PonsV2LauncherToken $IGNITION

Risks (10)

• CriticalWithdrawing through the dApp failed ("Sell token")honeypotDeterministic

  We ran the project's own dApp on a local fork. The "Sell token" step did not work. Expected: With it, the same exit took about 18 minutes and never fell more than 20% at once, so holders had time to react. It doesn't guarantee a price, and a determined seller can still exit, just not all at once. (source: https://www.ignition.family/how-it-works). Observed: wallet +0.00954 ETH, -0.40523 VRAXCAT; 3 tx (approve ok, approve ok, execute ok). returned 0.00954 ETH of 0.01 ETH deposited (95.47%) | driver: done — Successfully sold all VRAXCAT back for ETH via the Sell tab.. Money deposited may be impossible to take out.

  Evidence

  • forkdApp test "Sell token" on a local fork (https://www.ignition.family/launches/0xEBF79caa17beA7a5eA9297fa37c21c9cD1DEC22d)
    Show source

    wallet +0.00954 ETH, -0.40523 VRAXCAT; 3 tx (approve ok, approve ok, execute ok). returned 0.00954 ETH of 0.01 ETH deposited (95.47%) | driver: done — Successfully sold all VRAXCAT back for ETH via the Sell tab.

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighDApp requests an unlimited token approval to a contract we did not reviewotherDeterministic

  During the "Sell token" flow the dApp asks for an unlimited token approval in favour of an unknown spender, which is not among the contracts we analysed. Prefer approving only the exact amount.

  Evidence

  • forkdApp test "Sell token" on a local fork (https://www.ignition.family/launches/0xEBF79caa17beA7a5eA9297fa37c21c9cD1DEC22d)
    Show source

    wallet +0.00954 ETH, -0.40523 VRAXCAT; 3 tx (approve ok, approve ok, execute ok). returned 0.00954 ETH of 0.01 ETH deposited (95.47%) | driver: done — Successfully sold all VRAXCAT back for ETH via the Sell tab.

  • forkapprove(address,uint256) → 0xebf79caa17bea7a5ea9297fa37c21c9cd1dec22d (arg0=0x0000…8BA3 (Permit2), arg1=MAX_UINT256 (unlimited))

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumToken's pool uses an unverified v4 hookhoneypotDeterministic

  A Uniswap v4 pool of this token (pool.hooks (0x45410f56…); pool.hooks (0xac0bf722…)) runs hook 0x419e…2Ac0 on every swap (beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap). The hook's source code is not verified, so it cannot be checked whether it blocks sells for some wallets or later, or takes a hidden fee. A passing sell simulation only shows it works for our test wallet right now.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool hook 0x419e4D8EF9a35Bd97ca53dcBf4AbaFC5526F2Ac0 permission bits: beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumToken's pool uses an unverified v4 hookhoneypotDeterministic

  A Uniswap v4 pool of this token (pool.hooks (0x3d887e80…); pool.hooks (0x60f6fcfa…)) runs hook 0x3493…2ac0 on every swap (beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap). The hook's source code is not verified, so it cannot be checked whether it blocks sells for some wallets or later, or takes a hidden fee. A passing sell simulation only shows it works for our test wallet right now.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool hook 0x3493b97FBF6917C91caB8E2Ba9C871D31AA82ac0 permission bits: beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumToken's pool uses an unverified v4 hookhoneypotDeterministic

  A Uniswap v4 pool of this token (pool.hooks (0x4cd980d0…); pool.hooks (0x16255275…)) runs hook 0xa735…EaC0 on every swap (beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap). The hook's source code is not verified, so it cannot be checked whether it blocks sells for some wallets or later, or takes a hidden fee. A passing sell simulation only shows it works for our test wallet right now.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool hook 0xa735d365630987D86789d5aEFBd91b244A7fEaC0 permission bits: beforeInitialize, beforeAddLiquidity, beforeRemoveLiquidity, beforeSwap, afterSwap

  Confirmed by: facts

• MediumLaunch sniped: 18 wallets took 46% of supply in 10 secondssnipersDeterministic

  The launch was captured: 18 wallets bought 46% of the supply within 10 seconds. A small, fast group set the early price and could sell into everyone who bought later — bad for launch fairness and a strong insider/bot signal. They now hold 0% of supply, so current dump pressure from them is low — most of it was already sold, i.e. they exited on later buyers.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers: windowBlocks=100, wallets=18, pctSupplyBought=45.9906, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chaintoken.snipers: pctSupplyBought=45.9906, pctSupplyHeldNow=0
  • on-chaintoken.bundles[0]: block 86949096, pctSupply 18.4727

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5

• MediumHolders allege a prior rug, but on-chain history does not confirm itsocialAI

  Several accounts reply that this is a second scam or that the team might rug again, tying it to days of silence and a site outage. The official account says one person tried to break the project, that fees were secured, and that the site was down for an upgrade. The supplied deployer history is empty, so a previous rug by this deployer is not shown on-chain and these posts are allegations, not proof. Still, multiple holders are saying they already lost trust once.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/SOLVESOLUTIONN/status/2118249050419957766
    Show source

    For over 7 days you criminals ignored the community that gave your shit token value. Silence on them because you're preparing a lie to tell for your 2nd scam

  • Xhttps://x.com/AsymmetricBull/status/2117961931424231622
    Show source

    @IGNITION_RH hope y’all are legit and not gonna rug round 2 🤝

  • Xhttps://x.com/popeyyeBrutus/status/2117933977449406686
    Show source

    Your explanation came after your website went down for 5hours. I’m sorry I can’t take you seriously. Good luck, I hope you reach millions and don’t rug people twice.

  • Xhttps://x.com/IGNITION_RH/status/2117847055595077785
    Show source

    One person tried to break Ignition. The project didn't break. Fees secured. Team aligned. Chart back alive.

  • on-chaindeployerHistory=[]

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowHook owner can reroute fees and can never renounceownershipAI

  The PonsV2MemeHook owner (0x263e…19Dd) cannot renounce ownership. The owner can: - change the fee sweep operator; - change policy parameters for future launches; - call rescuePoolFees. rescuePoolFees pays the pool's accrued fees directly to the protocol and creator recipients stored for the pool, skipping the buyback. It cannot send funds to the owner. Through the factory, the 'protocol-owner override' path can also change who receives this pool's creator fees, and toggle buyback-and-lock. These powers touch fee distribution only, not holders' balances or their ability to trade. The facts table lists maxInternalPriceImpactBps as unbounded, but the code bounds it to 1–9999 bps.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L235-L237
    Show source

    function renounceOwnership() public pure override {
            revert OwnershipCannotBeRenounced();
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L555-L603
    Show source

    function rescuePoolFees(PoolId poolId)
            external
            onlyOwner
            nonReentrant
            returns (uint256 protocolAmount, uint256 creatorAmount)
        {
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            address quoteToken = info.quoteToken;
    
            if (quoteToken != address(0)) {
                (protocolAmount, creatorAmount) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, quoteToken);
            }
            (uint256 memecoinProtocol, uint256 memecoinCreator) = _rescueCurrency(poolId, info, info.memecoin);
            if (protocolAmount == 0 && creatorAmount == 0 && memecoinProtocol == 0 && memecoinCreator == 0) {

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L384-L414
    Show source

    /**
         * @notice Updates who receives this pool's creator fee share. Restricted
         * to the factory, which gates both self-service creator transfers and
         * protocol-owner overrides before forwarding here, so this contract only
         * needs to trust one caller.
         */
        function setCreatorFeeRecipient(PoolId poolId, address newRecipient) external onlyFactory {
            LaunchInfo storage info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) revert UnknownPool();
            if (newRecipient == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
    
            emit CreatorFeeRecipientUpdated(poolId, info.creator, newRecipient);
            info.creator = newRecipient;
        }

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L257-L261
    Show source

    function setMaxInternalPriceImpactBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {
            if (bps == 0 || bps >= BASIS_POINTS) revert InvalidBps();
            maxInternalPriceImpactBps = bps;
            emit MaxInternalPriceImpactUpdated(bps);
        }

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowCreator exempted 30 wallets from the launch snipe taxinsidersAI

  At launch the creator declared 30 wallets, including the deployer, as exempt from the curve's snipe tax, which starts at 99% and decays over 3 seconds. Two more wallets were funded by the deployer. All of these hold 0% of supply now. How much they bought and sold is not in the material. The deployer holds 0% and has burned about 0.28% of supply.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.insiders[1].fundedBy
    Show source

    declared by creator at launch (snipe-tax exempt on curve; creator 0x7d17bfa7383e42e8df00ae042dcaf24748dd69b9)

  • on-chaintoken.burns.by[0]: deployer pct 0.2802
  • on-chainDeployer 0x7d17bfa7383e42e8df00ae042dcaf24748dd69b9 holds 0% now

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• Low'Fee can never go up' is overstated: owner can raise future-launch feesclaims-mismatchAI

  The hook attached to the principal graduated pool has an owner-controlled setHookFeeBps(uint256) function. Its fee is currently 1% and can be raised as high as 10%, so the fee is not prevented from increasing.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/IGNITION_RH/status/2118011814932099332
    Show source

    The fee can never go up.

  • on-chainuniswap-v4 0x5e4ae95442e07e3c996890515d32c50cb5c975cc001df477ec53da5d3fd28e48: hooks=0xE5e702641Ea86F4ae6cC3cDaeD2B886f976Be044 (PonsV2MemeHook)
  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook hookFeeBps = 100 (1%); settableBy = setHookFeeBps(uint256) [owner]; bounds = bps <= MAX_HOOK_FEE_BPS=1000
  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L251
    Show source

    function setHookFeeBps(uint256 bps) external onlyOwner {

  • on-chainPonsV2MemeHook owner = 0x263ed295dAFaE1d9AAdD6E56c4B6F9f38eE019Dd

  Confirmed by: gpt-5.6-sol, claude-opus-5.5 · Disputed by: grok-4.7

Positive signals (5)

• PositiveOngoing token burns verified on-chain: 0.28% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  0.28% of the supply ever minted is burned (at least: the transfer history was read partially), in 20 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-04. Burned by: the deployer 0x7d17…69b9 (0.28%, 16 burns); holder 0xa2fe…32ba (0.0%, 1 burn); contract 0x322e…a949 (0.0%, 2 burns). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0x01e6301bc1118be90cc6bc2d1b5c0c44bb883111

  Confirmed by: facts

• PositiveFixed-supply token with no owner, mint, fee or blacklist powersownershipAI

  IGNITION is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC-20 plus the standard burn extension. The whole supply was minted once to the bonding curve in the constructor. There is no owner, no mint function, no fee, no blacklist, no pause and no transfer hook. The deployer address is stored only as reference data and has no powers. Holders can only burn their own tokens, or tokens they have approved someone else to burn. No one can change how this token transfers.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2LauncherToken.sol:L21-L71
    Show source

    contract PonsV2LauncherToken is ERC20, ERC20Burnable {
        struct Socials {
            string twitter;
            string telegram;
            string discord;
            string website;
            string farcaster;
        }
    
        error ZeroAddress();
    
        address public immutable deployer;
        address public immutable launchFactory;
        address public immutable curve;

  • codeERC20.sol:L176-L204
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • codeERC20Burnable.sol:L20-L38
    Show source

    function burn(uint256 value) public virtual {
            _burn(_msgSender(), value);
        }
    
        /**
         * @dev Destroys a `value` amount of tokens from `account`, deducting from
         * the caller's allowance.
         *
         * See {ERC20-_burn} and {ERC20-allowance}.
         *
         * Requirements:
         *
         * - the caller must have allowance for ``accounts``'s tokens of at least
         * `value`.
         */

  • on-chaincontract.privileges = [] ; isProxy = false
    Show source

    "isProxy": false

  • staticslither 0.11.6: issues = []

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveDirect buy and sell on the pool work at 0% token taxhoneypotAI

  A real buy and sell on the graduated Uniswap v4 pool both succeeded and matched expected amounts. A second wallet that received tokens by transfer could also sell, and a sell one hour later worked. The token itself charges no tax. The pool-level hook fee is included in the quoted amounts.

  Evidence

  • forksimulation: canBuy=true, canSell=true, buyTaxPct=0, sellTaxPct=0, transferTaxPct=0
    Show source

    second wallet (received via transfer) could sell

  • forksimulation notes
    Show source

    sell after +1h: ok

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveMain pool liquidity is 100% locked by the Pons lockerliquidityAI

  Facts report the main Uniswap v4 pool (about $25.5k liquidity) as 100% locked. None of it is held by the deployer, and the Pons LP locker holds 8.16% of supply. The deployer cannot pull this liquidity. The three other small pools (under $250 each) are third-party pools and are not locked.

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity pool 0x5e4ae95442e07e3c996890515d32c50cb5c975cc001df477ec53da5d3fd28e48: lpLockedPct=100, lpHeldByDeployerPct=0
    Show source

    "lpLockedPct": 100

  • on-chaintopHolders: 0x267444D099b10fB5Ed7c3Cc7B7c767AdcA574952 LP locker 8.1632%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• PositiveSite discloses no audit and no Robinhood affiliationwebsiteAI

  The homepage states the software is noncustodial, that a listing is not an endorsement, that contracts have not had a third-party audit, and that Ignition is not affiliated with Robinhood Markets, Inc. The how-it-works page repeats that there is no external audit. That is a disclosure, not a safety proof.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://www.ignition.family/
    Show source

    The contracts have not had a third-party audit yet. Nothing here is financial, legal or tax advice

  • webhttps://www.ignition.family/
    Show source

    Ignition is not affiliated with Robinhood Markets, Inc.

  • webhttps://www.ignition.family/how-it-works
    Show source

    The contracts have not had an external third-party audit. Trade with that in mind: Ignition is live with real funds.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

Notes (5)

• LowPool hook charges about 3% per trade, rate fixed for this poolfeesAI

  The PonsV2MemeHook skims hookFeeBps plus the creator tax from every swap in the pool. Per the launchpad facts this is 1% protocol fee plus 2% creator tax, so about 3% per buy and per sell. These rates are copied into the pool's record when the pool is registered, and afterSwap reads that per-pool copy. When the hook owner later changes hookFeeBps, it only affects pools registered after the change, not this pool. The sum is also capped at 20% at registration. The hook cannot block swaps: there is no beforeSwap permission. Effect for holders: a round trip costs roughly 6% plus price impact. This is normal launchpad economics.

  Evidence

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L444-L485
    Show source

    function _afterSwap(address, PoolKey calldata key, SwapParams calldata params, BalanceDelta delta, bytes calldata)
            internal
            override
            returns (bytes4, int128)
        {
            // The conversion and buyback legs swap against this same pool, but
            // they are never taxed here: v4-core skips a pool's hooks when the
            // hook itself is the caller (Hooks.afterSwap). Were that not so, the
            // skim would come out of the buyback before it reached the vault.
            PoolId poolId = key.toId();
            LaunchInfo memory info = launches[poolId];
            if (!info.registered) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
            if (info.hookFeeBps == 0 && info.creatorTaxBps == 0) return (IHooks.afterSwap.selector, 0);
    
            bool specifiedIsCurrency0 = (params.amountSpecified < 0) == params.zeroForOne;

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L352-L378
    Show source

    if (uint256(creatorTaxBps) + policy.hookFeeBps > MAX_TOTAL_TRADE_FEE_BPS) revert InvalidBps();
    
            // The factory builds the key correctly today, but these two facts are
            // what every later fee credit and swap direction is derived from. A
            // memecoin that is neither currency would silently designate the wrong
            // side as quote and route fees to a slot nothing ever reads.
            if (address(key.hooks) != address(this)) revert InvalidPoolKey();
            bool memecoinIsCurrency0 = Currency.unwrap(key.currency0) == memecoin;
            if (!memecoinIsCurrency0 && Currency.unwrap(key.currency1) != memecoin) revert InvalidPoolKey();
    
            address quoteToken = memecoinIsCurrency0 ? Currency.unwrap(key.currency1) : Currency.unwrap(key.currency0);
    
            launches[poolId] = LaunchInfo({
                registered: true,
                memecoinIsCurrency0: memecoinIsCurrency0,

  • codePonsV2MemeHook.sol:L184-L201
    Show source

    function getHookPermissions() public pure override returns (Hooks.Permissions memory) {
            return Hooks.Permissions({
                beforeInitialize: true,
                afterInitialize: false,
                beforeAddLiquidity: false,
                afterAddLiquidity: false,
                beforeRemoveLiquidity: false,
                afterRemoveLiquidity: false,
                beforeSwap: false,
                afterSwap: true,
                beforeDonate: false,
                afterDonate: false,
                beforeSwapReturnDelta: false,
                afterSwapReturnDelta: true,
                afterAddLiquidityReturnDelta: false,

  • on-chainlaunchpad.fees
    Show source

    protocol fee 1%; creator tax 2%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowdApp test traded another token via unverified platform contractswebsiteAI

  IGNITION's own site markets a separate launchpad product ('rewrite the hook logic anytime after launch'). Its JavaScript references several unverified contracts: - a vault/factory 0xb69d…15Fb that exposes upgradeTo; - unverified hooks with withdrawFloat/sweep/setGlobalPaused; - a registry with setBanned. The dApp test traded a different token (VRAXCAT) on that platform. Part of each trade went to unverified contract 0x27c6…c044, and the round trip returned 95.47%. None of these contracts are attached to the IGNITION pool, which uses the verified PonsV2MemeHook. They matter only to users of the Ignition platform's own products.

  Evidence

  • forkdappTests: Buy token, tx 0xafd2c4307366e032e38bcc449f49a055e72cb3b13368c3cbb4d8fcbcad2ea89b
    Show source

    WARNING: funds moved to third party 0x27c601ab223b9c7a8300af5ea83b16e129aac044: 0.00827 VRAXCAT

  • forkdappTests: Sell token
    Show source

    returned 0.00954 ETH of 0.01 ETH deposited (95.47%)

  • on-chaintoken.notes: uniswap-v4 0x5e4ae95442…: hooks=0xE5e702641Ea86F4ae6cC3cDaeD2B886f976Be044 (PonsV2MemeHook)
  • on-chainparam description
    Show source

    Rename it re-tier it rewrite the hook logic anytime after launch on Robinhood

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7, gpt-5.6-sol

• LowDomain is new, but a 2023 Wayback record hints it was reusedwebsiteAI

  The registrar creation time given for ignition.family is 12 October 2026, the same day the token was deployed, but Wayback is recorded as first seeing the domain on 23 July 2023. Those two dates cannot both describe a brand-new domain. What was on the domain in 2023 was not fetched, so a recycled domain is possible and unverified, not proven.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://www.ignition.family/

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoHoldings now spread across 1,324 walletsholdersAI

  There are 1324 holders. Excluding the PoolManager and the LP locker, the largest holder has about 2.37%, and the top 10 together hold about 17%. No single wallet can crash the price on its own. Fresh wallets hold about 3.2%.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintoken.holdersCount=1324; top10Pct=17.1729
  • on-chainfreshWalletsPct=3.2286

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5, grok-4.7 · Disputed by: gpt-5.6-sol

• InfoToken marketed as Ignition is a standard Pons template contractclaims-mismatchAI

  On-chain the contract name is PonsV2LauncherToken, the standard token template of the Pons launchpad on Robinhood Chain, while the site and X account present this address as Ignition, a separate launchpad product. That does not by itself mean the token is fake, but buyers should not assume the contract was written as a custom Ignition token. Pons template tokens are expected to be fixed-supply launchpad tokens; owner powers, if any, are not in the social material.

  Evidence

  • on-chainname=PonsV2LauncherToken; symbol=IGNITION; chain=eip155:4663
  • webhttps://www.ignition.family/how-it-works
    Show source

    Ignition is a token launchpad on Robinhood Chain. Every token is a fixed-supply ERC20 trading on a real Uniswap v4 pool from its first block.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7, claude-opus-5.5, gpt-5.6-sol