FlayToken $FLAY

Risks (2)

• MediumAbout 81% of supply held by multisigs and unanalysed contractsholdersAI

  The four largest holders are contracts: a Gnosis Safe (40%), a FlayTokenMigration contract (18.13%), an L1ChugSplashProxy bridge-style contract (11.65%) and a second Gnosis Safe (11.48%). If the people controlling the Safes, or the admins of the migration or bridge contracts, release or sell these tokens, the price could drop sharply. None of these contracts were analysed, so we cannot tell whether the tokens are locked, vested or freely movable.

  Evidence

  • on-chaintopHolders: 0x12174e62642A05DCB954B5A16c6b9fDFDF05250E GnosisSafeProxy 40%
  • on-chaintopHolders: 0xE84D23C9F9F69537c1C24C59Fcea2F5164B1e456 FlayTokenMigration 18.1313%
  • on-chaintopHolders: 0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35 L1ChugSplashProxy 11.6515%
  • on-chaintopHolders: 0x673A039f6a959Fa9dB65D16781e6deFDe30375D9 GnosisSafeProxy 11.4816%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• LowMain Uniswap v3 liquidity is unlocked and mostly held by a SafeliquidityAI

  The main pool (about $275k) shows 0% of its liquidity burned or locked. About 74% of the tracked position liquidity is held by the Gnosis Safe 0x673a…75d9 and about 26% by 0xa0b6…9e87. Either can withdraw their positions at any time, which would cut liquidity. The holder is a multisig, not the deployer, so this needs trust rather than signalling a rug.

  Evidence

  • on-chainliquidity uniswap-v3 0x68a70d80424a3f558873a0c467C554bcB723b227 liquidityUsd 275448, lpBurnedPct 0, lpLockedPct 0
  • on-chainv3 position liquidity other holders: 0x673a039f6a959fa9db65d16781e6defde30375d9 74.2183%, 0xa0b6253d7787ae282749b71fd4ef5d5c9d8a9e87 25.7816%

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

Positive signals (5)

• PositiveBuyback & burn verified on-chain: 0.68% of supply burnedburnDeterministic

  0.68% of the supply ever minted is burned (at least: the transfer history was read partially), in 591 burn transfer(s), last 2026-11-02. Burned by: contract 0x9008…ab41 (0.68%, 590 burns, 497 buyback); contract 0x498e…aa96 (0.0%, 1 burn). Burned tokens are gone for good, which reduces the supply over time.

  Evidence

  • on-chainTransfer events to 0x0 / 0x…dEaD and balanceOf(burn addresses) of 0xf1a7000000950c7ad8aff13118bb7ab561a448ee
  • on-chainburns burnedPct 0.6809, count 591, buybackBurns 497, ongoing true

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5

• PositiveToken contract has no owner powers (no mint, tax, blacklist or pause)ownershipAI

  FlayToken is a plain OpenZeppelin ERC20 + ERC20Permit + ERC20Votes. The only custom code is the constructor, which mints a fixed 1 billion tokens once, plus the required overrides that just call the parent code. Nobody can mint more, set a tax, blacklist wallets, pause transfers or upgrade the code. Transfers only check balance and allowance.

  Evidence

  • codeFlayToken.sol:L34-L58
    Show source

    contract FlayToken is ERC20, ERC20Permit, ERC20Votes {
        constructor(
            address tokenIssuer
        ) ERC20("Flayer", "FLAY") ERC20Permit("Flayer") {
            _mint({
                account: tokenIssuer,
                value: 1_000_000_000 ether // 1 billion tokens
            });
        }
    
        /// Override required functions from inherited contracts
        function _update(
            address from,
            address to,
            uint256 value

  • codeERC20.sol:L188-L216
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • on-chainisProxy=false, privileges=[]

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• PositiveSupply fixed at 1 billion, minted once at deploymentmintAI

  _mint is only called in the constructor, sending 1,000,000,000 FLAY to tokenIssuer. No public or owner mint function exists, so supply can only go down through burns.

  Evidence

  • codeFlayToken.sol:L35-L42
    Show source

    constructor(
            address tokenIssuer
        ) ERC20("Flayer", "FLAY") ERC20Permit("Flayer") {
            _mint({
                account: tokenIssuer,
                value: 1_000_000_000 ether // 1 billion tokens
            });
        }

  • on-chaintotalSupply = 1000000000000000000000000000

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• PositiveVerified Flayer Labs account claims this contract and buybackssocialAI

  The project posts under a verified X account created in July 2023, before this token was deployed. The bio and recent posts name the same contract and say protocol revenue is used to buy and burn FLAY. A related verified product account, Flaunch, says it was built by that lab. This is an identifiable, ongoing team, not an anonymous new ticker.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/FlayerLabs/status/2113619531058827339
    Show source

    Revenue from across the growing Flayer ecosystem continues to burn ethereum:0xf1a7000000950c7ad8aff13118bb7ab561a448ee .

  • webhttps://flayer.io/
    Show source

    Revenue from our products funds FLAY buybacks and burns, permanently removing tokens from circulation.

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• PositiveFounder is publicly identified on XsocialAI

  A verified account, Caps (@0xCaps), created in 2021, publicly ties itself to Flayer, Flaunch, NFTX, and $FLAY, and invites holders into a chat about products that buy and burn this contract. Third-party posts also name Caps as the founder. That is a real public identity link, not an unverifiable “doxxed” claim.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/0xCaps/status/2112014120027664387
    Show source

    If you’re a FLAY holder come and join the private chat where we talk about the products we’re building that buy and burn ethereum:0xf1a7000000950c7ad8aff13118bb7ab561a448ee

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

Notes (1)

• InfoLaunch snipers and bundles took under 1% of supplysnipersAI

  One sniper bought 0.002% of supply and holds nothing now. Three same-block bundles at launch took about 0.25%, 0.14% and 0.11% of supply. These shares are too small to threaten the price.

  Evidence

  • on-chainsnipers pctSupplyBought 0.002, pctSupplyHeldNow 0
  • on-chainbundles block 20827795 pctSupply 0.2504

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5