

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7

• LowX claims options on 228 tokens; site says launch with 3claims-mismatchAI

  Hours before the $KYTE launch post, @useKyte said Kyte was fully live with options on 228 tokens. The same site's status section still says mainnet is launching with 3 tokens and low caps. The homepage market table also presents many Robinhood Chain tokens as what you can trade on Kyte right now. Treat the 228 figure as unverified marketing until the listed-token set matches it.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/useKyte/status/2118516293943107714
    Show source

    Kyte is fully live. Options on 228 tokens on Robinhood Chain.

  • webhttps://kyte.sh/
    Show source

    Mainnet Contracts deployed on Robinhood Chain mainnet, owned by a 10 minute timelock and multisigs. Launching with 3 tokens and low caps.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

Positive signals (6)

• PositiveToken is a standard Pons template with no owner powersownershipAI

  KYTE is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 plus ERC20Burnable. It has no owner, no mint after deployment, no fees, no blacklist and no pause. The whole supply was minted once, to the bonding curve, in the constructor. The deployer field is only a label. The burn functions only let holders burn their own tokens, or tokens they have been approved to spend. Nobody can freeze, tax or take holders' tokens through the token contract.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L59-L71
    Show source

    deployer = deployer_;
            // Passed explicitly rather than read from msg.sender: PonsV2LaunchFactory
            // deploys this token indirectly through PonsV2LaunchDeployer to keep its
            // own bytecode under EIP-170's size limit, so msg.sender at construction
            // time would otherwise resolve to that deployer helper, not the factory.
            launchFactory = launchFactory_;
            curve = curve_;
            logo = logo_;
            description = description_;
            _socials = socials_;
    
            _mint(curve_, supply_);
        }

  • codeERC20Burnable.sol:L35-L38
    Show source

    function burnFrom(address account, uint256 value) public virtual {
            _spendAllowance(account, _msgSender(), value);
            _burn(account, value);
        }

  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = [] ; privileges = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveBuy, sell and transfer-then-sell all work at 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  On a fork of the graduated Uniswap v4 pool, the test wallet bought and then sold. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell one hour later worked. Every output matched the expected quote, and the token-level tax was 0%. There is no sign of a honeypot.

  Evidence

  • forkcanBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
  • forksecond wallet (received via transfer) could sell; sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is permanently locked by the Pons lockerliquidityAI

  The graduated Uniswap v4 pool holds about $18.9k of liquidity. Its only liquidity position is held by the Pons launch locker, labelled as a permanent LP lock. The deployer holds no LP. The creator cannot pull this liquidity.

  Evidence

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0xe25ab92955…: v4 position liquidity holders: 0x267444d099b10fb5ed7c3cc7b7c767adca574952 [locked: PonsV2LaunchLocker (permanent LP lock)] 100%
  • on-chainliquidity pool 0xe25ab929558cc6d69208ac1533224c1885ccedcfdeafefff72ea83887471229e: lpLockedPct=100, lpHeldByDeployerPct=0, liquidityUsd=18943

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveCreator holds no tokens and burned their launch buyinsidersAI

  The deployer/creator 0x9E1B…eDEe holds no tokens now and is recorded as having sold 0%. Its tokens went to the 0x…dEaD burn address in one burn, 2.2573% of supply. The creator was the only declared insider.

  Evidence

  • on-chainDeployer 0x9e1b43a7068371e0b0b96fd86e219639a951edee holds 0% now
  • on-chainburns.by: 0x9e1b43a7068371e0b0b96fd86e219639a951edee kind=deployer pct=2.2573
  • on-chaindeployerSoldPct=0

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveStaking pause cannot lock stakers' tokens or rewardspauseAI

  In StakingPool 0xD725…d17f, which stakes KYTE and holds about 1.43% of supply, the guardian or timelock can pause new stakes. However, unstake and claim have no pause check. The pool has no admin withdraw or rescue function, and the stake token is fixed. Only the timelock can set the minimum claim, and it is capped at 0.1 ETH. Fee splitting in FeeVault also works while paused. Stakers can always take their tokens back once their one-epoch lock ends.

  Evidence

  • codeStakingPool.sol:L82-L112
    Show source

    /// @notice Immediate. Takes pending stake first, then active. Earned rewards stay claimable. Works while paused.
        function unstake(uint256 amount) external nonReentrant {
            if (amount == 0) revert Errors.AmountZero();
            _roll();
            Account storage a = _sync(msg.sender);
            if (amount > a.active + a.pending) revert Errors.InsufficientStake();
    
            uint256 fromPending = Math.min(amount, a.pending);
            uint256 fromActive = amount - fromPending;
            if (fromActive > a.active - _lockedActive(a)) revert Errors.StakeLocked();
            a.pending -= fromPending;
            pendingSupply -= fromPending;
            a.active -= fromActive;
            activeSupply -= fromActive;
            a.rewardDebt = _share(a.active);

  • codeStakingPool.sol:L131-L135
    Show source

    function setMinClaim(uint256 minClaim_) external onlyTimelock {
            if (minClaim_ > MAX_MIN_CLAIM) revert Errors.FeeAboveCap();
            emit Events.ParamChanged("minClaim", minClaim, minClaim_);
            minClaim = minClaim_;
        }

  • codeFeeVault.sol:L65-L67
    Show source

    /// @notice Split the whole WETH balance. At most once per epoch; works while paused.
        /// @dev Rounding dust stays in the vault for the next split.
        function split() external nonReentrant {

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveSite discloses no Robinhood affiliation and that audits are pendingwebsiteAI

  kyte.sh and the docs both say Kyte is not affiliated with or endorsed by Robinhood, and the roadmap lists audits as upcoming rather than finished. The domain's first Wayback capture is the token launch day (2026-11-06), while the account said the concept site was up on 2026-11-01, so the public web presence is new and matches a project that only just launched.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://kyte.sh/
    Show source

    Kyte is not affiliated with or endorsed by Robinhood.

  • webhttps://docs.kyte.sh/
    Show source

    Kyte is built on Robinhood Chain and is not affiliated with or endorsed by Robinhood.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (5)

• LowMain pool charges a 3% fee on every swap, fixed at launchfeesAI

  The main pool's hook (PonsV2MemeHook) takes a cut of every swap. The cut is the hook fee (1%, live value) plus the creator tax (2%, from the curve's creatorTaxBps), taken from the swap's unspecified side. The fee terms are copied into the pool's record when the pool is registered. Each swap then uses that stored record, not the hook's live settings. So if the Pons hook owner later calls setHookFeeBps (capped at 10%), only future launches change, not this pool. The combined rate is also capped at 20% when a pool is registered. The 2% creator tax goes to the creator's fee recipient, which the factory can change. This is normal Pons economics, but buyers and sellers do pay about 3% per trade.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L364-L378
    Show source

    launches[poolId] = LaunchInfo({
                registered: true,
                memecoinIsCurrency0: memecoinIsCurrency0,
                memecoin: memecoin,
                quoteToken: quoteToken,
                creator: creator,
                buybackCreatorRecipient: buybackCreatorRecipient,
                protocolFeeRecipient: policy.protocolFeeRecipient,
                creatorTaxBps: creatorTaxBps,
                protocolFeeShareBps: policy.protocolFeeShareBps,
                buybackBurnBps: policy.buybackBurnBps,
                hookFeeBps: policy.hookFeeBps,
                maxInternalPriceImpactBps: policy.maxInternalPriceImpactBps,
                buybackEnabled: buybackEnabled
            });

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L454-L467
    Show source

    LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;
            (Currency feeCurrency, int128 unspecifiedAmount) =
                specifiedIsCurrency0 ? (key.currency1, delta.amount1()) : (key.currency0, delta.amount0());
            if (unspecifiedAmount < 0) unspecifiedAmount = -unspecifiedAmount;
            if (unspecifiedAmount == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            uint256 unspecified = uint256(uint128(unspecifiedAmount));
            uint256 feeAmount = (unspecified * info.hookFeeBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            uint256 taxAmount = (unspecified * info.creatorTaxBps) / BASIS_POINTS;
            uint256 totalAmount = feeAmount + taxAmount;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L251-L255
    Show source

    function setHookFeeBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps > MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
            hookFeeBps = bps;
            emit HookFeeBpsUpdated(bps);
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L352
    Show source

    if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();

  • on-chainlaunchpad fees: buyPct=3, sellPct=3 (protocol fee 1%; creator tax 2%)

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowGraduated curve still holds 32.9% of supply; its fate is unconfirmedholdersAI

  The curve 0x1925…9e23 reports graduated=true, sellableTokens=0 and tokenReserve=0, yet its token balance is still 32.8995% of supply. The curve source was omitted. Its function table lists only buy (curve-gated) and graduate (factory-only, already executed) as token-out paths. What happens to these tokens could not be confirmed. If they can still leave the curve, that would be a large supply overhang.

  Evidence

  • on-chainExcluded from concentration: 0x1925d297d55426649031e0ebfa0ad48301e59e23 (bonding curve) 32.8995%
  • on-chaincurve params: graduated = true, sellableTokens = 0, tokenReserve = 0, reservedTokens = 285714285714285714285714285

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoOne-time burn: 2.3% of supply sent to a burn addressburnDeterministic

  2.3% of the supply ever minted is burned, in 1 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-06. Burned by: the deployer 0x9e1b…edee (2.3%, 1 burn). This happened once, around launch; there is no sign of a continuing burn mechanism.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x072d88c2f31f568c0f4b8f613692eb489541ed45

  Confirmed by: facts

• InfoBot's 'Audit Passed' claim conflicts with Kyte's own roadmapclaims-mismatchAI

  A third-party alert account posted that $KYTE has 'Audit Passed' and honeypot no. Kyte's own site puts independent audits and a bug bounty under Next, not Done, and says the GitHub repo is not public yet. The bot line is an allegation and conflicts with the project's own roadmap, so it should not be read as an audit.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/SolanaTren59241/status/2118683543769694683
    Show source

    Security: Audit Passed | Honeypot: No

  • webhttps://kyte.sh/
    Show source

    Next Audits and bug bounty Independent audits and a public bug bounty.

  • Xhttps://x.com/useKyte/status/2118687852225876362
    Show source

    Next, we're working on making our GitHub repository public

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoOfficial X account is one week old and the team is anonymoussocialAI

  @useKyte was created 2026-10-30 and the first posts are 'coming soon' for this same options product, so it does not look like a renamed old account. It has 95 followers and a gold check the account says is a Verified Organization. Team members are not named anywhere in the bio, posts, or site, so 'who runs this' stays anonymous. Launch replies are mostly generic 'DM me / send it' accounts plus gem-caller posts, not independent reviews.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/useKyte/status/2116267359958622240
    Show source

    The onchain options market on Robinhood. Coming soon.

  • Xhttps://x.com/useKyte/status/2118066181634695514
    Show source

    Kyte is now a Verified Organization on X. We have secured the gold checkmark

  • Xhttps://x.com/Alpharadarp/status/2118689861255287247
    Show source

    DM me privately on Telegram for exclusive VIP channel access and fresh early calls.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7