DegenToken $DEGEN

Risks (4)

• HighOwner (0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d) can stop tradingpauseDeterministic

  unpause() (owner (0x704E…3c0d)): Can pause / freeze all transfers

  Evidence

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L134
    Show source

    function unpause() public onlyOwner {

  • staticprivilege unpause() restricted to owner (0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d)
    Show source

    Can pause / freeze all transfers

  Confirmed by: facts

• HighOwner (0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d) can stop tradingpauseDeterministic

  pause() (owner (0x704E…3c0d)): Can pause / freeze all transfers

  Evidence

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L127
    Show source

    function pause() public onlyOwner {

  • staticprivilege pause() restricted to owner (0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d)
    Show source

    Can pause / freeze all transfers

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L127-L137
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    function pause() public onlyOwner {
            _pause();
        }
    
        /**
         * @dev Unpause all token transfers
         */
        function unpause() public onlyOwner {
            _unpause();
        }

  • codeERC20Pausable.sol:L30-L32
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual override whenNotPaused {
            super._update(from, to, value);
        }

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L139-L145
    Show source

    function _update(
            address from,
            address to,
            uint256 value
        ) internal override(ERC20, ERC20Pausable, ERC20Votes) {
            super._update(from, to, value);
        }

  • on-chainpaused = false
  • on-chainowner() = 0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5

• MediumToken's pool uses an unverified v4 hookhoneypotDeterministic

  A Uniswap v4 pool of this token (pool.hooks (0xf9827806…)) runs hook 0x5123…0080 on every swap (beforeSwap). The hook's source code is not verified, so it cannot be checked whether it blocks sells for some wallets or later, or takes a hidden fee. A passing sell simulation only shows it works for our test wallet right now.

  Evidence

  • on-chainpool hook 0x51238c1b3e31e264824A48492DA32609E8560080 permission bits: beforeSwap
  • on-chainv4-hook 0x51238c1b3e31e264824A48492DA32609E8560080 — verified=false owner=0x471462020Bd85FBaEDCFC3Ef9badD0E9b49aD9D7
  • on-chainhook permissions (from address bits) = beforeSwap
  • on-chainuniswap-v4 pool 0xee381526b93d418077a9d1b9c9b495a3d135410af9a58bc2a5f512fb7b61cbf7 liquidityUsd 10553

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5

• MediumOwner (0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d) can mint up to a capmintDeterministic

  mint(address,uint96) (owner (0x704E…3c0d)): Can mint new tokens (inflate supply / dump); mints supply; capped by constants MINT_CAP=1

  Evidence

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L104
    Show source

    function mint(address to, uint96 amount) external onlyOwner {

  • staticprivilege mint(address,uint96) restricted to owner (0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d)
    Show source

    Can mint new tokens (inflate supply / dump); mints supply; capped by constants MINT_CAP=1

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L104-L122
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    function mint(address to, uint96 amount) external onlyOwner {
            if (block.timestamp < mintingAllowedAfter) {
                revert MintingDateNotReached();
            }
    
            if (to == address(0)) {
                revert MintToZeroAddressBlocked();
            }
    
            // record the mint
            mintingAllowedAfter = block.timestamp + MINIMUM_TIME_BETWEEN_MINTS;
    
            // mint the amount
            if (amount > (totalSupply() * MINT_CAP) / 100) {
                revert DegenMintCapExceeded();

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L41-L46
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    uint32 public constant MINIMUM_TIME_BETWEEN_MINTS = 1 days * 365;
    
        /**
         * @dev Cap on the percentage of totalSupply that can be minted at each mint
         */
        uint8 public constant MINT_CAP = 1;

  • on-chainmintingAllowedAfter = 1830297600

  Confirmed by: facts, claude-opus-5.5

Positive signals (4)

• PositiveToken owner is a Safe multisig needing 2 signaturesownershipAI

  The owner of DEGEN is a verified SafeL2 multisig contract, not a single private key. Its signature threshold is 2, and its nonce shows 251 executed transactions. Pausing or minting therefore needs at least two signers. Two things could not be checked: how many signers exist in total, and whether any Safe modules are enabled. A module could execute transactions without signatures.

  Evidence

  • on-chainowner-contract (SafeL2) 0x704Ec5C12Ca20a293C2C0B72B22619A4231f3c0d getThreshold = 2
  • on-chainSafeL2 nonce = 251

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• PositiveCode has no taxes, blacklist, limits or upgrade pathfeesAI

  DEGEN is built from standard OpenZeppelin parts: ERC20, Burnable, Pausable, Permit, Votes and Ownable. The transfer logic (_update) only calls the parent implementations, so there are no transfer fees, no blacklist or whitelist, and no limits on transaction size or wallet size. The contract is verified and is not a proxy, so its code cannot be swapped. Pause and capped mint are the only owner powers. Note that no buy/sell simulation ran in this scan, so this conclusion rests on the code alone.

  Evidence

  • codeDegenToken.sol:L139-L145
    Show source

    function _update(
            address from,
            address to,
            uint256 value
        ) internal override(ERC20, ERC20Pausable, ERC20Votes) {
            super._update(from, to, value);
        }

  • codeERC20.sol:L188-L216
    Show source

    function _update(address from, address to, uint256 value) internal virtual {
            if (from == address(0)) {
                // Overflow check required: The rest of the code assumes that totalSupply never overflows
                _totalSupply += value;
            } else {
                uint256 fromBalance = _balances[from];
                if (fromBalance < value) {
                    revert ERC20InsufficientBalance(from, fromBalance, value);
                }
                unchecked {
                    // Overflow not possible: value <= fromBalance <= totalSupply.
                    _balances[from] = fromBalance - value;
                }
            }

  • on-chainisProxy = false, verified = true

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• PositiveVerified X account matches this token and its launch datesocialAI

  The official-looking X account @degentokenbase is verified, links to degen.tips, and was created on 2024-01-06, the day before this contract was deployed (2024-01-07). Followers are large (~138k) and recent posts get real replies, not empty bot engagement. This is the long-running Base DEGEN community token, not a newly spun anonymous ticker.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/degentokenbase/status/2117316314792624301
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    We’re pushing $DEGEN harder than ever.
    
    More ideas. more experiments. more ways to build with the community.
    
    1B $DEGEN burned this year.
    
    $187K bought back YTD.

  • webhttps://www.degen.tips/
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    CONTRACT ADDRESS
    0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed

  • on-chaindeployedAt = 2024-01-07T15:25:35.000Z; name = DegenToken; symbol = DEGEN
    Show source

    target 0x4ed4e862860bed51a9570b96d89af5e1b0efefed on eip155:8453

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

• PositiveWebsite lists this contract and names founder and companywebsiteAI

  degen.tips lists this exact contract, contact Gentlemen Labs, Inc. (support@gentlemenlabs.xyz), and says jacek started DEGEN. The verified account @jacek0x (created 2022, ~45k followers) describes itself as founder of $DEGEN. That is a public identity claim, not an anonymous “doxxed” label with no name. Exchange listings on the site are marketing claims and were not independently confirmed here.

  Evidence

  • webhttps://www.degen.tips/
    Show source

    So, who's actually behind degen?
    jacek started degen by rallying the early farcaster crowd.

  • webhttps://www.degen.tips/
    Show source

    CONTACT
    Gentlemen Labs, Inc.
    support@gentlemenlabs.xyz

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7

Notes (2)

• InfoHolder spread and LP lock could not be checked this scanholdersAI

  The transfer scan and the LP analysis both failed (eth_getLogs errors). As a result, top-holder shares, team or insider concentration, and whether the Uniswap v3 and Aerodrome liquidity is locked are all unknown. No buy/sell simulation was run in this scan either.

  Evidence

  • on-chainwarnings: transfer scan: eth_getLogs: invalid params; LP analysis uniswap-v3: eth_getLogs: invalid params

  Confirmed by: claude-opus-5.5

• InfoBurn and buyback figures are unconfirmed team claimsclaims-mismatchAI

  The project and community posts say about 1B DEGEN was burned this year and about $187k was bought back. Those numbers are not in the chain facts given for this review, so holders should not treat the posts as proven supply reduction. They are also not a scam allegation by themselves.

  Evidence

  • Xhttps://x.com/degentokenbase/status/2117316314792624301
    Show source

    1B $DEGEN burned this year.
    
    $187K bought back YTD.

  • Xhttps://x.com/CraigGreenberg5/status/2117937220761883036
    Show source

    5% of the base:0x4ed4e862860bed51a9570b96d89af5e1b0efefed  supply (~1.8B tokens) is locked in an irreversible burn contract.  So far +1B tokens burned

  Confirmed by: grok-4.7